Problems of Communism

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SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1982

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Michel Oksenberg
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Soviet Succession
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USSR Investment Policy
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

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Problems of Communism

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

China's Political Evolution: 1972–82
Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush

In the decade since 1972, the Chinese political system has undergone a profound transformation—from the revolutionary totalitarianism that characterized the Maoist system to the reformist authoritarianism of the current leadership in Beijing. It is far from certain how stable the new system will prove to be, and one may speculate that those features of the current system that diverge most markedly from centuries-old Chinese traditions might prove to be the least durable.

Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities
Jerry F. Hough

Leonid Brezhnev's successors, whoever he or they may be, face many critical, unresolved domestic and foreign policy issues. It is not a foregone conclusion that a new leadership will choose the same conservative, consensual response that characterized the Brezhnev leadership. A look at the careers, personal ties, and policy positions of leading candidates to succeed the General Secretary permits us to speculate on the possible consequences of the succession.

Soviet Succession: Signs of Struggle
Sidney I. Ploss

Kremlinological techniques reveal signs of possible efforts to ease Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev out of power, suggesting that the Brezhnev succession may already be under way. Prospects for four leading candidates—Konstantin Chernenko, Yuriy Andropov, Andrey Kirilenko, and Dmitriy Ustinov—and their putative approach to policy issues are examined.

Soviet Investment Policy: Unresolved Dilemmas
Boris Rumer

Current Soviet investment policy is incapable of generating the economic growth envisaged for the USSR economy in 1981–85. Efforts to channel increasingly scarce investment resources into the renovation of existing industrial facilities and the completion of certain priority projects out of the welter of current incompleted construction jobs will run afoul of a number of problems, including inadequate production of metals and machinery. A temporary slowdown in industrial output and reliance on Western credits will be essential if the Soviet Union is to sort out its current investment dilemmas.

* * *

Essay-Reviews (over)

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Essay-Reviews

Windows on a Changing China
Lowell Dittmer

The Chinese political system has undergone significant transformation since the death of Mao Zedong. As the Chinese search for a new model, so Western observers must rethink their understanding of the Chinese experience and present. Several recent books offer promising methodologies and areas of research, drawing our attention to the role of bureaucracy and attitudes toward it in China, to the phenomenon of factionalism in the Chinese political culture, and to the unresolved if decreasingly examined issue of class differentiation in the People's Republic.

The USSR in the Third World
William I. Zartman

Why does the Soviet Union play a disruptive, rather than conciliatory, role in the Third World? The answer lies in the structure of the Third World, which limits the Soviet Union's opportunities to those provided by local conflict and permits it only to escalate, rather than mediate, conflict.

The Graying of the Soviet Union
Stephen Sternheimer

The Soviet Union is experiencing a dramatic aging of its population similar to that observed in a number of Western societies. This development has created a Pandora's box of social, economic, and political problems for the Soviet welfare state that will sorely try the skills of Brezhnev's successors.

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China's Political Evolution: 1972–82

by Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush

In the past decade, but especially since Mao Zedong's death in 1976, the Chinese political system has experienced a spectacular sequence of events: the arrest of Mao's wife Jiang Qing and her associates in the "gang of four," one month after his death; the return to political power of Deng Xiaoping in mid-1977, a reversal of fate after his removal but 15 months earlier; the proclamation by Premier and party Chairman Hua Guofeng in early 1978 of the ambitious goal of transforming China into a modern state by the year 2000; the quiet abandonment of these unrealistic targets 10 months later, although the leaders still remained committed to rapid economic growth and openness to the outside world; the normalization of relations with the United States in late 1978; the incursion into Vietnam in late February 1979; the political experimentation epitomized by the "democracy wall" movement in the spring of 1979; the sharpening tension between Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping; the erosion of Hua's position as well as the purge of Politburo members who had advanced during the Cultural Revolution; the proclamation of sharp economic retrenchment and the postponement of several multimillion-dollar import purchases in December 1980; the major reassessment of Mao Zedong in June 1981, which enumerated his many policy errors while reaffirming the essential wisdom of his beliefs; the replacement of Hua as party chairman by Hu Yaobang and as premier by Zhao Ziyang in 1980–81, thereby marking Hu and Zhao as Deng's chosen successors; a major shake-up of personnel in the party and state structure in early 1982; and finally, the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, in September 1982, which consolidated the gains of the previous three years in establishing a more durable political order.

Quieter developments have also occurred. Seven deserve to be specially emphasized:

- The strategy of economic development was changed. The leaders have cut the rate of capital accumulation sharply and allowed the nation's wage bill to increase. Furthermore, they have sought to alter the balance among heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture, moving away from the Stalinist emphasis upon heavy industry toward light industry. Within agriculture, cropping patterns have been changed to boost production of crops used in light industry.
- The methods of organizing agricultural production have undergone sweeping change. The incomes of peasant households in many regions are now based on the crops raised on specific plots of land assigned to the households. The institutions which directed peasant activity (commune, production brigade, and production team) have had their powers significantly curtailed. Changes of equal magnitude are being attempted in industrial management, although the obstacles in this area may be greater.
- The country has been opened to foreign commerce and foreign influence. Special economic zones now exist as a means of encouraging investment in China, and foreign firms enjoy special privileges. Foreign books in translation, classical and popular music, films, and

Mr. Oksenberg is a Professor of Political Science and a Research Associate of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor). He is author of China: The Convulsive Society, *1971, and co-author of* China and America, Past and Future, *1977. Mr. Bush is Deputy Director of the Asia Society's China Council (Washington, DC). He is author of* The Politics of Cotton Textiles in Kuomintang China, 1927–37, *1982, and has collaborated on a number of the Council's publications.*

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clothing styles—all controlled and in limited scope, to be sure—are now available.

- Class labels and other terms of opprobrium (e.g., "landlord," "reactionary," "rightist") are being removed from several million Chinese. The government has promised to restore these people to their previous positions and, in some cases, has offered restitution for the damages they suffered.
- A major corpus of laws and regulations has been enacted which offers some promise of making life for Chinese more just and predictable. This includes criminal, civil, marriage, and tax laws.
- The government has vigorously encouraged family planning. Major programs have been enacted to achieve the goal of the one-child family.
- A growing energy problem has arisen due to a levelling-off in coal and petroleum production. Energy shortages now constitute a major brake on rapid industrial expansion.

Without denigrating the importance of these developments, this essay eschews a focus on either the factional power struggles or the specific economic and legal reforms. Instead, we wish to step back and to ask questions about the decade 1972–82, from the eve of Mao's decline to the arrangement of an initial succession after Deng. How does the Chinese political system today differ from that of a decade ago? What remains the same? More important, why the changes? Has the system reached an equilibrium point? Are aspects of the Maoist system that have been abandoned likely to be restored? Is the political evolution of the past 10 years likely to continue?

Our core argument can be summarized succinctly. During the decade under scrutiny, China passed a watershed. In 1972, totalitarian revolutionaries ruled the nation; by 1982, China's rulers had become authoritarian reformers. The totalitarian revolutionaries had acted upon their belief that rapid, violent, and comprehensive transformation of elites and institutions was the most effective mode of change. The leaders had unleashed upon society and themselves a reign of ter-

An artist in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, naps near a portrait of the late Mao Zedong.

—Liu Heung Sh'iung/Contact.

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ror. They had constructed a totalitarian regime which sought to deny privacy or cultivation of individuality in society. They expected all citizens, especially those in urban areas, to express their belief in the integrating ideology of the regime, to participate in political life, and to surrender their individuality to a collective identity.

By contrast, in 1982, the top Chinese leadership appears to be committed to gradual and peaceful change within a framework of continuity of elites and institutions. The leaders have shifted their emphasis in implementing policy from mobilization of the populace to action through the bureaucracy. They have also sought to end the terror. While seeking orthodoxy to which all intellectuals and creative artists are expected to adhere, the authoritarians do permit individual silence and a limited withdrawal or distancing from politics. Also, orthodoxy is less well defined and broader in scope.

Being authoritarian, to be sure, China's leaders today maintain extensive surveillance over the population and tolerate no organized opposition or challenges to their rule. They value hierarchy and discipline and are not hesitant to employ force in ordering their realm. Yet, individuals may cultivate personal pursuits and are encouraged to plan their careers. The current leaders no longer measure their own performance by their progress in nurturing a new "socialist man" or in creating a classless society. Instead, they wish their performance to be judged by their ability to improve the material well-being of the populace.

This evolution can be attributed to several interrelated factors. The passing of Mao and the advent of a leadership group who had suffered during the Cultural Revolution is a key factor. More than personnel changes at the top are involved, however. The developments in China bear a great resemblance to trends in other societies after sustained periods of terror and politically induced social change. The case of the post-Stalin Soviet Union and the Khrushchev era comes immediately to mind. Yet, societies can manifest different types of Thermidor, and China's post-Mao moderation reveals the reassertion of certain deeply rooted traditions which the Maoist system had challenged. China's evolution since Mao's death represents the continued adaptation of Communist revolution to the Chinese cultural context.

We note that the process of domesticization has not yet ended. In some respects, the present reforms are not fully congruent with some aspects of the cultural heritage. Furthermore, certain bureaucracies of the Maoist era remain strong and resistant to change, while power is still vested as much in people as in institutions. Finally, China is undergoing massive economic changes, and the exposure to the outside world will also have its impact. For all these reasons, we conclude that the Chinese political system has yet to reach an equilibrium, and further evolution can be anticipated.

The Maoist System Before Its Decay

To understand and trace the changes that have occurred since Mao's death requires a review of the Maoist system. That system, of course, underwent continual change. Therefore, we portray the Maoist order in 1970–72, the time of Mao's last effective political acts—the elimination of Lin Biao and the opening to the United States. Thereafter, the Chairman was unable to mobilize his resources and impose his will upon the nation in a sustained manner.

In the aftermath of the traumatic Lin Biao affair, the entire population was being told that Mao's designated heir had plotted to assassinate the Chairman. This sordid event and the near anarchy of the Cultural Revolution struggle had seriously eroded the confidence of the populace in the system and its rulers.[1] To the extent that the system retained its ability to elicit compliance from the populace, it was vulnerable to the capricious intervention of one man, Mao Zedong, acting on his idiosyncratic impulses. Indeed, Mao had shaped the system so that it would be responsive to him. To be sure, Mao's power was not totally unconstrained; he had to cajole, threaten, and bargain to attain his ends. On occasion, he was on the defensive and had to acquiesce to the initiatives of others. Still, his was the dominant voice, and opposition to him carried the risk of political oblivion or worse. If the concept of tyrant has any validity, it applied to Mao.[2]

Power was vested more in people than in institutions.[3] Competing factional groupings, some in power, others on the sidelines, and yet others under arrest, sought access to Mao and, if they obtained it, sought to control and manipulate him. Factions struggled to achieve dominance over the four major bureaucratic clusters into which power is organized in China: the personnel system; the apparatus governing allocation of material goods, energy, and capital; the propaganda network; and the coercive apparatus of the military and the public security forces. In Beijing, different factional groupings had bases of power in different organizational hierarchies. Jiang Qing and her associates relied on the

[1] *The Wounded: New Stories of the Cultural Revolution, 1977–78,* Hong Kong, Joint Publishing Co., 1979. See in particular the title story by Lu Xinhua.

[2] Michel Oksenberg, "The Political Leaders," in Dick Wilson, Ed., *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History,* New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 70–116.

[3] See Lowell Dittmer, "Bases of Power in Chinese Politics," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), October 1978, pp. 26–60; and Lucian W. Pye, *Mao Tse-tung: The Man in the Leader,* New York, NY, Basic Books, Inc., 1976, esp. Part 3.

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

A massive turnout of People's Liberation Army troops celebrates the formation of the Henan Province Revolutionary Committee in Zhengzhou at the height of the Cultural Revolution.

—China Pictorial (Beijing), No. 4, 1968, p. 13.

propaganda apparatus and a portion of the military (e.g., the 37th Army). The emerging cluster of Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing, and Ji Dengkui seems to have had particular strength in the public security forces. Zhou Enlai and the sidelined Deng Xiaoping had supporters in the economic apparatus, among the scientific establishment, and in the organizational apparatus for the administration of personnel. Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, and many others then under arrest had latent but powerful ties within the economic and organizational apparatuses.

Chains or networks of personnel linked leaders in Beijing to provincial, county, and even the primary units (*dan-wei*) to which each individual in China belongs. Factions in Beijing did not have equally strong links to all parts of the country. Some factions had more intimate connections with certain cities, provinces, and lower levels, while other factions had their strength in different regions. Clearly, Jiang Qing had nourished a strong cluster of support within the Shanghai municipal apparatus, and apparently was seeking to root her supporters in Baoding, Zhengzhou, Hangzhou, and Shenyang as well. Hua Guofeng and his associates apparently had strong links with the Hunan, Shanxi, and Hebei provincial party apparatuses. Deng Xiaoping continued to have latent strength in the southwest.

The cement holding these networks together was *guan-xi*, a Chinese concept meaning a relationship or interconnection.[4] A sense of loyalty, mutual obligation, and shared vulnerability—given the atmosphere of the times—bound clusters of people together. A high-level official in Beijing was, in effect, the patron or family head of many clients, who in turn were patrons of lower-level clients. This general picture, of course, is overly simplistic. Loyalties at any one moment could be felt toward more than one patron or toward competing clients. An official could move from one network to another. Perhaps it is more accurate, therefore, to speak of shifting constellations of officials in the capital, the provinces, and the lower levels, linked informally through *guan-xi* and formally through bureaucratic ties.

Domestic policy choices were not based upon a careful analysis of the alternatives. Factions in Beijing offered documentation on behalf of their preferences from "investigation research" they themselves had sponsored in model units preselected to implement successfully the faction's preferred policy alternative.[5] In addition, as we will discuss below, reliable statistics on most social and many economic matters were simply not available.

Bureaucracies in the capital and the provinces had been engulfed in relentless campaigns. Few agencies remained untouched not only by the initial terror imposed by marauding Red Guards in 1966–1969, but also by such subsequent campaigns as "Struggle, Criticism, and Transformation" and "One Hit, Three Anti's." A significant portion of cadres in most agencies were undergoing ideological reschooling in May 7th cadre schools. Another portion, while still listed on the table of organization, were living in humiliating circumstances, forced to reside in "cow sheds" and assigned to menial tasks. The latter fate struck the former leaders of units who had been identified as

[4] Lucian W. Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics*, Cambridge, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981; J. Bruce Jacobs, "A Preliminary Model of Particularistic Ties in Chinese Political Alliances: *Kan-ch'ing* and *Kuan-hsi* in a Rural Taiwanese Township," *China Quarterly* (London), June 1979, pp. 237–73; and Fox Butterfield, *China: Alive in the Bitter Sea*, New York, NY, Times Books, 1982, esp. Part I.

[5] Edward Friedman, "The Politics of Local Models, Social Transformation and State Power Struggles in the People's Republic of China: Tachai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing," *China Quarterly*, December 1978, pp. 873–90.

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"capitalist roaders" during the Cultural Revolution. Thus, by 1972, most national agencies responsible for identifying issues demanding decision by the leaders, for shaping the choices for the leaders, and for implementing decisions found themselves in varying degrees of chaos and paralysis. The typical unit in the party or government consisted of people who had survived the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath together. Memories of injustices and lost battles were stored away, to be acted upon when the opportunity presented itself. Personal animosities had accumulated, and the malcontents frequently remained in their units since they were unable to transfer elsewhere. Tensions within units were high, and the level of trust among their officials tended to be low. The ability to explore ideas and share information without fear was limited to one's most intimate and reliable friends. Even so, if one's ideas were suspect, one could endanger one's friends. In short, *rather than breeding cohesiveness, the external* pressures had pulverized bureaucratic units into warring factions and isolated, cautious individuals. Factions within each unit were linked to different external networks of personal ties.

Of course, one can exaggerate the extent to which politics in Beijing by 1972 had become an issueless struggle for power and survival among the top leaders. Factions did have substantive differences.[6] For example, in 1972, Jiang Qing and her associates no doubt believed in the value of the Cultural Revolution and sought to defend the social and political experiments it had spawned, while Zhou Enlai and his supporters saw virtue in curtailing these experiments. Yet, these differences were so closely intertwined with power considerations that the outside observer cannot disentangle the interplay among ideological commitments, policy preferences, and factional alignments.

It is also inaccurate to assert that the top leaders functioned without any procedural order toward the end of Mao's rule. To a residual extent, authority and preroga-

[6] Merle Goldman, *China's Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1981, Chaps. 6 and 7.



A lecture in Marxism-Leninism at a May 7th cadre school, founded in 1968 on the outskirts of Beijing.

—*China Pictorial* (Beijing), No. 2, 1974, p. 30.

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tives still did flow from the particular position that an individual occupied. For example, rules governed the process by which directives (*zhong-fa*) of the Central Committee were drafted, i.e., certain positions brought access to the drafting process. While top officials did not necessarily abide by the rules, the rules constrained their behavior.[7]

The system of 1972 was not totally irrational, nor was it meant just to suit the power needs of Mao or his factional backers. China's current leaders have wished to convey an image of irrationality partly because this is the perception they have of what they seized and inherited, and partly because—like good politicans anywhere—by darkening the past they enhance their own achievements.

As its principal architect, Mao had designed a system that supported not only his power needs but also his larger goals for China in the late 1960's, and his strategy for attaining those goals. Put in its best light, the policy process which Mao shaped through 1972, when for the last time it escaped his control, had this rationale.[8] It was meant to downplay economic interdependence among regions, the national use of material rewards, and the regular, formal promotion system as the best means of preserving China's unity. Instead, Mao relied on coercion and the propagation of a single ideology as his principal instruments for integrating his heterogeneous nation. To be sure, the central economic agencies retained a role in redistributing resources from the more developed to the less developed regions of the country, a process which may have reduced interprovince tensions and promoted unity. Nonetheless, in terms of allocating power among the organizational hierarchies in China, Mao assigned primacy in integrating the society to the propaganda apparatus, the public security forces, and the military. With Mao's proxy, those who presided over these hierarchies wielded great power.

The emphasis on the inculcation of values was related to the diagnosis of the major impediments to China's modernization made by Mao in his later years. Mao always had been sensitive to certain deeply ingrained cultural attributes which seemed to him inimical to China's modernization. These were fatalism, passivity, familialism, a preference for harmony and the avoidance of conflict, and a disdain for physical labor. But after achieving power in 1949, Mao chose to give more emphasis to the establishment of an economic infrastructure as the prerequisite for China's growth.[9] Hence, he embraced the Stalinist development model, with its emphasis on steel, machine-building industries, and energy production. Then, in the late 1950's and early 1960's, Mao increasingly concentrated on institutional issues: the role of the party, the creation of rural communes, and the refinement of campaigns as a technique for implementation of policy.[10] But from the early 1960's until the end of his life, Mao considered the attitudes of Chinese bureaucrats and the populace generally to be the major impediment to China's modernization. Hence he launched a *cultural* revolution.[11] Mao had concluded that a new culture would emerge only through the deliberate fostering of class struggle, pitting portions of the populace against his own bureaucracy. By the mid-1960's, Mao had also decided that many of his associates and their subordinates were beyond salvation and were unworthy of succeeding him. Not only a cultural revolution but a massive purge of the unredeemable was necessary in his view to keep China on his path to modernity.

Similarly, Mao came to view the organizational web of party, government, and armed forces as an inherently conservative repository of the values he was seeking to eradicate. Distrustful of bureaucracy, he sought ways of administration which minimized its role. Hence, his attraction to campaigns (*yun-dong*) as an alternative mechanism of policy implementation. With the encouragement of his more radical supporters, especially Zhang Chunqiao, Mao deliberately promoted a primitive economy. His demand for maximum local self-sufficiency, the restrictions on the number of commodities that could be traded on the regulated free market, and his simultaneous curtailment of the capacity of planning agencies to allocate goods according to plan—all sought to minimize commerce and the division of labor in society. To bring about such an unstratified social and economic structure, Mao realized, would require enormous change. Thus, instead of the incremental, inherently cautious, fragmented decision-making which a

[7] Kenneth Lieberthal et al., *Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, 1978.

[8] See Stuart Schram, "Introduction: The Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective," in Schram, Ed., *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 1-108; and John Bryan Starr, *Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

[9] See, for example, Mao's opening speech to the March 1955 national conference of the CCP. "It is no easy job to build a socialist society in a large country like ours with its complicated conditions and its formerly very backward economy. We may be able to build a strong, highly industrialized socialist society over three five-year plans, but to build a strong, highly industrialized socialist country will require several decades of hard work. . . ." Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 5, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1977, p. 155.

[10] Mao's speech to the January 1958 Nanning Conference, out of which emerged the Sixty Work Methods, demonstrates this new emphasis. See *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought*, Vol. 1, Joint Publications Research Service, Washington, DC, No. 612691, Feb. 20, 1974, pp. 77-84.

[11] See, for example, "Talks with Mao Yuan-hsin (1964-6)," in Stuart Schram, Ed., *Chairman Mao Talks to the People, Talks and Letters: 1956-1971*, New York, NY, Pantheon, 1974, pp. 242-52.

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bureaucratic policy process tends to yield, Mao sought sweeping, bold, utopian policies that a mobilization system is more likely to engender.

Mao sought a system in perpetual change. According to his dialectic and idealist vision of history, thesis could be turned into antithesis, which in turn would become synthesis.[12] What appeared irreconcilable today could be reconciled tomorrow. To name Mao's three favorite polarities—discipline and freedom, centralism and democracy, a general will and the individual spirit—they were viewed by him as equally desirable but contradictory qualities at this stage in history. However, Mao thought that wise leaders could drive their society forward, raising the material standard of living and altering the consciousness of the populace. Ultimately, the polarities could be reconciled in a classless, abundant society, provided that the greatest threat to the attainment of this vision—the calcification of the social structure—was overcome.

This brings us to the core of Mao and the policy process he structured. As noted earlier, he was to the end of his life a revolutionary and a totalitarian ruler. He believed that the only way to transform China was rapidly, violently, comprehensively; its elites and institutions would have to be subjected to continual change. China's problems were so vast that efforts to attain peaceful, gradual change could not be sustained and would eventually be lost in the morass of bureaucracy. In his view, to transform China required vision and extraordinary confidence that a politically involved Chinese populace—given no respite to cultivate individual pursuits—could overcome its plight of poverty and weakness. To unleash portions of the populace in all their fury required leaders capable of interacting directly with the forces in society without mediation by intervening bureaucracies. Mao saw little intrinsic value in institutions like the party, government, or army. They were to serve as instruments whose credibility and authority could be expended in his larger effort to transform China into a strong, prosperous, socialist nation.

Evolution of the System, 1972–82

Since early 1972, the Chinese system has evolved through several stages: (1) a concerted effort to restore order and to rebuild institutions based on an amalgam of pre-1966 and Cultural Revolution values, a period lasting until late 1973; (2) an unbridled struggle for political survival and succession to Mao, from late 1973 to October 1976, when the "gang of four" were arrested; (3) a period of uncertainty lasting until mid-1978, with some of the leaders seeking to establish a neo-Maoist system; (4) introduction of broad institutional reforms and a moderation and rationalization of economic goals, a stage that began with the emergence of Deng Xiaoping as the dominant political leader in mid-1978; (5) from late 1980 to mid-1982, the appearance of resistance to reforms and the resultant efforts by Deng and his associates to weaken and remove the points of resistance.[13]

September 1971–August 1973. Mao sought to preserve his rule and surmount the Lin Biao affair by incorporating the two principal factional groupings—led by Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing respectively—that had supported him in the attack on Lin. Mao turned to Zhou to create order out of the economic chaos, but he gave

[12] Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press, 1973, pp. 293–301; and Starr, op. cit., Chap. 1.

[13] For secondary accounts of this period, see Goldman, op. cit., Chaps. 6 and 7; and Jürgen Domes, *China After the Cultural Revolution: Politics Between Two Congresses*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press, 1977.

A giant poster in a Beijing park in May 1974 proclaims the current propaganda campaign: "Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Are the Principal Force in Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius."

—Pictorial Parade.

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preeminence to the "radicals" in the cultural domain to preserve his ideological gains of the previous five years. As the military's role in civilian institutions declined, the rebuilding of the state and party apparatuses began, and a number of supposedly chastened "capitalist roaders" returned to help staff them (the most prominent returnee was Deng Xiaoping, who first reappeared in public in April 1973). They began to work with officials who had come to the fore during the Cultural Revolution.

This modus vivendi in personnel was accompanied by an attempt in a range of policy areas to introduce more pragmatic methods while retaining Cultural Revolution values.[14] In industry, for example, limited material incentives were introduced, although mobilization continued to be used to stimulate output. In the educational sphere, examinations were reintroduced to judge the academic competence of students, even though ideological considerations remained important in the admissions process. In design, the policy process remained Mao-centered; in fact, the physically declining Chairman was unable to achieve the coherence he sought or to control the conflict he had built into the system.

September 1973–October 1976. In the wake of the Tenth CCP Congress in August 1973, struggle between the Zhou-Deng and Jiang factions intensified, each side trying to secure advantage for the day that Mao died. (The military and public security factions maneuvered on the sidelines.) Each faction offered competing programs for China's development. Each tried to put through its policy in various sectors. And each seemed to enjoy moments of political ascendancy: the Jiang forces during the first half of 1974 (the "Criticize Confucius-Criticize Lin Biao" campaign); the Deng forces from late 1974 to late 1975 (under the slogan of the "four modernizations"); and the radicals again from late 1975 until Mao's death in September 1976 (a period in which the more pragmatic policies were again set aside).[15] The three years of unabated conflict left behind a weak and largely ineffective political system that had come to rely very heavily on coercion.

October 1976–October 1978. After the euphoria that ensued from the arrest of the "gang of four" had somewhat abated, a long list of neglected economic problems came to attention. It became clear that, without major changes in the policy process, the nation would meet with disaster. The disparate groups that had combined to oust the radicals attempted to work together (as had been the case after the Lin Biao affair). Neo-Maoists, led by Hua Guofeng, and the pragmatists who supported the newly rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping could agree on the priority of economic growth and the need for some ideological liberalization in the fields of science, education, and culture. Material incentives and the purchase of foreign technology were again deemed acceptable. A mere 18 months after Mao's death, this leadership presented an ambitious program in pursuit of the "four modernizations" (in agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology).[16]

However, the coalition was inherently unstable. The neo-Maoists were willing to accept modernization, especially when described as "a new leap forward." But they were less prepared to accept dilution of Maoist values or methods of rule. With Hua Guofeng as their principal spokesman, the neo-Maoists essentially advocated continuing the mobilization process, sustaining class struggle, propagating Mao's ideology, and implementing policy through compaigns. The pragmatist camp believed that Maoist values and Mao's style of rule were at the root of China's problems. They also judged that nothing less than an open attack on Mao was necessary to regain popular support. Also, some of Deng's followers came to question whether the leadership had the resources, institutional capacity, and popular support to pursue a policy of forced-draft industrialization. After some fencing over these issues during the spring and summer of 1978, the leadership dispute came to a head in December at the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee.[17] In the streets of Beijing, an increasingly bold public began writing posters which attacked the Cultural Revolution and Mao.

November 1978–November 1980. Both in China and abroad, the Third Plenum is now regarded as the crucial watershed of the post-Mao era. It was at that session (and the central work conference preceding it) that Deng Xiaoping unquestionably gained the upper hand in China's leadership. His colleagues living (Chen Yun and Peng Zhen, for example) and dead (Peng Dehuai, Tao Zhu) were rehabilitated. The case of Liu Shaoqi was reopened, and he was rehabilitated in February 1980. The neo-Maoists came under attack, historical

[14] Zhou Enlai, "Report to the Tenth Party Congress," *Peking Review*, Sept. 7, 1973.

[15] For a sense of the growing conflict, contrast Zhou Enlai's "Report on the Work of the Government" to the Fourth National People's Congress (*Peking Review*, Jan. 24, 1975) and Zhang Chunqiao's "On Exercising All-round Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie" (ibid. Apr. 4, 1975).

[16] See Hua Guofeng's speech to the first session of the Fifth National People's Congress, "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern, Powerful Socialist Country," *Peking Review*, Mar. 10, 1978.

[17] The respective speeches of Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping to the National Science Conference in March 1978 and to the All-Army Political Work Conference in June 1978 demonstrate the growing conflict within the leadership. See ibid., Mar. 24, Mar. 31, June 16, and June 23, 1978.

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verdicts on such issues as the Tiananmen Incident were reversed, and an evaluation of Mao was promised.[18]

Equally important were the new directions charted for the country's institutional life. In law, politics, and economics, liberalization would, it was predicted, have a positive, energizing effect and engender popular support for the regime. In this spirit, the Third Plenum promised that "socialist modernization" was China's long-term priority, and that mass political campaigns and all that came with them were no longer appropriate. In order to promote "socialist legality" and limit police abuses, the criminal justice system was reformed, and economic laws were drafted. To promote "socialist democracy," direct popular vote was mandated for the election of delegates to county-level people's congresses, and plans to end the rubber-stamp nature of the National People's Congress were circulated. Life tenure in office, perceived to be the root of many of the problems of the late-Mao era, came under attack. Even the closing of Democracy Wall and the later ban on wall posters constrained but did not reverse this democratizing trend.

In addition, a major shift in economic policy became apparent especially after Chen Yun, an economic specialist and a top party official in the 1940's, joined the Politburo Standing Committee in December 1978. This "readjustment" entailed the abandonment of the investment policy stressing high rates of accumulation and development of heavy industry. It also entailed a "restructuring" in the Soviet-style system of central control, in the direction of allowing greater play of market mechanisms.[19]

December 1980–Spring 1982. By late 1982, the institutional reforms and related policies had achieved success in some areas (for example, boosting agricultural production and peasant income),[20] but fostered difficulties on other fronts (for example, generating inflation and a large government deficit). These economic difficulties prompted the declaration of a policy of economic retrenchment in 1980. Perhaps equally unsettling for the leadership, however, were the political and ideological repercussions of reforms. In 1979, elements of the public began to question the necessity for one-party rule and the socialist system itself, while in 1980, the leadership began to perceive a disruptive



There is intense public interest in the diversity of views displayed on Beijing's Democracy Wall in 1979.

—Bernard Chalon/Camera Press.

Western impact upon Chinese thought and behavior.[21]

Indeed, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun themselves concluded that reform of institutions without a workable national consensus on ideology would not succeed.[22] The issue was widely discussed during 1981, in the context of an evaluation of the filmscript "Unrequited Love," written by Bai Hua, who worked in the military's large cultural establishment. The film's sympathetic portrayal of a Chinese intellectual victimized during the Maoist era epitomized for the more orthodox party officials the damaging effects of cultural freedom. The leadership tried to disarm the critics with a rebuke of Bai Hua and a general attack on "bourgeois liberalism."[23] In this context, the official verdict on Mao, adopted at the Sixth Plenum in June 1981, was less condemnatory than it might otherwise have been.[24] In the absence of a clear-cut ideological alternative to Mao's thought, the Deng regime had to soft-pedal its criticism of Mao the man in order to be able to espouse elements of his thought.

Writers and artists were not the only group affected by the new stress on values and ideology. Focusing on poor preparation of the party cadres, Chen Yun termed the problem of party work-style a "life-and-death matter,"

[18] "Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party," ibid., Dec. 29, 1978.

[19] The post-Third Plenum political and economic reforms are detailed in Hua Guofeng's "Report on the Work of the Government," *Beijing Review*, July 6, 1979.

[20] Frederic M. Surls and Francis C. Tuan, "China's Agriculture in the 1980's," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China Under the Four Modernizations: Part 1*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 419–88.

[21] James D. Seymour, Ed., *China: The Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement, 1978–1979*, Pine Plains, NY, E. M. Coleman Ent., 1980; and Butterfield, op. cit.

[22] "Hu Yaobang's Speech," *Beijing Review*, July 13, 1981.

[23] For the official verdict on the Bai Hua affair, see Tang Yin and Tang Dacheng, "On the Erroneous Tendency of 'Unrequited Love'," *Wenyi Bao*, No. 19, Oct. 1, 1981, reprinted in *Renmin Ribao*, Oct. 7, 1981, and trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Oct. 14, 1981, pp. K/1–9.

[24] "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," *Beijing Review*, July 6, 1981, pp. 10–39.

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and a drive against economic crimes by officials began in early 1982. Young people were told more and more frequently that a "spiritual civilization" must accompany material progress. Fearing "the corrosive influence of capitalist ideas," the regime tightened restrictions on contacts between Chinese and foreigners.

In short, the parameters of institutional reform were more clearly etched. The Chinese system would remain highly centralized and authoritarian. The Communist party would retain its monopoly of power and be revitalized in order to perform well its distinctive role. The instruments of totalitarian rule—the public security forces and the propaganda apparatus—would be curbed but not dismantled. The economy would remain largely under state plan; the role of the market would be secondary. Within these constraints, the Maoist system would be significantly altered.

The System in 1982

The tortuous path of development from 1972 to 1982 reveals that no single vision of rule—and certainly not Mao's—guided China during the entire decade. Differences existed among the leaders on many issues. Moreover, the twists and turns in policy suggest that the same leaders, even Deng Xiaoping, changed policy positions as they confronted new problems, learned new lessons, and faced shifting constellations of opponents. Nonetheless, since 1972, views akin to Deng's gradually have come to the fore, and Chen Yun's influence has been palpable since he returned to office in 1978. To be sure, Deng's views suffered setbacks in late 1973, in 1976, perhaps temporarily in the spring of 1979, then in late 1980, and late 1981. Also, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and their particular supporters may have important differences among themselves. In spite of all this, one can say that since 1978 an effective consensus has existed among the top leaders concerning broad political and economic objectives and the major methods to achieve them.[25]

The dedication of the leadership to the attainment of a strong and prosperous China is as firm as that of Mao. However, their appraisal of the disastrous consequences of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, as well as their sensitivity to the excesses of the anti-rightist and rectification campaigns of 1957—which Deng himself had helped direct—caused them to depart sharply from Mao's view of the way to achieve the goal.

Instead of seeking to unite China primarily through coercion and propaganda, they encouraged unity through increased economic interdependence among regions, through reliance on effective, planned allocation of material goods and capital, and through a regularized promotion and personnel management system. The immediate bureaucratic beneficiaries of this emphasis were the leading economic agencies—the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the People's Bank of China—and the central agency responsible for managing a regular personnel system, the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The losers were the Propaganda Department of the CCP, the Ministry of Public Security, and the military. Billboards that once displayed Mao's sayings now advertise various merchandise. Tens of thousands were released from the labor camps of the public security apparatus, while millions more lost their "labels" and ceased being under continual supervision by the public security forces. The military lost many of its privileges and suffered a reduced budget.[26] Abandoning Mao's totalitarian demand for the positive involvement of everyone in politics, Deng has been willing to permit individuals to withdraw from politics and to pursue their private interests, be it careers or avocations, and to create works of art, provided these do not exhibit opposition to the rule of the party.

Deng and Chen saw the need for regularity and predictability. Their pledge has been: no more campaigns, no more Maoist dialectical swings between periods of mobilization and stability. The goal has been steady rule through a professional bureaucracy, untainted by corruption and personal ties. The object has been to eliminate the immobilism, the factionalism, and the reliance on personal ties (*guan-xi*) in the bureaucracy which had thrived during the Cultural Revolution. The establishment of the Academy of Social Sciences and the reestablishment of professional associations are intended to generate a more empirical policy process and to encourage greater communication among professionals working in different units or systems (*xi-tong*).

[25] For Deng Xiaoping's views, see "Text of Deng Xiaoping's Report on the Current Situation and Tasks" in *Cheng Ming*, March 1980, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 11, 1980, Supplement, pp. 1–27; "Deng Xiaoping's Latest Speech," *Ching Pao*, October 1980, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 21, 1980, pp. U/1–5; "Comrade Deng Xiaoping Talks on Questions of Correcting Party Work Style," in *Hongqi* (Beijing), Nov. 1, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 3, 1981, pp. K/1–9; and Pi Yun, "Speeches by Four Top Leaders That Must be Studied by Chinese Communists Cadres," *Chen Ming*, February 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 2, 1982, pp. U/12–14.

On Chen Yun, see Pi Yun, loc. cit., pp. U/6–10; and Nicholas R. Lardy and Kenneth Lieberthal, *Chen Yun's Strategy for China's Development: A Non-Maoist Alternative*, White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, forthcoming, 1983.

For a general analysis of political developments in China since Mao's death, see A. Doak Barnett, *China's Economy in Global Perspective*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1981, Chap. 1.

[26] June Teufel Dreyer, "China's Military Power in the 1980's," press briefing packet published by the China Council of the Asia Society, Washington, DC, July 1982.

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A caucus at the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in June 1981, from left to right: Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Li Xiannian, and Zhao Ziyang. The Plenum adopted a major resolution evaluating the historical role of the late Mao Zedong in the Chinese revolution.

—*China Pictorial* (Beijing), No. 9, 1981, p. 2.

To guard against bureaucratism in the pejorative sense, the leaders have reestablished the disciplinary control commissions within the party that existed in the 1950's and again during the post-Great Leap Forward recovery. They have sought more vigorous monitoring of the bureaucracy through elected congresses. For a brief span in 1978–79, they encouraged open petitioning over accumulated grievances, in mid-1979 permitting petitioners to assemble at the entrance to Zhongnanhai (the state and party headquarters) and in late 1978 and the spring of 1979 sponsoring the Democracy Wall. They assigned close aides to high positions on newspapers and gave them a mandate to undertake investigative journalism. They saw expansion of the marketplace as a further check on bureaucratic slothfulness. There was even discussion in those heady days of 1979 about establishing a bicameral legislative system, with invigorated minor democratic parties playing a serious political role in the revitalized Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. They have given considerable publicity to many cases of corruption and abuse of power and have punished the offending bureaucrats.

The major immediate objective domestically has been to improve the standard of living of the populace. Deng, Chen, and their associates clearly felt that the justification of party dictatorship and socialist rule in China rested on the party's ability to improve the welfare of the people. In this regard, performance in the past has been lackluster: the average income, diet, or availability of material goods in 1977 were hardly better than in 1957.[27] Without improvement in the quality of life, the leaders believe, the Chinese people would not embrace more advanced socialist or collectivist forms of social organization. Deng and his associates also have envisioned a more lively, diversified cultural life than the narrow range of theater, literature, and movies offered in Mao's last years. In short, the reformers have staked

[27] Nicholas R. Lardy, "Food Consumption in the People's Republic of China," in Randolph Barker and Radha P. Sinha, Eds., *The Chinese Agricultural Economy*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, forthcoming in 1982.

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

A young couple, clad in current fashions, enjoys a moment's relaxation in a Beijing park in 1981.

—BLACK STAR.

their popular standing on improving the material and cultural quality of life in China now and have promised a more abundant tomorrow. Mao had avoided basing his legitimacy on such tangible promises and, except in 1955 and 1958, tried not to arouse expectations about a more abundant life in the near future. Deng and his associates have felt it necessary to do so in order to restore morale in the country and reestablish the confidence of the populace in the efficacy of their government. Only in this way, they believe, can China's major problems of productivity and modernization be solved.

When one looks at the program of reform espoused by the present leadership and at their strategy for implementing it, one has to conclude that the leadership has already succeeded in changing the system significantly from what it had been in 1972. First, China has begun to recover from the trauma of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath.[28] Though this is very difficult to judge, it does seem that the totally benumbed quality of much of the populace has begun to disappear. To be sure, cynicism and apathy are widespread, especially in urban areas. Some of the enthusiasm and optimism for the "four modernizations" generated among the urban intellectuals in 1978–79 appear to have dissipated. Nonetheless, the current leaders seem to have inspired some popular confidence in their capacity to steer a steadier course toward gradual economic growth. The fears of a return to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution so prevalent in 1976–78 appear to be subsiding. The leaders probably have done much to restore their ability to rule effectively, though they have yet to regain the power and authority which the system enjoyed in the 1950's.

China today has collective rule, in contrast to Mao's one-man rule.[29] To be sure, Deng has enjoyed periods where the initiative was almost totally his; nonetheless, no one ruler can bend the entire system to his will, as Mao was able to do on many occasions. One cannot envision Deng, Chen, or any ruler at this stage being able to launch a Great Leap Forward or a Cultural Revolution as Mao did. The legitimacy of the regime is not rooted in the thought and writings of a single leader, as in the Maoist era. Most major decisions in China today appear to be based on the building of a consensus within the Politburo and Secretariat, and—in a formal sense—even minor decisions frequently require the approval of several members of the State Council's Standing Committee.

Power still appears rooted more in people than in institutions, and indications remain of factional alignments at the top.[30] Nonetheless, factional strife has been dampened; it is no longer a Hobbesian struggle for survival. Progress has been made in rebuilding institutions. The streamlining of the State Council in early 1982, the drafting of the 1982 state constitution, and the restructuring of the apex of the party apparatus at the 12th CCP Congress represent major steps in this process. Appointment of Zhao Ziyang as premier and Hu Yaobang as party general secretary, as well as the anticipated naming of a head of state—i.e., a chairman of the People's Republic—will also contribute to the institutional revival. A smoother succession can now be anticipated following the deaths of Deng and Chen than occurred in 1976 when Zhou and Mao died. The leaders have begun to reveal how their policy process actually works—how documents are drafted and issued, how leaders live and work, how meetings are convened.[31]

[28] Based on personal impressions of the authors during visits to the PRC between 1977 and 1982.

[29] Michel Oksenberg, "Economic Policy-Making in China: Summer 1981," *China Quarterly*, June 1982, pp. 165–94.

[30] Lucian W. Pye, op. cit.

[31] On leadership discussions concerning agricultural policy, see "Always Keep in Mind the 800 Million Peasants: A Report on Zhongnanhai," which appeared originally in *Liaowang* and is translated in *FBIS-CHI*, May 20, 1981, pp. K/7–14.

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Chinese Premier Zhoa Ziyang (left foreground) delivers a report on the restructuring of the State Council at a March 2, 1982, plenary meeting of the 22nd Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress presided over by Peng Zhen (to Zhao's right), Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee.

—Eastfoto.

Furthermore, they have begun to obey the rules governing the stages through which discussion of policy ought to proceed before a policy is formally promulgated.[32]

Yet, certain aspects of the system remain the same. Different factional groupings on the Politburo and Secretariat still have their distinctive sources of power in the capital, based in different organizational hierarchies. *Guan-xi* networks of people still link leaders in Beijing to provinces, counties, and primary units. The power of middle-level bureaucrats remains intertwined with the waxing or waning influence of their bosses and protectors. Many bureaucrats continue to believe that the single most important factor determining their fate is the political strength and interest of the State Council Standing Committee member responsible for their agency.[33]

Yet, in terms of the principal mechanisms for integrating the country, major changes have occurred since 1972. In Mao's last years, China's essential unity, severely tested to be sure, was retained primarily through coercion, the propagation of ideology, and the personal ties linking individual leaders in Beijing to leaders in different parts of the country. By 1982, the economic planning apparatus had been substantially reestablished, fiscal and monetary controls had been revitalized, and a national personnel management system, with promotions and dismissals based on merit, had begun to be restored.[34] Meanwhile, the range of responsibilities of both the military and the public security forces has contracted. In particular, the public security forces have lost their direct control over millions of people previously in labor camps or under surveillance because they were charged with being one of the "five black elements."[35] The establishment of a judicial system and procuracy and the proclamation of legal codes offer hope that some checks would eventually exist on the powers of the police. With the acknowledgment that Mao's body of writings was germane to his time, had to be reinterpreted to suit new conditions, and contained flaws in any case, no identifiable, authoritative, current doctrine prevails on which behavior has to be firmly based.[36]

[32] On the procedures followed in the drafting of the resolution evaluating Mao (see fn. 24), see translation of a July 15, 1981, Xinhua broadcast (summarizing an article in *Liaowang*) in *FBIS-CHI*, July 17, 1981, pp. K/4–10.

[33] Oksenberg, "Economic Policy-Making in China: Summer 1981," loc. cit., pp. 83–84.

[34] On increased fiscal and monetary controls, see, for example, a Mar. 22, 1982, broadcast on improving tax collection, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 24, 1982, pp. K/1–3; a May 12, 1982, *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing) editorial on accounting work, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 14, 1982, pp. K/5–6; and Chen Zingbo, "Why Does the New Draft Constitution Provide for an Auditing Body," *Renmin Ribao*, June 8, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 16, 1982, pp. K/17–20. On personnel management issues, see an Apr. 5, 1982, *Renmin Ribao* report and commentary, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 5, 1982, pp. K/1–3.

[35] Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Public Security System," manuscript.

[36] "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party . . . ," loc. cit.

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All these generalizations need qualification. The economic bureaucracies still are deficient in their ability to plan, and orders issued in Beijing are not always swiftly or totally obeyed. Nor has the personnel system become totally regularized and based exclusively on merit. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the public security forces are still very powerful, constituting a pervasive and intrusive presence across the land. When one observes the number and location of the compounds through whose gates pass vehicles with the telltale white license tags—the identifying tag of PLA registry—one realizes the extent to which Beijing and other cities remain under PLA control. The propaganda apparatus still limits the range of permissible cultural expression, and opinions cannot challenge four principles: Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, the dictatorship of the proletariat, pursuit of socialism, and leadership by the Chinese Communist Party.[37] In short, the strengthening of the web of economic organizations—the People's Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Commission, the State Statistical Commission—and the revitalization of the party's Organization Department and the various personnel agencies within the government are at present the principal indications of change in the balance among the formal systems unifying the diverse, heterogeneous nation.

Three additional developments have accompanied and undergirded the reemergence of the economic bureaucracies. First, campaigns as an alternative mode of policy implementation have been essentially abandoned. Since the death of Mao, the Chinese have not been subjected to one hallmark of the Chairman's rule: the designating of a particular task or set of tasks as central; the organization of ad hoc committees to direct the campaign, staffed by bureaucrats seconded to the committee; the supply of study documents to enlighten the populace about the campaign's objectives; and the struggle against people whom the ad hoc committees identified as obstacles to the campaign—all done in an atmosphere of frenzy.[38] The campaigns totally disrupted bureaucratic routine, as budgets and personnel were altered. Perhaps no other development so clearly accounts for the reassertion of bureaucratic rule as does the abandonment of campaigns.

A second development has been some progress in rebuilding the state statistical network.[39] Meaningful choice requires reliable data. The Cultural Revolution brought about the decimation of China's statistical system. At its nadir, the State Statistical Bureau had 13 personnel in its central offices, down from 400 on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. With the exception of a few key statistics—for example, on the production of items like petroleum and steel under tight central control—accurate data were simply unavailable on many basic facets of the economy and society. Population data were dubious, no complete and reliable census having been conducted since 1953. Such rough enumerations as were carried out were undertaken by agencies with a vested interest in the outcome. An annual national survey of household income and consumer expenditures which had been conducted since the mid-1950's was terminated in 1966. Statistics on agricultural cropping patterns and yields were suspect because peasants had become skilled in hiding production and many bureaucrats had lost the incentive to acquire accurate agricultural data. By the mid-1970's, a tacit bargain had been struck in many locales between the government and peasantry: as long as the brigades and teams met their delivery quotas, the government



Workers at a computer station in Jinnan, Shandong Province, in late June 1982 prepare for the Chinese population census, being carried out with United Nations assistance.

—Lehtikuva/Photoreporters.

[37] See fn. 23.

[38] Gordon Bennett, *Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership,* Berkeley, CA, University of California, Center for Chinese Studies, 1976.

[39] Based on interviews conducted by Michel Oksenberg with PRC officials in the summer of 1981. See also International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *China: Socialist Economic Development,* Washington, DC, IBRD, 1981, Annex A.

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would not probe too deeply into total output. Additional constraints on statistics resulted from unwillingness by agencies to share reliable information.

By 1982, in contrast, the State Statistical Bureau was approaching its pre-Cultural Revolution manpower ceiling and was utilizing new technologies such as computers in data analysis and remote sensing to check on cropping patterns. A national census was under way with United Nations assistance. The annual survey of household income and consumer expenditures was resumed in 1978, although it was not rooted in rigorous survey methods. Some of the distortions in agricultural data are being removed. In short, the statistics which the bureaucracy now supplies to the leadership warrant somewhat greater confidence, even though severe problems remain.

The third development was the amelioration of tensions within the bureaucracies. From 1972 to 1976, the "cultural revolutionaries" and the rehabilitated "capitalist roaders"—the tormenters and the tormented—worked side by side in the various agencies. Since 1978, those officials who had risen during the Cultural Revolution have been gradually weeded out, while more of the officials who had been purged have returned to office. Of course, a renewal of fragmentation among the top leaders could revive intra-agency strife around Cultural Revolution cleavages. However, personnel changes, new issues, and somewhat dimmed memories, as well as greater leadership cohesion at higher levels seem to have dampened animosities within agencies. This generalization does not apply to all agencies. Bureaucracies which were at the vortex of the Cultural Revolution—for example, the ministries of Culture and Education—manifested more evident scars than those which were either totally destroyed and had to be rebuilt (e.g., the Statistical Bureau), or which had been somewhat isolated from the turmoil (e.g., some of the machine-building ministries).

The developments from 1972 to 1982 we have sketched can be summarized in tabular form (see Table 1). Though the table is oversimplified, it vividly underscores the considerable change over the decade. The extent of the changes immediately raises two questions: Why did the changes occur? Will they endure?

Causes of Change and Its Durability

Three interrelated factors help to explain the evolution of the system: the change in the top leaders, the course of revolution, and China's specific development problems. The human factor is the passing of Mao and the

Table 1: Evolution of the Chinese Political System, 1972-82

Attribute of the system	In 1972	In 1982
Method of change preferred by leader(s)	Revolution	Reform
How leader(s) view process of change	Dialectical	Linear
Preferred method of policy implementation	Mobilization of populace; class struggle	Rule by bureaucracy; regularity
Intrusiveness of state	Total	Pursuit of some private interests and withdrawal tolerated
Main tasks of governance	Restoration of order; attitudinal change; elimination of lingering bourgeois influences	Raising economic production and living standards
Mechanisms for integrating the policy	Networks of personal relations; coercion; ideology	Networks of personal relations; regularized personnel system; planned allocation of material goods and capital, coercion
Techniques for controlling "bureaucratism"	Campaigns	Experimentation with numerous techniques, none successful
Extent of "institutionalization"	Low; rule of men rather than institutions	Low; major efforts under way to rebuild institutions
Nature of politics at top level	Unbridled factionalism below top leader	Struggle among factions and opinion groups governed by unwritten rules
Rule at top	One-man rule	Collective leadership
Empirical bases of decisions	Prior preferences demonstrated in model units	Investigation; statistical compilation; model units
Popular confidence in political system	Low	Somewhat improved
Dominant organizational hierarchies	People's Liberation Army, public security forces, party Propaganda Department	Party committee chain of command, party Organization Department, State Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance, army, public security forces

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rise of Deng and Chen. Many of the changes only took place after Mao's death, the arrest of his principal allies in revolution, and the subsequent eclipse of his lingering beneficiaries (e.g., Hua Guofeng). The Chinese system remains one which reflects the aspirations and techniques of rule of the top officials. To that extent, the system will continue to evolve and take on the coloration of Deng's and Chen's successors.

A second, more systemic factor is also at work, namely, the course of any totalitarian revolution.[40] The reform-oriented, institutionalized polity which had begun to emerge by 1982 bears a great resemblance to the Chinese system which was making its appearance in the mid-1950's and then again in the early 1960's, after the Great Leap Forward campaign (1958–60). By launching the Cultural Revolution in 1966, Mao sought to postpone in China the inevitable aftermath of revolutions—be they in France, Russia, Germany, Cuba, or Vietnam—that is to say, the strengthened grip of bureaucracy over society. Mao deliberately sought mechanisms to keep society in constant turmoil so as to prevent a bureaucratic domination in China.[41]

Nevertheless, it appears as though societies reach a limit beyond which they do not welcome turmoil and become exhausted by it. Problems of legitimacy and compliance come to the fore as the leaders must grapple with a cynical, disenchanted population which has been coerced for too long. Yet, upon closer examination, no revolutionary or totalitarian regime has followed exactly the same path. What is common among totalitarian regimes, as Richard Lowenthal has noted, is their

call for mobilization to be directed toward development of one sector [of the nation], while totalitarian instruments of control and repression are used to demobilize the other sectors. . . . Herein lies the dilemma of the totalitarian regime that has successfully mobilized its system's assets to attain a single developmental objective. . . . Its very success has led to mounting pressures to bring the system into balance, to allow development in the hitherto unauthorized areas; yet, if it does so, it will be sanctioning the end of the revolution from above, the end of the movement toward the goal culture.[42]

Lowenthal's insight implies that the post-totalitarian phase in each case will be a specific reaction to the particular emphases of the mobilization effort. In sum, since each revolutionary effort to transform a society has its own emphasis, it will leave its own particular legacy. For this reason, while focusing on the post-Mao era, this essay laid initial stress on Mao's goals and techniques of rule. To an extraordinary extent, the pressing problems now, even six years after Mao's death, are precisely the ones Mao neglected as he directed the nation's energies elsewhere. The contours of the 1982 political system are, to a considerable degree, a reaction to the Maoist system. The political institutions and process Deng and his associates have called into being have been designed to cope with the particular set of problems Mao had neglected and thus bequeathed to his successors:

- lagging agricultural production;
- an inefficient industrial system;
- high unemployment among youth;
- a low standard of living;
- widespread apathy and cynicism;
- an inadequate scientific and technological manpower base;
- specific bottlenecks in transportation, communications, and energy;
- an unacceptably high rate of population increase.

So pressing are these problems and so seemingly supportive to their solution is the political system Deng, Chen, and their associates have designed, that the observer might be tempted to assume that rationality has prevailed and an equilibrium may have been reached. Such a conclusion is unwarranted on several grounds.

To begin with, the major instruments of totalitarian rule have been weakened but not eliminated. The military, the public security forces, and the propaganda apparatus have yet to acquire roles in domestic affairs commensurate with the objective resources under their command. They are potentially destabilizing institutions and focal points of resistance to the system which Deng and Chen have forged.[43]

In addition, the current system and set of policies generate their own, new set of problems, and it is not yet clear that the Deng-Chen system is capable of handling these problems. In particular, the system relies heavily on rule through bureaucracy, but it has yet to

[40] On this topic, see Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution,* Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1965. See also Robert Tucker, *Marxian Revolutionary Idea,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. 172–214.

[41] Starr, op. cit., pp. 300–08.

[42] Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," in Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems,* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1970, p. 14. See also David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization,* Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1965, esp. Chap. 10, and Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors,* New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1980, especially pp. 5–62.

[43] For a more general treatment of the problem of a post-mobilization regime, see Richard Lowenthal, "The Ruling Party in a Mature Society," in Mark G. Field, Ed., *Social Consequences of Modernization in Communist Societies,* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, pp. 81–118.

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develop effective mechanisms for ensuring that the bureaucracy will be responsive either to popular will or indeed to orders from above.[44] Over a protracted period, the Deng-Chen system could prove to be one in which tensions accumulate but for which there are no adequate safety valves. To be sure, the new opportunity for individuals to withdraw from politics and the personnel readjustment in the bureaucracies lessen the causes of tension. Furthermore, unlike the Maoist system, the Deng-Chen system does not envision the use of social tensions as an engine of history. Nevertheless, several already apparent cleavages in the system could prove politically troublesome if allowed to become too sharp. These are: (1) civil-military relations; (2) generational layering where the experiences and education of age cohorts have differed sharply; (3) urban-rural differences, since living standards and opportunities for social mobility are highly unequal; (4) tensions between coastal and interior provinces, since the benefits of China's opening to the West flow much more rapidly to the coastal provinces; and (5) income differentials within and among localities, with perhaps rising resentment as income differentials grow under the post-1978 remuneration system. The long-term consequences of increased contact with the outside world are also difficult to foresee.

Another potential source of instability stems from the promise the leadership has made to raise the standard of living of the populace. From 1978 to 1982, real income has gone up dramatically for many, particularly in the countryside, and moderately for others, especially in the cities. Not only have wages gone up, but construction of housing has increased significantly, as has the production of many consumer durables (watches, bicycles, portable radios, television sets, etc.).[45] The slightly more affluent urban Chinese populace is beginning to press upon scarce leisure-time facilities, such as theaters, parks, and sports grounds. Therefore, questions remain. Are expectations rising more rapidly than the expansion of consumer goods industries? Is it in fact wise to stimulate support for the regime through such a heavy reliance on material incentives? What might happen if the economic strategy does not succeed, the growth rate falters, and standards of living stagnate? In that case, the fundamental stability of the Chinese regime would not necessarily be at stake, but many of the changes made since 1972 would be threatened, particularly in the relative importance of various

[44] Harry Harding, *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949–1952*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1981.

[45] "Economic Readjustment: Results Since 1979," *Beijing Review*, Aug. 30, 1982, p. 15.

Issues facing today's Chinese leadership: at the left, unemployed painters and carpenters seek work in the main square of Urumqi, Xinjiang Autonomous Region; at right, part of China's effort to control its population growth, a poster in Lanzhou, Gansu Province.

—Vincent Mentzel.

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bureaucracies and the mechanisms for integrating the society.

In addition to the leadership, the natural course of totalitarian revolutions, and the concrete problems facing the Chinese leaders, another consideration bears mention in explaining the change from 1972 to 1982 and in assessing the future: Chinese cultural traditions. One way of looking at the last years of Mao and the post-Mao era is in the light of China's cultural heritage. In many respects, what has transpired is a reassertion of certain dominant strands in the Chinese tradition.[46] In particular, as W. Theodore deBary has argued, the two dominant models of rule in China have been harsh dictatorship or benevolent but still authoritarian bureaucracy, with the latter being more common through the centuries.[47] Ironically, the Cultural Revolution helped revive the traditional culture it had been intended to destroy.[48] The harsh dictatorship under Mao strengthened people's desire to confide in those whom they trusted, i.e., those with whom they shared ties. Thus, the immediate family in many ways became more important; school, native place, or early career connections became tickets to survival. The disillusionment with the formal Maoist ideology led to increased interest in traditional religion, especially Buddhism and Taoism. Thus, what makes current China at least superficially resemble the imperial system is the twin reassertion of formal bureaucracy and the informal means (especially use of *guan-xi* and the prevalence of factions) for coping with the state.

The present leadership swiftly jettisoned those aspects of the Maoist system which ran especially counter to the dominant strands in the Chinese tradition. These were its denial of the cultivation of individual pursuits, its emphasis on class struggle, and its extreme denigration of bureaucracy and hierarchy. To be sure, such concepts as "privacy" and "individualism," so central to Western political thought, were not well developed in the Chinese tradition; on the other hand, notions of "withdrawal," "quietude," and particularly, "self-cultivation" were quite well developed. Not privacy but scholarship, meditation, and detachment were esteemed values, and rule which prevented cultivation of talent—poetry, painting, carving of seals—was threatening to culture and the attainment of virtue. Mao's fostering of struggle also ran counter to a deeply ingrained preference for harmony. Campaigns and the brawling that accompanied them brought disorder instead of the preferred regularity and order.[49]

To the extent that the Deng-Chen system represents a reassertion of "Chineseness," several exceptions must also be noted: collective leadership, the idea of linear progress, the downplaying of ideology, and the empirical basis of policy choice. Let us briefly identify each of these very complicated matters. When unified, China always has had a single, discernible ruler. It remains to be seen if a system of shared power will work. The traditional Chinese view of history being cyclical has more in common with Mao's dialectic conceptions than with the current leadership's notions that progress can be gradual and evolutionary. As to ideology, in the absence of extensive, formal religion, the state always played a major role in the inculcation of morality; this had a major role in helping unify the country. The current system would seem to leave a vacuum in the propagation of a unifying, coherent set of beliefs.

Turning to epistemological matters, the current leaders are trying to build methods of research and analysis derived from Western social sciences into the empirical procedures of the bureaucracy. Many students of China would argue that these methods are antithetical to dominant Confucian precepts: the view that most facts are infused with values and hence that truly "neutral" social and policy sciences cannot be developed; the preference to learn through the emulation of models rather than through the understanding of scientific principles.[50] It remains open to question, therefore, whether the current effort to develop an empirically based policy process will really succeed.

Deng and his associates seem to have rekindled the century-old debate over how best to root the quest for modernity in the nation's intellectual heritage. In fact, as Benjamin Schwartz has stressed, it is incorrect to speak of a single or even dominant Chinese intellectual tradition.[51] Rather, aspects of Confucianism, legalism, Bud-

[46] Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949-52,* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1980.

[47] See DeBary's contribution to *China's Future and Its Implications for U.S.-China Relations,* Occasional Paper No. 2, Washington, DC, East Asian Program, The Wilson Center, August 1980, pp. 1-11.

[48] See the writer Wang Meng's comment on the Cultural Revolution: "Sometimes a thing has the opposite effect of that intended. When, in the past, indiscriminate emphasis was placed on drawing a clear line between classes, the line vanished; when struggling against each other was stressed, people realized the value of friendship and loyalty; when politics was overemphasized, people became tired of it; and after the movement to sweep away all old ideas, customs and habits, people clung to these things even more." Wang Meng, "The Barber's Tale," *Chinese Literature* (Beijing), July 1980, p. 26.

[49] On these points see Donald J. Munro, *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China,* Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1977; and Richard H. Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press, 1971.

[50] Richard Baum, "Scientism and Bureaucratism in Chinese Thought: Cultural Limits of the 'Four Modernizations,' " paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Toronto, Mar. 13-15, 1981.

[51] Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1964, and his "Some Polarities in Confucian Thought," in David Nivison and Arthur Wright, Eds., *Confucianism in Action,* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1959, pp. 50-62.

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dhism, and various popular religions offered China's rulers a diversity of traditions upon which to draw. The real question was which of these diverse strands should be combined with which Western ideas to create an ideological amalgam suited to Chinese needs. China's rulers and their thinkers were confronted by a series of dualities each of which was sustained by an eclectic mixture of Chinese and Western thought. Among these polarities spurring debate were:

- the notion that societies can be egalitarian versus the notion of a hierarchical natural order;
- the notion that hierarchy is inevitably oppressive versus the idea that hierarchy is essential for order and the attainment of morality;
- the view that only external controls can order a society versus the idea that fostering of virtue in each person is the requisite for order;
- the notion that China can attain modernity through self-reliance and exclusion of the outside world versus the belief that the West and Japan have much to offer;
- the belief that mankind can swiftly create a utopian community if properly motivated versus the view that economic conditions basically shape the social structure and that economic conditions can be changed only gradually;
- the belief that theory—abstract knowledge—is acquired in practice versus the notion that theory can arise from reflection.

The distinctive and complex response to each of these polarities which was provided by Mao became the official ideology of the nation.

The reassertion of "Chineseness" in post-1976 China has meant a partial return to examining these polarities in ways which had absorbed Chinese intellectuals before 1949. To be sure, the precise terminology and the centers of gravity have changed in the intervening years, thus revealing the impact of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. But the polarities that are being explored and the syntheses that are being sought echo the debates of an earlier period.

As we have already noted, Deng and his associates have exhibited an ambivalent attitude toward renewed intellectual ferment. On the one hand, they acknowledge its necessity since Mao's prescriptions seem inadequate for dealing with China's current problems. On the other hand, they fear that the ferment will escape their control—with unpredictable consequences. No matter what the ideological proclivities of the leaders, they are unlikely to be able to provide the same continuity and coherence in ideology that Mao had achieved. Until a consensus on ideology exists, it is improbable that China's political system will be fully stable.

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Soviet Succession

EDITOR'S NOTE—The important question of who will succeed Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remains an open one. Below we offer two divergent "Kremlinological" assessments of the subtly evolving constellation of front-running contenders and their possible policy preferences. In the first contribution, Mr. Hough traces the personal background and policy stances of his "candidates" in the context of the complex policy agenda facing any successor leadership. In the second, Mr. Ploss assesses indirect recent evidence of a challenge to Brezhnev's leadership and offers a somewhat different line-up of leading contenders.

Issues and Personalities

by Jerry F. Hough

Once again, Leonid Brezhnev's health seems to have deteriorated, and speculation about the Soviet succession is rising. This time, however, the situation is substantially different from what it was several years ago. Two of the inner core of the Politburo, Aleksey Kosygin and Mikhail Suslov, have died, and the position of a third, Andrey Kirilenko, appears to have slipped badly. Brezhnev's long-time personal assistant, Konstantin Chernenko, has continued to gain greater status and now seems to be the number two man in the political system. Most recently, the long-time chairman of the KGB, Yuriy Andropov, has been moved into the Central Committee (CC) Secretariat and into the inner leadership core.

In a recent article in *Problems of Communism,*[1] William Hyland lamented the decline of Kremlinology in the West, and with good reason. There have been only four leaders in Soviet history (five, if one includes Georgiy Malenkov's short interregnum), and each has been associated with major changes in policy and even in the way the political system functions. The succession to Brezhnev will come at a time of critical policy choices. It will probably involve the disappearance of a historic generation from the scene. If not immediately, then over three or four years, it will almost surely produce substantial change of some kind. Yet, clues about leadership politics have been much scarcer over the last 15 years than in the past.

Despite the uncertainty of the evidence, Hyland is correct in insisting that we give attention to this important subject. This article will attempt to assemble the bits of information that are available about the leading contenders and about the issues that will lie at the heart of the struggle for power. Even if events prove our current thinking wrong, our mistakes may nonetheless indicate where we have to rethink our underlying assumptions about the Soviet political system.

Mr. Hough is Professor of Political Science and Policy Sciences, Duke University (Durham, NC), and Staff Member, The Brookings Institution (Washington, DC). He is the author of many works on the Soviet Union, including How the Soviet Union Is Governed, *1979.*

[1] "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1982, pp. 17–26.

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Andrey Kirilenko (far right) at the May Day 1982 parade in Moscow, his first appearance after several months out of the public light. He joins (right to left) Viktor Grishin, Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolay Tikhonov, and Konstantin Chernenko on the Red Square rostrum.

—Bernard Charlon/Gamma-Liaison.

The Issues

Issues have always been important in Soviet successions. In the past, even if the emerging leader rose to power primarily through control of personnel selection, he was careful to identify himself with strong currents of opinion within the party. In this succession, issues will very likely be even more important. There is today no logical successor in the sense of a man of the right age and background serving as the general secretary's chief assistant for personnel selection. Indeed, since personnel turnover in recent years has been slow, it is not clear that anyone has had an opportunity to build a political machine at all. In addition, since the mid-1970's, Brezhnev has steadfastly refused to face up to a growing number of problems, and his successors will not be able to avoid them. The problems are so contentious that there are certain to be leadership differences of opinion about them, and the struggle for power in the succession will surely involve a struggle over issues as well.

The policy issues in this succession will not, however, be simple and clear-cut. Westerners often define the political struggle in the Soviet Union in terms of "reform" or "liberalization" versus "conservativism" or even "neo-Stalinism."[2] There is a strong element of truth in this view, but the situation should not be oversimplified. Issues that are important for most reformers at one time can become unimportant only a short time later. Reforms that are instituted can provide the basis for a new conservative consensus and become in turn the target of a new reform movement. Key values held by reformers (or conservatives) can come into conflict with each other and force difficult choices on specific issues. This last question is particularly crucial now, for the reforms introduced under Khrushchev and Brezhnev have become the essence of the status quo that needs to be attacked if the programs of the contemporary economic reformers are to be realized.

There are many significant issues confronting the

[2] Stephen F. Cohen, "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* (Urbana, IL), June 1979, pp. 197–202.

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Soviet Union. First, the Soviet Union is, of course, a multinational state, with some 20 major peoples with their own language, culture, and territorial base. In particular, the growing number of those with a Muslim background raises new problems. The question of what to do with the Central Asians, which has been the center of great, and probably exaggerated, attention in the West, may not be urgent, but it must be faced sometime in the decade. Moreover, the nationality factor is never far beneath the surface on any policy question that arises—for example, the distribution of investment, demographic policy, economic decentralization, or political liberalization.

Second, a series of questions concerning political reform are on the agenda of discussion. Brezhnev has essentially continued Khrushchev's social reforms that favored workers and peasants. But he has moved away from Khrushchev's more extreme antibureaucratic tendencies and populist notions of mass participation. The key phrases of the Brezhnev era have been "scientific decision-making," "the administration of society," and "the scientific-technical revolution," all of which connote the flow of influence in decision-making to those with specialized knowledge—administrators, scholars, and educated people in general. As a present-day critic, Anatoliy Butenko, has expressed it, "one of the widespread prejudices is that 'power by the workers' is unrealizable and utopian, since the administration of public affairs has become extremely complex and demands deep specialized knowledge, as a result of which the time will never come when 'each cook will rule.'"[3]

Criticism of this Brezhnev policy, however muted, is not difficult to discern in the Soviet media and among Soviet officials and scholars. On the one hand, a number of leading intellectuals inside the party establishment have appealed with increasing frequency for greater democratization. Butenko has published a forceful call for workers' self-management and has suggested—without being specific—substantial changes in the representative institutions as well.[4] Fëdor Burlatskiy, head of the philosophy department of the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee, has made a similar appeal, speaking out for a withering away of the state in the form of a transfer of more functions to the public organs.[5] Together with Georgiy Shakhnazarov, a deputy head of the Central Committee's Socialist Countries Department, he has also called for the establishment of political science and of a political science institute, one of whose purposes would be to work toward the improvement of the political system.[6] Shakhnazarov himself is more cautious in speaking about any withering away of the state but has advocated a democratization of the process by which candidates are nominated as well as a loosening of information policy.[7]

On the other hand, there have been indirect cautions against democratization. No one in the Soviet Union can come out publicly against further democratization. It is quite possible, however, to discuss the importance of professionalization or to hint about the need for continuing repression by speaking of the dictatorship of the proletariat in contemporary conditions.[8] Moreover, there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Chernenko's report that "at times one hears the question—don't we have too much democracy? Doesn't it lead to a weakening of discipline?"[9]

Third, the relationship of the Soviet Union with the outside world and the level of military spending have become the subjects of intense public debate. The world situation has changed radically in recent years; military parity has been achieved with the West; the relationship with the United States has become confrontational; NATO is under severe strain; the internal changes in China since the death of Mao Zedong raise the possibility of a change in Chinese foreign policy; and the Soviet involvement in the Third World has had little payoff, and none of the major Third World countries have proved revolutionary. Major differences of opinion on how the Soviet Union should respond to each of these changes can be found in Soviet books, journals, and newspapers, and increasingly even on Soviet television.[10]

On the basic question of relations with the West, for example, Vadim Zagladin, the first deputy head of the Central Committee's International Department, has

[3] A. P. Butenko, *Politicheskaya organizatsiya obshchestva pri sotsializme* (The Political Organization of Society Under Socialism), Moscow, Mysl', 1981, p. 178.

[4] Ibid., esp. pp. 160–90. Butenko is head of the Department of Political and Ideological Problems of the Economy of the World Socialist System Institute (IEMSS)—the leading Soviet institute on Eastern Europe.

[5] F. Burlatskiy, "The Political System of Developed Socialism," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 12, August 1979, pp. 62–73.

[6] G. Kh. Shakhnazarov and F. M. Burlatskiy, "On the Development of Marxist-Leninist Political Science," *Voprosy Filosofii* (Moscow), No. 12, 1980, pp. 10–23.

[7] G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, *Sotsialisticheskaya sud'ba chelovechestva* (The Socialist Fate of Mankind), Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, pp. 187, 191, 196, 212–13.

[8] See, e.g., M. I. Baitin, *Sushchnost' i osnovnyye funktsii sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva* (The Essence and Basic Functions of the Socialist State), Saratov, Izdatel'stvo Saratovskogo Universiteta, 1979; and Yu. A. Krasin, "Worker Participation in Management and Professionalism," *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 4, 1982, pp. 3–14. Krasin is prorector of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee.

[9] K. Chernenko, "The Vanguard Role of the Party of Communists: An Important Condition of Growth," *Kommunist*, No. 6, April 1982, p. 41.

[10] For a survey of the major published debates related to foreign policy, see Jerry F. Hough, "The World as Viewed from Moscow," *International Journal* (Toronto), Spring 1982, pp. 183–97. For debates related to Latin America, see idem, "The Evolving Soviet Debate on Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* (Chapel Hill, NC), No. 1, 1981, pp. 124–41.

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testified that there are two "extreme views":

There are people who say that the situation is so complex and difficult that there is no way out, that only the worst can be expected, that we are on the very threshold of war. . . . On the other hand, there are some people who say that there have been all kinds of crises, this will pass too. We are strong, we have the strength of the Soviet Union; it will all pass of its own accord.[11]

Although he does not spell out the alternative to these two "mistaken" views, it clearly involves an active diplomatic effort to improve the situation.

Nevertheless, it is the fourth issue—that of economic reform—that will surely be the central issue of the succession, in part because everyone recognizes that the economy is not functioning well. The rate of increase in Soviet industrial growth is declining, and the reduction in the share of GNP allocated to industrial investment in recent years does not bode well for the future. Agriculture is such a concern that three times in the last four years Brezhnev has told the Central Committee that the food shortage is a political problem as well as an economic one. The refusal of the leadership even to publish the size of the 1981 harvest is dramatic evidence of the sensitivity of the question. And the poor performance of the service sector is universally conceded. In all these spheres, East European countries have developed a number of reforms, and the question before the Soviet leadership is which, if any, of these innovations to adopt.

Westerners often treat economic reform in the Soviet Union as an obvious good, which has been thwarted only by ideological rigidity and bureaucratic self-interest. Without any question, there are people in the Soviet Union who see the introduction of market mechanisms as an ideological abomination,[12] and many officials in Gosplan, the ministries, and even the provincial apparatus (notably its agricultural components) fear reform as a threat to their power or even to their jobs. Nevertheless, the rigid ideologues are found mainly in the older generation that is passing from the scene. Moreover, Khrushchev was able to scatter the ministerial personnel to new regional economic councils (*sovnarkhozy*) in 1957. If it wanted, the party leadership could hit just as hard at bureaucratic privilege today.

Those with dogmatic ideological views and bureaucratic self-interest certainly oppose reform, but the reasons why reforms have not been instituted so far lie elsewhere. In recent years, the overwhelming obstacle to reform has been Brezhnev himself. As his health has declined, he seems not to have been well enough to run the government on a day-to-day basis, and power in that sense has flowed to others. Although the same can be said of Mao in his last years, it is absolutely clear in retrospect that Mao retained the power to block actions that a majority of the leadership wanted to undertake. Similarly, Brezhnev's ability in the last few years to advance two old cronies, Chernenko and Nikolay Tikhonov, as key men in the political system demonstrates that his position in this respect is not unlike Mao's.

There are also major conceptual and political obstacles to economic reform that will surely outlive Brezhnev. There is no precise blueprint for a successful economic reform in the Soviet Union. The evidence suggests that the various parts of a meaningful reform are interrelated and, therefore, difficult to introduce in a piecemeal manner.[13] While it is easy enough to say that more power should be delegated to local levels, the question of controls is crucial. One of the primary sources of the rapid expansion in inflationary purchasing power in Poland in the 1970's, for example, was a relaxation of centralized controls over managers before strict market controls were introduced.[14] It is also easy to say that the profit criterion should be used to judge managers. But if prices are determined essentially on the basis of costs, managers have an incentive to keep their costs high. Cost-plus contracts are scarcely regarded as the key to efficiency in the United States, and the situation is little different in a socialist system. The logic of using the profit criterion is that prices should be controlled by the market.

On a more theoretical level, it is easy to say that the Soviets should move toward a more market-oriented economy. However, it is no simple matter to establish a system that yields prices close to market prices while maintaining its planned character and avoiding the more serious types of unemployment and inflation found in the West. After all, some prices—particularly commodity prices—fluctuate widely in the West.[15] Is

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[11] Interview on Prague radio. Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Aug. 4, 1982, p. CC/11.

[12] Sometimes views of this type can be expressed more easily in discussions about China than in those about the USSR. See, for example, V. I. Lazarev, *Klassovaya bor'ba v KNR* (Class Struggle in the PRC), Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p. 12, 20, 311–16; and Ye. A. Konovalov, "On the Evolution of Socioeconomic Structures in the PRC," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Moscow), No. 2, 1980, p. 10.

[13] An East European joke hints at the problem by reporting the result of a dispute over whether to change to the British practice of driving on the left side of the road: they decided to do so incrementally, with the trucks adopting it first and the cars only some months later.

[14] Jerry F. Hough, *The Polish Crisis: American Policy Options,* Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1982, pp. 13–14.

[15] For example, the January 1 market price for copper rose from 59 cents a pound in 1978 to 69 cents in 1979 to $1.03 in 1980 and then fell to 85 cents in 1981 and 73 cents in 1982. These prices are the January futures price for bulk contracts. They are printed in any major newspaper with a major financial section, including *The New York Times.*

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market socialism to have the same fluctuation in prices? Is it to feature the same increases and decreases in production associated with such fluctuation in the West, with marginal producers operating only at times of high prices and eventually closing down?

The task of finding an acceptable model of economic reform is complicated, also, by the fact that even educated persons in the Soviet Union often have great difficulty thinking in market or even economic terms.

In the labor sphere, for example, Soviet economists seem torn between the contradictory desires of reducing labor turnover and of giving managers the incentive to economize on labor. The enormous attention devoted by Soviet officials and scholars to the problem of labor turnover comes at a time when Soviet turnover rates are well below those in the West.[16]

Similarly, in Soviet agriculture, a strong case can be made that the long-term secret to agricultural abundance is to turn the terms of trade against the peasant and create structural conditions in which the more productive can mechanize and increase efficiency.[17] Otherwise, marginal producers will never be forced off the farm. Yet the Brezhnev regime has raised the subsidy to agriculture—from about 2 billion rubles in 1965 to 35 billion in 1980—by raising procurement prices paid to the peasants while holding consumer food prices and the prices of industrial goods sold to agriculture essentially steady.[18] Brezhnev has announced that the subsidy will be raised another 16 billion rubles in 1983.[19] Although the consumer price policy can be explained by political considerations, the continual raising of procurement prices seems motivated by a general belief that this is the key to more production.

Even if the Soviet leaders resolve the conceptual problem and decide what kind of reform they want, they still face a political problem. Some of the prerequisites for a thoroughgoing reform are already quite clear, and they are politically unpalatable.

First, while the precise point of price equilibrium may be difficult to ascertain, it is absolutely certain that many

[16] The question of labor turnover is discussed in a soon-to-be completed dissertation for the University of Michigan by Peter A. Hauslohner, "Managing the Soviet Labor Market: Policy-making and Political Learning Under Brezhnev." Professor Hauslohner, now at Yale University, emphasizes the conceptual barriers to reform.

[17] See the discussion by James R. Millar in James R. Millar and Alex Nove, "A Debate on Collectivization: Was Stalin Really Necessary?" *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1976, pp. 52–53.

[18] Vladimir G. Treml, "Subsidies in Soviet Agriculture: Record and Prospects," prepared for the forthcoming compendium of the US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects.*

[19] *Pravda* (Moscow), May 25, 1982, p. 2.

Soviet consumers crowd around a meat counter in Irkutsk. State subsidies keep the retail price of meat low in the Soviet Union.

—Martine Franck/MAGNUM.

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key prices are now far from that point. As in Poland, the price of meat is politically the most serious problem. The retail price for meat is about one half the price paid to peasants for it, resulting in continual shortage in the stores, even though per capita meat consumption is not far from the British level.[20] Poland had a per capita meat production well above the British level before the strikes of 1980,[21] and nevertheless had severe shortages. The new Soviet food program projects a rise in annual per capita meat consumption to 70 kilograms in 1990—the level the Poles had achieved in the late 1970's. This strongly suggests that even if the Soviet Union fulfills its ambitious plan for meat production, it still will have severe shortages so long as present meat prices are maintained.

Many other politically sensitive prices are also set well below market levels. Some, such as those for mass transportation, pose no problem, for the demand for these items is finite. Where the demand is high, however, the problems can be severe. The price of bread is lower than the procurement price of grain, and it is economically rational for farmers to feed their livestock bread instead of grain. Books are priced so low that a best seller is one that sells out in a single day. Tickets to good plays are unobtainable through regular channels. The number of hospital beds per 100,000 population is double the American level (1,249 vs. 630 in 1980), and the Soviet figure is still going up, although American health economists consider even the American number excessive.[22]

Second, apart from some rationalization in prices, economic reform also requires some change in policy regarding labor and wages. The existing incentive system tends to reward managers who hoard labor, and the major new performance indicator now being introduced ("normed value-added production"—*normativnaya chistaya produktsiya*) encourages managers to produce more labor-intensive goods than the old gross output target did.[23] As a result, there is an overutilization of labor, and labor productivity has increased more slowly than it should. Moreover, even if a manager wants to get rid of a worker, the existing trade union and legal protections make it difficult for him to do so.

In addition, virtually all Soviet economists contend that wage policy does not provide sufficient incentive to encourage economic growth.[24] During most of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, a marked tendency toward egalitarianism was observable in wage policy.[25] For all wage-earners, the gap between the top tenth and bottom tenth widened a bit in the early 1970's, but those at the bottom of the scale are largely service personnel.[26] In economic terms, the crucial wage differential is that between blue-collar workers and engineering-technical personnel (ITR), for it determines whether workers have the incentive to become foremen and engineers and reflects the extent to which managers are rewarded for performance. Table 1 shows trends in this differential for industry, construction, and agriculture throughout the Brezhnev years. The figures for the second half of the 1970's are little short of astonishing, especially given the countervailing consensus among Soviet economists. In industry, engineering-technical personnel received an average monthly wage increase of 13.3 rubles, while workers received 24.6 rubles. In construction, the respective figures were 5.9 rubles and 27.6 rubles. In agriculture, the wages of the technical

[20] In 1980, the annual per capita consumption of meat in the USSR was stated to be 58 kilograms. The per capita British meat consumption was 46.2 kilograms in 1975, down from 50.4 kilograms in 1970. Ibid., p. 2; and P. G. Hare and P. T. Wanless, "Polish and Hungarian Economic Reforms—A Comparison," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), October 1981, p. 492. The precise Soviet statistics need to be treated with great caution, but the exaggerations are surely not enough to drop Soviet consumption significantly below the 1975 British level.

There are several reasons why such a level of consumption is not inconsistent with shortages in the state stores. First, of course, some meat is sold through the collective farm markets. Second, if goods are priced too low, they may sell out very quickly, but the actual quantity sold in a brief period may be quite substantial—even more so than if prices are so high that the goods do not move and remain on the shelves. Third, Soviet citizens eat their main meal (*obed*) in the middle of the day. Hence they eat most of their meat at the cafeterias at work. In recent years, when I have often observed an absence of meat in Moscow stores, I have always found it in street cafeterias, as well as at those in the Lenin Library and the Academy of Sciences institutes, and it has been priced very reasonably. (On one day a week, fish is offered instead of meat.) In light of other preferences given to industrial workers, the same situation must prevail in factory cafeterias.

[21] Polish per capita consumption of meat rose from 49.2 kilograms in 1965 to 53.0 kilograms in 1970, to 70.3 kilograms in 1975, and remained roughly at the last level through 1979. See Hare and Wanless, loc. cit., p. 492. The authors state that the British and Polish definitions of meat and meat products are identical.

[22] *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1982,* New Nork, NY, Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1981, p. 592; and *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 g.* (National Economy of the USSR in 1980), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981, p. 499. To be sure, the problem is not all one of demand unrestrained by cost. For example, the figure for the United Kingdom, which has a comprehensive state medical program, was 894 in 1977 (*World Almanac,* p. 588). In the Soviet Union, the hospital bed figure is the basis for budget decisions, and the Ministry of Health deliberately prolongs hospital stays in order to increase its budget. For example, a woman giving birth without complications is forced to stay in the hospital for 13 days before returning home, even though the possibility of contagion there probably increases the dangers for the new-born and may even be a factor in Soviet infant mortality figures.

[23] The validity of this charge is acknowledged by A. Bachurin, deputy chairman of Gosplan in charge of labor questions. *Pravda,* July 16, 1982, p. 3.

[24] See the discussion in Jerry F. Hough, "Policy-Making and the Worker," in Arcadius Kahan and Blair Ruble, Eds., *Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R.,* New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1979, pp. 380, 390–91.

[25] Janet G. Chapman, "Recent Trends in the Soviet Industrial Wage Structure," in ibid., pp. 151–83; Alistair McAuley, *Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union,* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1979; and David Lane, *The End of Social Inequality: Class, Status, and Power Under State Socialism,* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 54–66.

[26] Michael Ellman, "A Note on the Distribution of Earnings in the USSR Under Brezhnev," *Slavic Review,* December 1980, pp. 669–71. Professor Ellman concludes that the trend toward egalitarianism ended in 1968. But his evidence does not go beyond 1974. Moreover, the particular indicator used is very sensitive to changes in the minimum wage, and the introduction of a large increase in the minimum wage in 1968 makes that a very atypical year for comparison.

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Table 1: Average Monthly Wages in Soviet Industry, Construction, and State Agriculture, 1965–80

(in rubles)

	1965	1970	1975	1980
INDUSTRY				
Engineering-technical workers (ITR)[1]	148.4	178.0	199.2	212.5
Workers	101.7	130.6	160.9	185.5
Ratio of ITR wages to worker wages	*1.46:1.00*	*1.36:1.00*	*1.24:1.00*	*1.15:1.00*
CONSTRUCTION				
ITR[1]	160.7	200.0	207.0	212.9
Workers	108.4	148.5	180.3	207.9
Ratio of ITR wages to worker wages	*1.48:1.00*	*1.35:1.00*	*1.15:1.00*	*1.02:1.00*
STATE AGRICULTURE				
Agricultural-technical personnel[2]	136.3	162.5	180.2	185.7
Workers	72.5	98.8	125.3	149.0
Ratio of agricultural-technical worker wages to worker wages	*1.88:1.00*	*1.64:1.00*	*1.44:1.00*	*1.25:1.00*

[1] This category includes line managers as well as rank-and-file engineers and technicians.

[2] This category includes agricultural specialists (such as agronomists and veterinarians) as well as engineers and technicians involved with equipment and repair.

SOURCE: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1980), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981, pp. 364–65.

personnel rose by only 5.5 rubles (they actually declined between 1977 and 1980), and those of farm workers by 23.7 rubles.

As a result, the fifth issue of the succession must be the nature of Soviet social policy. The policy pursued by Khrushchev and especially Brezhnev has, in a way, represented a gesture toward the Marxist ideal, "To each according to his needs." Everyone has a guarantee to a job—which is secured by giving managers an incentive to retain excess labor force. Everyone can afford the basic necessities (subsidies keep prices low, sometimes below cost), and if only corruption and the black market could be eliminated, these necessities would be rationed by willingness to stand in line rather than by amount of income. Income differentials between managers on the one hand, and workers and peasants on the other, have been reduced.[27]

The egalitarian ideal has, of course, not been reached by any stretch of the imagination. Many—including many scholars—argue that the policy of egalitarianism should be pushed still further: the minimum wage, the earnings of collective farmers, and pensions should be increased; the income supplements for children of poor families should be raised; more money should be pumped into the countryside to reduce migration to the city; privileges for the well-to-do and powerful should be reduced; more of the country's resources should go into "collective income" (e.g., free day-care centers, subsidized resorts, better free hospital care, and so forth).[28]

Market-oriented reforms, on the other hand, would move away from the egalitarian ideals. If more money were to go to the productive and the innovative, income differentiation would widen. If meat, theater tickets, books, and the like were priced at the supply-and-demand equilibrium point, then low-income people would not be able to afford as much as they can today. If the peasant were unfettered, the old bugaboo of the kulak would reappear, for some peasants would be more productive than others and would have to be encouraged to increase their investment and acreage.

Hence, as new Soviet leaders enter the succession period, they will face many dilemmas. Chernenko has

[27] As Hedrick Smith has documented in *The Russians* (New York, NY, Quadrangle, 1976), the topmost elite has been given a number of nonmonetary privileges, but these are provided only to a very narrow sector of the managerial elite. Moreover, even the scale of the privileges to the high officials can be exaggerated in comparative terms. For a case in which one of the country's top 25 publishing officials was unable, despite the support of two Central Committee members, to get his three-room apartment enlarged to four, see Vladimir Voinovich, *The Ivankiad or The Tale of the Writer Voinovich's Installation in His New Apartment*, New York, NY, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1976.

[28] Given the finite amount of funds available, every appeal for a collective good, income supplements, increases in pensions and minimum wages, etc.—and such appeals are innumerable—is, in practice, an appeal that funds be diverted from other goals. In addition, many scholars write articles and books that advocate movement to greater egalitarianism in more general terms. For example, see A. A. Amvrosov, *Ot klassovoy differentsiatsii k sotsial'noy odnorodnosti obshchestva* (From Class Differentiation to Social Homogeneity), 2nd ed., Moscow, Mysl', 1978; and A. P. Butenko, *Sotsialisticheskiy obraz zhizni: problemy i suzhdeniya* (The Socialist Way of Life: Problems and Judgments), Moscow, Nauka, 1978.

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called for a "radical (*korennyy*) improvement of the economic mechanism, a removal of class differentiation, and a further widening of participation,"[29] and it is highly likely that the new leadership will enunciate some such program. Ultimately, however, choices will have to be made. In addition to the trade-off between economic growth and social justice as traditionally defined in the Soviet Union, there can be a conflict between workers' self-management or increased trade union power on the one hand and economic reform on the other. A stronger role for the trade unions could limit the regime's ability to widen wage differentials. More workers' self-management could affect both the level of workers' wages and the ability of managers to fire unproductive workers or to reduce the work force.

These dilemmas facing the Soviet leaders involve conflicts between central values that all contenders ostensibly hold dear and judgments about the stability of the political system. Throughout the 1970's, the Polish leadership feared—and with good reason—what they knew had to be done. Is there a similar fear among the Soviet leadership? Those major American specialists who privately predict a military dictatorship in the Soviet Union believe that there is. If Soviet leaders were to go ahead with price increases, the resulting political explosion would require martial law in their view.[30] And it is certainly possible that there are Soviet leaders who say or think that, ultimately, martial law is the only way to institute economic reform (or who at least believe that "after me, the deluge"). Otherwise, the inaction to date is inexplicable. There are likely to be other leaders who think that action must be taken soon or the situation will get out of hand.

These dilemmas also involve foreign and defense policy. Economic reform is likely to be expensive in the short run. The artificially low prices are, of course, reflected in subsidies in the state budget. If prices were raised, this money could be saved and transferred to the wage fund. Gross wages could be raised roughly as much as food prices without any other financial consequences. The problem, however, is that those who need the compensatory wage increases are those with lower and middle incomes (or pensioners), not those who can already afford the prices on the collective farm market. If economic reform requires more incentives for the most productive and a widening of the income gap between engineering-technical personnel and workers, the upper-income sector will need to receive even greater increases than will the middle and lower sectors. If the consumer sector is going to function better, it will require some capital expenditures. Moreover, the enormous new budgetary commitments for the food program will be difficult to repudiate. When these various types of expenditures are added together, they do produce a financial strain.

Manpower—where it will come from and how it will be remunerated—is a major issue facing the Soviet leadership.

—Camera Press.

Some of the strain of economic reform could conceivably be relieved by concentrating on price reform, by shifting some of the burden of improving services to an enlarged private sector, and by postponing the increase of rewards to the most productive. Nevertheless, since industrial investment is already being severely restricted and needs to be expanded,[31] the only reasonable source of money to reduce the problems caused by price increases is the defense sphere. While some Soviet leaders do speak about the need both to strengthen defense further and to institute some kind of economic reform—notably, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, the Ukrainian party leader[32]—significant economic reform is generally dependent on political and military détente, and advocacy of the two tends to go together.

[29] Chernenko, loc. cit., p. 29.

[30] For a surfacing of this argument in print, see L. H. Gann and M. S. Bernstam, "Soviet Vulnerabilities," *National Review* (New York, NY), Aug. 20, 1982, p. 1021.

[31] Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors*, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 300. See Boris Rumer, "Soviet Investment Policy: Unresolved Problems," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1982, pp. 53–68, for a fuller discussion of this problem.

[32] For example, see his speech in *Pravda*, June 7, 1975, p. 2. See also Christian Duevel, "Similarities and Differences in the Soviet Leaders' Recent Approach to some Issues of Foreign Policy," *Radio Liberty Research Reports* (Munich), RL 211/78, Sept. 28, 1978, which compares Andropov and Shcherbitskiy.

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With the politics of internal reform thus intertwined with the politics of foreign and defense policy, the problems for contenders trying to build a winning coalition are complicated even more. It is almost certain that different contenders will choose different trade-offs and will therefore have to base themselves on different social and bureaucratic forces.

The Candidates

Leonid Brezhnev undoubtedly remembers well that when Nikita Khrushchev placed a man of the right age and experience in a post that positioned him to become the successor, that man took advantage of the situation to succeed "prematurely." Determined to prevent anyone from doing to him what he did to Khrushchev, Brezhnev has consistently avoided appointing someone with the proper qualifications to a post that would make him the obvious heir apparent. For this reason, the question of who will succeed Brezhnev has always remained quite difficult to answer, perhaps even for members of the Politburo itself.

Today, there are at least five men who have or have had at least a reasonable chance to become general secretary, and several others with at least an outside chance. The five are Andrey Kirilenko, Konstantin Chernenko, Yuriy Andropov, Viktor Grishin, and Mikhail Gorbachëv.

Andrey Kirilenko. For years, Western Sovietologists have pointed to Kirilenko as the likely heir apparent.[33] They have assumed that he has been de facto second secretary (that is, the secretary providing overall supervision of personnel selection and economic management) of the CPSU Central Committee (CC) and that he has therefore been in a good position to build a winning political machine. In addition, his background is as extensive as that of any of the other candidates, not only because of the breadth of his responsibilities in the Brezhnev period, but because of his years of experience as an obkom (oblast party committee) first secretary both in the Ukraine and in the RSFSR.

One thing is certain—Kirilenko has been associated with Brezhnev for a long time. Born several months before Brezhnev in 1906, Kirilenko actually rose faster than Brezhnev in the wake of the purges of the 1930's. He was named second secretary of the Zaporozh'ye obkom in 1939, when Brezhnev was only one of the junior obkom secretaries in Dnepropetrovsk. The two men first crossed paths early in the war, when Kirilenko served as the (political) member of the Military Council of the 18th Army of the Southern Front (from November 1941 until April 1942), and Brezhnev was deputy head of the Political Administration of the Southern Front (which supervised the 18th Army) or perhaps head of the Political Department of the 18th Army (a post which would have been subordinate to the member of the Military Council).[34]

The two men's association has continued almost uninterrupted since the close of the war. Kirilenko returned to civilian work, resuming his post of obkom second secretary in Zaporozh'ye when it was liberated in 1944. In August 1946, Brezhnev became obkom first secretary in Zaporozh'ye and, consequently, Kirilenko's boss. In November 1947, Brezhnev was named obkom first secretary in Dnepropetrovsk. When he moved on to Moldavia in 1950, Kirilenko succeeded him in Dnepropetrovsk, most likely on Brezhnev's recommendation. From 1955 to 1961, Kirilenko served as obkom first secretary in Sverdlovsk, and from 1961 to 1966 as deputy chairman of the Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR. When the Bureau was abolished in 1966, Kirilenko became, together with Suslov, one of the two CC senior secretaries under Brezhnev. In 1976, when Kirilenko received a medal on his 70th birthday, President Nikolay Podgornyy presented the award, but Kirilenko directed his answer primarily to Brezhnev, using the familiar form of "you" (*ty*) to emphasize the closeness of the relationship. Kirilenko is the only Politburo member to have used this form of address in such a public forum.[35]

The exact nature of Kirilenko's responsibilities during the Brezhnev era should be considered more of an open question than it usually is. For most of the Khrushchev period, there was a senior CC secretary—Aleksey Kirichenko from 1957 to 1960, Frol Kozlov from 1960 to 1963, and Brezhnev from 1963 to 1964—who provided overall supervision of the central state apparatus and personnel selection in at least the non-Russian republics. (It is probable that none of the three had authority over the Bureau of the Central Committee for the

[33] See, e.g., Richard Coffman and Michael Klecheski, "The 26th Party Congress: The Soviet Union in a Time of Uncertainty," in Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson, Eds., *Russia at the Crossroads: The 26th Congress of the CPSU*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 200–01.

[34] *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), 8 vols., Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976–80, Vol. 4, p. 182. This source provides a good comprehensive biography of Kirilenko. Brezhnev's biographies do not make clear when Brezhnev moved from the Southern Front to the 18th Army, but since he held the latter post for "more than two years," it is likely to have been after Kirilenko left. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 586, and Vol. 2, p. 367. The first post also was lower in status than Kirilenko's.

[35] *Pravda*, Oct. 15, 1976, p. 1. Even men as close to Brezhnev as Suslov and Chernenko, both of whom Brezhnev addressed in public as "*ty*" spoke to him in the polite form "*vy*." Ibid., Sept. 25, 1982, p. 1; and Dec. 20, 1981, p. 1.

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RSFSR.) Although it is generally assumed that Kirilenko stepped into this role for Brezhnev, this interpretation should not be accepted without reservations, especially for the period since 1976.

There are, it should be understood, ways of dividing the work of the senior CC secretaries other than the Khrushchev pattern. In the last years of the Stalin period (1950–53), for example, the responsibility of supervising the lower party apparatus and the central state machinery was split between Khrushchev and Malenkov. It is quite possible that something similar happened in the Brezhnev period, probably at the time of Chernenko's elevation to the Politburo. At least until very recently, Kirilenko clearly has fulfilled much of the Malenkov role of supervising central governmental policy and economic planning, although he seems not to have Malenkov's responsibility for foreign policy and agriculture.[36] What is lacking is evidence that Kirilenko has continued to have responsibility for the party organs at lower levels.

The crucial question in this respect is the subordination of Ivan Kapitonov, the head of the Organizational Party Work Department of the Central Committee. Kapitonov has direct supervision over personnel selection, and he has placed long-time associates in several posts in this realm. Thus, the first deputy head of the Organizational Party Work Department, Nikolay Petrovichev, worked as head of the propaganda-agitation department of the Moscow obkom under Kapitonov in the late 1950's, and the editor of *Partiynaya Zhizn'*, Mikhail Khaldeyev, was Komsomol secretary under Kapitonov in the early 1950's.[37] The assumption has been that Kapitonov, who is not a member of the Politburo, must be subordinate to one of the CC secretaries, namely, Kirilenko. It is, however, within the realm of possibility that Kapitonov always reported to Brezhnev directly, and within the realm of high probability that sometime in recent years—probably in October 1977, when Chernenko became a candidate member of the Politburo—Kapitonov began reporting to Chernenko. Since the mid-1970's, all of Kirilenko's articles have dealt solely with the economy, while Chernenko's have often centered on questions that are the responsibility of the personnel secretary.[38] In 1982, it was Chernenko and Kapitonov who attended the trade union session that removed Aleksey Shibayev as chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions, while in 1976 it had been Kirilenko and Kapitonov at the session that had installed him.[39]

The height of Kirilenko's power seemed to have come in September 1976, when an apparent protégé, Yakov Ryabov, the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk obkom, became the CC secretary in charge of the security forces, the military, and the defense industry. In February 1979, however, Ryabov was removed (he was named first deputy chairman of Gosplan, with responsibilities largely for labor planning). At the same time, a number of signs began suggesting that Kirilenko's status was falling.[40] In 1982, there have been rumors that his health is failing, but his political health is surely worse. (While Suslov's health had been poor for years, his status in the press never fell.)

In the unlikely event that Kirilenko does become general secretary, it is probable that relatively little would change. In his speeches, he comes across as a rather traditional bread-and-butter Communist, who emphasizes industrial growth and the increase in living standards that comes from it. He says little about shortcomings and little about changes in the planning process that he has supervised. Some of his articles can be incredibly detailed and narrow in their focus on industrial problems.[41] Except in 1974 when he showed enthusi-

[36] In practical terms, Kirilenko supervised Boris Gostev, head of the Planning and Financial Organs Department of the Central Committee (and himself was almost certainly head of the department until September 1975) as well as the heads of the various industrial, construction, transportation, and trade departments of the Central Committee (some indirectly, through Vladimir Dolgikh and Yakov Ryabov). However, Dolgikh's election to candidate membership in the Politburo in May 1982 seems to have been accompanied by his assumption of responsibility for the Planning and Financial Organs Department. On July 2, 1982, *Pravda* reported two July 1 meetings: a perfunctory one honoring the day of the rural cooperative workers and a CC conference on economic planning. Kirilenko attended the former, but not the latter, (although both Gostev and a high Gosplan official were there). Mikhail Gorbachëv and Dolgikh represented the Politburo.

[37] US Department of State, *Directory of Soviet Officials*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, August 1960, Vol. 1, p. 154; 1981 *Yezhegodnik bol'shoy sovetskoy entsiklopedii* (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1981, p. 594, 607.

[38] For example, see A. Kirilenko, "The CPSU's Economic Policy in Action," *Kommunist*, No. 4, April 1975, pp. 15–32; idem, "Comprehensive Program of Planning and Management Improvement," *Partiynaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 18, September 1979, pp. 6–16; and K. Chernenko, "The Great Unity of Party and Nation," *Kommunist*, No. 17, November 1980, pp. 10–26.

[39] *Pravda*, Mar. 6, 1982, p. 2, and Nov. 24, 1976, p. 2. Moreover, Shibayev was a man out of the Kirilenko mold—an aviation industry engineer who had become a plant manager before becoming an obkom first secretary in the RSFSR; the new trade union chief, Stepan Shalayev, despite a managerial background, also had worked for 17 years in the central trade unions. 1981 *Yezhegodnik*, pp. 609–10.

[40] In May 1979, Kirilenko was cut out of a Politburo picture in a Moscow newspaper, and even if the omission was accidental, the editor was not removed. In October, East German Communist party leader Erich Honecker called Chernenko Brezhnev's nearest comrade-in-arms. Through 1981, Kirilenko received a number of slights in comparison with Chernenko. In January 1982, he suffered the most remarkable snub of all. In the listing of the members of Suslov's funeral commission, Kirilenko was listed out of alphabetical order behind two other Politburo members. *The New York Times*, May 28, 1979, p. 2; Terry McNeill, "The Brezhnev Succession: Taking Stock of the Candidates," *Radio Liberty Research Reports*, RL 323/79, Oct. 29, 1974; Boris Meissner, "The 26th Party Congress and Soviet Domestic Politics," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1981, p. 5; Elizabeth Teague, "Kirilenko at 75, Chernenko at 70: What Chances Does Either Have of Succeeding Brezhnev?" *Radio Liberty Research Reports*, RL 356/81, Sept. 9, 1981; *Pravda*, Jan. 27, 1982, p. 1.

[41] See, for example, A. Kirilenko, "An Important Factor in Raising the Effectiveness of the Economy," *Kommunist*, No. 7, May 1978, pp. 23–37.

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The new chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, S. A. Shalayev, addresses the 17th Trade Union Congress in Moscow in March 1982. The presence of Konstantin Chernenko (third from right behind Shalayev) at this meeting which reshuffled the trade union leadership was suggestive of Chernenko's growing stature as a possible successor to Leonid Brezhnev. Chernenko is seated between Brezhnev and Politburo member (and former trade union chairman) Viktor Grishin.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

asm about Soviet-American summit meetings,[42] he manifests relatively little interest in international relations. He certainly expresses more support of détente and less alarm about the Western threat than some of his colleagues, but he seems to take the ebbs and flows of détente for granted, as if on the assumption that relations cannot get too bad.[43] Perhaps he was the target of Zagladin's earlier-mentioned jibe about extreme views in this respect.

Konstantin Chernenko. The great mystery man among the contenders is 71-year-old Chernenko. Most indicators of status place him in the number two position in the Soviet political system, even after Andropov was elected CC secretary in May 1982. It is quite possible that on a day-to-day basis Chernenko has already been serving as the transitional general secretary.

One can argue that Chernenko has accumulated an extraordinary number of levers of power in his hands. Since 1965, he has been head of the Central Committee's General Department, which handles the flow of classified documents within the party apparatus and until recently supervised the disposition of letters sent by the public to the Central Committee.[44] According to Arkadiy Shevchenko, a former assistant to Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, Chernenko has used this role to serve in effect as secretary to the Politburo.[45] In addition, his attendance at recent army and border guard

[42] *Pravda*, June 12, 1974, p. 3.

[43] For example, in 1975 he treated détente as something that the changing correlation of forces required the West to adopt. *Leningradskaya Pravda* (Leningrad), June 11, 1975, p. 2. This line was not included in the shortened version in *Pravda*.

[44] In the past, the department was called the *spetsotdel* (Special Department). For a discussion of its work, see Leonard Schapiro, "The General Department of the CC of the CPSU," *Survey* (London), Summer 1975, pp. 53–65.

[45] *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1982, p. 29.

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meetings indicates that he, rather than Andropov, supervises the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department, which in turn oversees the police and the military.[46] And finally, as has just been discussed, Chernenko has by all indications come to oversee the Organizational Party Work Department and personnel selection.

Nevertheless, despite the enormous apparent strength of Chernenko's position, he is difficult to visualize as a general secretary. Since 1960, his main role has been head of Brezhnev's personal secretariat—his Aleksandr Poskrëbyshev—and such people rarely are chosen to succeed their masters in any system. They find it difficult to establish an independent image, and their proximity to power and their service as the leader's "no man" have usually made them many enemies.

Chernenko's background is also most unimpressive. After three years in the border guards from 1930 to 1933, Chernenko spent eight years in low-level ideological work in his native Krasnoyarsk Kray, where, at the age of 31, he became a kraykom secretary (presumably the secretary for ideological work).[47] His performance must not have been distinguished, however, for in 1943, at the height of the war, he was sent for two years to college—the Higher School of Party Organizers. In 1945, he was again made an obkom secretary for ideology, but in a less important oblast, Penza.[48] In 1948, he was moved to a still lower job, head of the propaganda-agitation department of the Moldavian Central Committee, although as a Russian outsider he, rather than the Moldavian who held the title, may have been serving as the real ideological secretary.

The major event in Chernenko's life occurred in 1950, when Brezhnev arrived in Kishinëv to become the first secretary of the Moldavian Central Committee. Brezhnev worked in Moldavia only until 1952, and Chernenko until 1956. But when Brezhnev became CC secretary for heavy industry and the defense industry in 1956, Chernenko was named head of the mass political work section of the Central Committee's Propaganda-Agitation Department. (It is fairly common for the associates of one CC secretary to be named as the subordinates of others; the practice seems to serve the functions either of political control or of solidifying alliances among secretaries—in the Chernenko case, the alliance between Brezhnev and Suslov.) When Brezhnev became chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1960, and again when he became first (and then general) secretary of the CPSU in 1964, he selected Chernenko to head his personal secretariat.

Thus, Chernenko has been exposed to a wide range of decisions as a personal assistant but has no significant experience of his own outside the ideological sphere. He has not run a major economic unit or party organization, he has had almost no direct responsibility in the foreign policy realm, and he has not even been one of Brezhnev's policy assistants. His education—even if one counts a correspondence degree he received at Kishinëv Pedagogical Institute—is not the sort usually considered appropriate for top posts in the Soviet Union. And, finally, he is not even a good public speaker.

Even today, it is possible that Chernenko's seeming power may be largely illusory. He first came to prominence in 1975 at a time when Brezhnev's health was quite poor, appearing in foreign policy settings (e.g., the Helsinki Conference of Chiefs of State), in which he served largely as an aide-de-camp.[49] The following year, when Brezhnev's health was much improved,[50] Chernenko did not figure as a member of Soviet delegations. But he publicly returned to Brezhnev's side when the latter's health deteriorated once more. Conceivably, Chernenko has been functioning more as Brezhnev's eyes and ears—and even as his memory—than as a real policymaker.[51] If he is serving as personnel secretary, he has not built much of a local machine—only 15 of 71 RSFSR obkom first secretaries have been changed in the last five years, and some give every appearance of being allied with other contenders.[52]

Chernenko's best chance would seem to be as a transitional leader with relatively little power. But it is dangerous to judge a new leader by his background. Who could have predicted that President Harry Tru-

[46] *Pravda,* May 12, 1982, p. 2, and May 28, 1982, p. 2. In January, the obituary of Semën Tsvigun, the first deputy chairman of the KGB, was signed by only two Politburo members—Chernenko and Gorbachëv. Since Chernenko worked with Tsvigun in Moldavia, Gorbachëv's name would seem to imply his responsibility for the Administrative Organs Department at that time. Ibid., Jan. 21, 1982, p. 2.

[47] Most of Chernenko's biographies give little information about his early career. It is described, however, in *Sovetskaya voennaya entsiklopediya,* Vol. 8, pp. 452–53.

[48] *Kul'tura i Zhizn'* (Moscow), Mar. 11, 1948, p. 1. While Chernenko was in Penza, the head of the agriculture department of the obkom and later the head of the agriculture administration of the oblast government executive committee was Fëdor Kulakov, the CC secretary for agriculture during most of the Brezhnev era. Kulakov in turn was Gorbachëv's patron in Stavropol'. It would be fascinating to know whether this combination of circumstances created a political link between Chernenko and Gorbachëv.

[49] For Brezhnev's health, see *The New York Times,* June 14, 1975, p. 1; July 31, 1975, p. 2; Aug. 1, 1975, p. 2; and Jan. 25, 1976, p. 1. For Chernenko, see *Pravda,* June 11, 1975, p. 1, and July 29, 1975, p. 1.

[50] *The New York Times,* Jan. 25, 1976, p. 1, and Sept. 23, 1976, p. 7.

[51] Arkadiy Shevchenko, the former Soviet diplomat, says that when he attended meetings in 1977 at which Brezhnev was present, the latter's memory functioned very badly. *The Washington Post,* June 6, 1982, p. 28.

[52] For example, P. A. Leonov, shifted from Sakhalin to Kalinin, had been head of the party organs department under Grishin and Kapitonov; B. F. Murav'yëv, the new first secretary in Kuibyshev, graduated in 1952 from Karelo-Finnish University, i.e., an institution in an area where Andropov had been active from 1940 to 1951.

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man, President Anwar Sadat, or Pope John XXIII would turn out to be historic figures?

If Chernenko is purely a transitional leader, his policy preferences might not be very important. Nevertheless, if he does become general secretary, the coalition that he has put together (this will be discussed in the conclusion) and the content of his speeches and articles suggest that he is a strong supporter of détente and of some kinds of reform.[53] When Brezhnev presented Chernenko with awards on his 70th birthday, he praised his assistant for being "restless" in the good sense of the term, a man with "a creative, daring approach." In response, Chernenko acknowledged that he sometimes makes "nonstandard decisions."[54]

Sometimes Chernenko's words seem extraordinarily bold. In his 1980 election speech, he did not speak out in support of the recent invasion of Afghanistan (nor did the slightly abbreviated version published in *Pravda* even mention the subject).[55] In a recent article in *Kommunist,* he explicitly indicated that discussion of the balance between the organizational and ideological roles of the party could indicate the extent to which the party should dominate society (with the revisionist position being that the party should limit itself to ideological work). He then went on to say that, of course, the balance between organizational and ideological work was not fixed once and for all, discussing the issue in a manner which indicated a commitment to a less obtrusive involvement.[56]

Yet, Chernenko's speeches often combine formulations that have been advanced by strong reformers with examples from the past that suggest little change. Hence, they give the impression of skillful efforts to reassure both his boss and a prospective reform coalition. It is not clear who would be disappointed if Chernenko became the new leader.

Judging by his speeches, Chernenko seems to fall more within the Khrushchev tradition than into the camp of economic modernizers. He has written often of the need for "further perfection of the political system"[57] and frequently expresses what sound like antibureaucratic, and proparticipatory views. (Indeed, when he spoke at a conference on rural ideological work in 1948, he, unlike the other speakers, is reported to have attacked the Ministry of Agriculture and the Committee for Radio for insufficient installation of radios in the countryside).[58] He has stated that "some forms and methods of economic administration which arose in preceding stages of socialist construction and which were progressive and effective in their own time cease to be such,"[59] and it is easy to imagine him leading an attack on Gosplan and the ministries. Nevertheless, his language suggests a greater attraction to popular participation than to the use of economic levers, and it is hard to imagine him pushing for a change in social policy in order to provide greater economic rewards to managers.

Yuriy Andropov. If the Central Committee selects the best-qualified major contender as Brezhnev's successor, then it surely will select Andropov. The most urgent problems of the Soviet leadership are handling relations with the United States and China, maintaining control over Eastern Europe, and deciding which, if any, of the East European reforms to adopt in the Soviet Union. Andropov is the only man in the leadership with real expertise on all these questions.

Andropov was born in 1914 and graduated from the Rybinsk Water Transportation Technicum in 1936.[60] (He apparently overlapped for a year in Rybinsk with Kirilenko, who graduated in 1935 from the city's premier institute, the Rybinsk Aviation Institute.) From 1938 until 1951, Andropov served in Komsomol and party posts in Yaroslavl' and the Karelo-Finnish Republic, working under the present Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolay Patolichev, who was obkom first secretary in Yaroslavl'. He worked under (or at least with) Otto Kuusinen, who was chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in the Karelo-Finnish Republic. By the time that Andropov was made head of a CC subdepartment (*podotdel*) in 1951, he had accumulated five years of college education at Petrozavodsk University and the Higher Party School, through part-time study.

Andropov then moved into the foreign policy sphere, in 1953 becoming counselor and chargé d'affairs in Hungary and in 1954 moving up to be ambassador.[61] He was stationed in Budapest both during the evolutionary process that led to the 1956 revolution and during the Soviet invasion itself. In May 1957—just before Khrushchev elevated Kuusinen into the party Secre-

[53] See Hyland, loc. cit., p. 23.

[54] *Pravda,* Sept. 25, 1981, p. 1.

[55] *Moskovskaya Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 16, 1980, p. 2, and *Pravda,* Feb. 16, 1980, p. 2.

[56] Chernenko, "Vanguard Role of the Party," loc. cit., p. 26.

[57] See, for example, *Pravda,* Feb. 27, 1979, p. 3.

[58] *Kul'tura i Zhizn',* Mar. 11, 1948, p. 1.

[59] K. U. Chernenko, *Voprosy raboty partiynogo i gosudarstvennogo apparata* (Questions of the Work of the Party and State Apparatus), Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p. 317.

[60] Andropov's biography can be found in *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 3rd ed., Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, Vol. 2, p. 23.

[61] This assumes that he was not already in this sphere in the CC aparatus from 1951 to 1953. His post is an extremely unusual one. I have seen only several references to a *podotdel* (subdepartment). One turned out to be the group of consultants under Kuusinen in the early 1960's (*Pravda,* Mar. 3, 1964, p. 2). Another was headed by V. M. Churayev in the early 1950's and apparently was in the Party Organs Department (ibid., Mar. 2, 1982, p. 6). Andropov is likely to have been in the same department.

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tariat and Presidium (as the Politburo was then called)—Andropov was named head of the newly created Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee. He retained this position until May 1967. In 1961, he was given the title of CC secretary.

Although little direct evidence is available on Andropov's policy orientation during this period, his personal connections were extremely suggestive. He almost surely was a protégé of Kuusinen, who as CC secretary acted as a progressive counterweight to Suslov in the ideological-foreign policy realm. (Kuusinen's propensities were indicated in his selection of Fedor Burlatskiy, probably the most vocal proponent of de-Stalinization in the Soviet media between 1954 and 1957, to head his full-time "group of consultants"—his main staff.[62]) When Kuusinen died in 1964, Andropov inherited his group of consultants. He soon chose a new leader for it—Georgiy Arbatov, who had been writing pro-détente articles since the mid-1950's.[63]

In May 1967, Andropov was appointed chairman of the KGB. While the KGB is best known for its secret police activities, it also performs foreign intelligence functions, and Andropov was the first secret police head in Soviet history with substantial preparation for these latter responsibilities. The KGB's three major deputy chairmen for internal security—Semën Tsvigun, Georgiy Tsinev, and Viktor Chebrikov—had been associated with Brezhnev in Dnepropetrovsk or Moldavia,[64] and one suspects that Andropov had only partial control over them at best. For both these reasons, it is likely that Andropov gave considerable attention to the foreign policy responsibilities of the KGB. In fact, he was promoted to full membership in the Politburo at a 1973 CC plenary session that ratified détente and simultaneously named the ministers of foreign affairs (Gromyko) and defense (Dmitriy Ustinov) to the Politburo.

In May 1982, only three months after the death of Suslov, Andropov was elected a CC secretary.[65] All the evidence suggests that Andropov assumed Suslov's responsibility for supervising two CC secretaries in the ideological-foreign policy realm—Boris Ponomarëv and Mikhail Zimyanin.[66] It is not clear, however, whether Andropov also supervises Konstantin Rusakov, head of

Politburo member Yuriy Andropov, recently returned to the Secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee after 15 years as head of the Committee for State Security.

—Camera Press.

the Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee. In general, he has maintained a fairly low profile. However, in one ceremonial meeting, Andropov did speak for the Politburo, and he was the Central Committee secretary to walk with Brezhnev from the plane when the latter returned from vacation in late August, even though Chernenko was also present both times.[67]

Since 1975, Andropov has been much more urgent in his support for détente than any of the other major contenders. In 1975, when Suslov was expressing worry about ultrareactionary forces in the West and Shcherbitskiy was emphasizing that the nature of imperialism had not changed,[68] Andropov was insisting that the "relaxation of international tension does not occur by itself. . . . It is necessary to actively struggle for it. There cannot be any pause or breathing space since détente is a continuous process which demands constant movement forward."[69] In 1979, he asserted that "it is impossible to underestimate the danger of a course of retarding détente,"[70] and in 1980, he was the only Politburo

[62] For a description of Burlatskiy's meeting with Kuusinen, see F. M. Burlatskiy, "O. V. Kuusinen—Marxist-Leninist Scholar and Theorist," *Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir* (Moscow), No. 6, 1979, pp. 99–104.

[63] For Arbatov's relationship to Kuusinen, see Georgiy Arbatov, "Otto Kuusinen: Marxist Theoretician," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 42, October 1981, pp. 18–20.

[64] Their biographies can be found in the 1981 *Yezhegodnik*, p. 608.

[65] *Pravda*, May 25, 1982, p. 1.

[66] He has attended many sessions with visiting foreign Communists from the Communist world (but not the non-Communist world), and he has signed the one obituary of a cultural figure where the ideological secretary's signature was appropriate. Ibid., June 29, 1982, p. 6.

[67] Ibid., June 25, 1982, p. 2; FBIS. *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, Sept. 1, 1982, p. R/1.

[68] *Pravda*, June 7, 1975, p. 2, and June 10, 1975, p. 2.

[69] Ibid., June 10, 1975, p. 2.

[70] Ibid., Feb. 23, 1979, p. 2.

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member to warn that détente was in serious danger.[71] Unlike many other Politburo members, Andropov has coupled his support for peace and détente with a call for negotiations, even in 1980 in the wake of the US sanctions after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As early as 1976, he was quite explicit in stating that "the policy of peaceful coexistence, as is well known, presupposes negotiations and the seeking of mutually acceptable decisions, sometimes of a compromise nature."[72]

Andropov has not expressed his domestic views as clearly as his foreign policy views. As chairman of the KGB, he naturally has spoken out against ideological subversion (although not in his two most recent speeches, one during the 1980 RSFSR Supreme Soviet elections and the other on the 1982 anniversary of Lenin's birthday).[73] But he has also alluded repeatedly to "unsolved problems" and, especially this last April, to the need to solve them through internal resources.[74] Andropov is likely to favor making the hard choices that economic reform requires (that probably is the meaning of his call to solve problems by internal means). The first ideological decrees issued after he became CC secretary called for a major expansion of economic education and for a fuller discussion in literary journals of contemporary socioeconomic problems.[75] And since he is the Politburo's specialist on Hungary, it is difficult to believe that the Soviet Union would have been as tolerant of Hungarian economic reform—indeed, quite favorable toward it in the last few years—had Andropov not supported it.

Viktor Grishin. Like Andropov born in 1914, Grishin has spent his entire career in Moscow and in Serpukhov, 60 miles to the south. He graduated from two Moscow technicums—one for soil analysis and the other for locomotive service and repair—and worked for several years at a locomotive depot. He then entered party work in Serpukhov, where he became gorkom first secretary in 1948.[76] Soon after Khrushchev became

Viktor Grishin addresses a meeting on November 6, 1971, commemorating the 54th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. Behind him are Nikolay Podgornyy and Leonid Brezhnev; and behind Brezhnev, Yuriy Andropov.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Moscow obkom first secretary in late 1949, he named Grishin to head the machine-building department (which in large part was apparently also the defense industry department). In 1952, less than four years after he had been a mere gorkom second secretary in Serpukhov, Grishin was named second secretary of the Moscow obkom. In those years, the Moscow obkom supervised the city of Moscow in addition to the outlying region (it does not do so now). With Moscow first secretary Khrushchev simultaneously serving as CC secretary in charge of personnel selection, the second secretary was an important figure. Grishin served in this capacity until 1956, when he was named chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions. In 1967, he became first secretary of the Moscow gorkom, by now a post independent of the obkom.

From a contemporary perspective, the crucial question about Grishin's early years in Moscow is his relationship with two other men who worked in the city in the early 1950's—Kapitonov and Gorbachëv. Kapitonov preceded Grishin as obkom second secretary; and from 1954 to 1956, as obkom first secretary, he supervised Grishin directly. Gorbachëv, as Komsomol secretary of Moscow University in 1954–55, was ultimately subordinated, although at several levels removed, to Grishin's obkom. If the two are Grishin supporters, Kapitonov has been in a position to build a political machine for him,

[71] Ibid., Feb. 18, 1980, p. 2.

[72] Ibid., Apr. 23, 1976, p. 2. For further analysis of Andropov's earlier pro-détente speeches, see Christian Duevel, "Andropov's Lenin Anniversary Speech," *Radio Liberty Research Reports*, RL 262/76, May 19, 1976; idem, "Some Aspects and Implications of Honecker's Revision of 'The Dictatorship of the Proletariat,'" ibid., RL 295/76, June 4, 1976; and idem, "Similarities and Differences in the Soviet Leaders' Recent Approach to some Issues of Foreign Policy," ibid., RL 211/78, Sept. 28, 1978.

[73] *Pravda*, Feb. 12, 1980, p. 2, and Apr. 23, 1982, pp. 1–2.

[74] Ibid., June 10, 1975, p. 2, and Apr. 23, 1982, p. 2.

[75] Ibid., June 27, 1982, p. 1, and July 30, 1982, p. 1.

[76] The exact date is not known. He was not first secretary in November 1947 but was in the post as of February 1949. He probably assumed the job in December 1948, when the former first secretary was named deputy chairman of the Moscow oblast trade union organization. See *Moskovskiy Bol'shevik* (Moscow), Nov. 28, 1947, p. 2, Dec. 28, 1948, p. 1, Feb. 2, 1949, p. 1, and Aug. 3, 1949, p. 2. For further biographical information about Grishin, see *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya*, Vol. 3, pp. 53–54.

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and Gorbachëv, to gain support among the younger obkom secretaries. The connections could be crucial—if they are friendly.[77]

Because of Grishin's long tenure in Moscow, many in the city claim to have some sense of him as a person. The popular impression seems to be quite uniform. He is usually described as cautious, moderate, and judicious, as a man who is inclined to serve more as a chairman of the board and less as an innovator. Some say that he is of only average intelligence.

Judging by his speeches, Grishin holds rather old-fashioned views. Indeed, while Kirilenko in 1976 spoke of himself, at age 70, as "middle-aged," Grishin in 1975 spoke of himself, at age 61, as part of the "older generation."[78] To the extent that he ventures beyond discussions of Moscow, he tends to raise traditional themes: the working class, collectivism, and the evils of the private-property psychology. The most striking feature of his speeches is the great emphasis he gives to ideological work, especially in contexts in which it would not necessarily be expected.[79] Unlike many of Chernenko's speeches, Grishin's speeches give no hint that he is speaking about this subject in Aesopian fashion. The foreign policy sections of his election speeches are little more than an endorsement of Brezhnev and his policies, and he supports the existing level of military expenditures.[80] While Grishin might be willing to be a neutral general secretary who presides over change initiated by his colleagues, it is difficult to imagine him leading an attack on Brezhnev's social policy and on the prerogatives of the Moscow ministries. He seems more disposed toward ideological exhortation of the worker than toward radical change in the incentive system, let alone toward a widening of the private sector.

Mikhail Gorbachëv. Gorbachëv is by eight years the youngest man in the Politburo. Born in 1931, he is part of an important new generation moving toward the top in the Soviet Union. Too young to have fought in World War II and to have its college education disrupted by the war (although not too young to have been affected by it),[81] this "postwar generation" went through Soviet colleges when the standards of admission and instruction were at their highest, and went to work as the Stalin period ended.[82] Gorbachëv attended Moscow University, where, as noted, he was Komsomol secretary. He graduated with a law degree in 1955. Although his biographers depict him as a combine operator in his youth, a local newspaper reports that this was a summer job.[83]

Gorbachëv has spent most of his career in his native region of Stavropol'. After graduation, he returned home as a Komsomol official, soon becoming the first secretary of the Komsomol gorkom. In 1961, after several years as second secretary of the Komsomol kraykom, he was named first secretary. Judging by the local press, he concentrated his attention at this time on such questions as agriculture and rural youth rather than education.[84] In March 1962, he was transferred to party work as party organizer of the kraykom in the kolkhoz-

[77] One should never forget that familiarity sometimes breeds contempt and enmity instead of friendship, and the Moscow party organization clearly has had fissures. Kapitonov himself was demoted as Moscow obkom first secretary in 1959 and sent to Ivanovo, reportedly because he could not get along with the chairman of the oblast government executive committee, Nikolay Ignatov. See "To Educate Cadres in the Spirit of Excellence," *Partiynaya Zhizn',* No. 8, April 1959, pp. 10–11. From the late 1950's to the mid-1960's, three obkom and gorkom first secretaries—G. G. Abramov, N. G. Yegorichev, and V. I. Ustinov—quickly fell into disrepute.

[78] *Pravda,* Oct. 15, 1976, p. 1, and June 7, 1975, p. 2.

[79] See V. V. Grishin, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Writings), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp. 488, 590, and 641.

[80] *Pravda,* June 7, 1975, p. 2, Feb. 15, 1979, p. 2, and Feb. 6, 1980, p. 2.

[81] For example, Stavropol' Kray, where Gorbachëv grew up, was occupied by the Germans. Suslov served as head of the partisans there.

[82] For a discussion of this generation, see Jerry P. Hough, "The Generation Gap and the Brezhnev Succession," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1979, pp. 1–16; and idem, *Soviet Leadership in Transition,* Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1980.

[83] *Stavropol'skaya Pravda* (Stavropol'), Feb. 6, 1979, p. 1. For further biographical information on Gorbachëv, see *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Desyatyy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: Tenth Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo sovetov narodnykh deputatov, 1979, p. 119.

[84] *Stavropol'skaya Pravda,* May 12, 1961, p. 1, June 24, 1961, p. 2, Sept. 26, 1961, p. 2, and Jan. 19, 1962, p. 2.



Mikhail Gorbachëv, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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A September 1974 photo of construction work on the Great Stavropol' canal in the northern Caucasus, a project brought to completion under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachëv.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

sovkhoz administration in the district surrounding the city of Stavropol'. In December 1962, when the party apparatus was bifurcated by Khrushchev, Gorbachëv was named head of the party organs department of the rural kraykom. From 1960 to 1964, he worked under Fëdor Kulakov, the first secretary of the party kraykom and then the rural party kraykom, and later to become the CC secretary for agriculture (1965) and a Politburo member (1971).[85] In 1966, Gorbachëv was named the first secretary of the Stavropol' party gorkom. While working in this capacity, he also completed a second college degree—this time through part-time work at the Stavropol' Agricultural Institute. In 1968, he became second secretary of the party kraykom, and in 1970, first secretary, a job he held until 1978.

As kraykom first secretary, Gorbachëv had a major responsibility for the development of irrigation in the Stavropol' region, historically one of the Soviet Union's major grain producers. The Central Committee and Council of Ministers decided in 1971 to speed construction of the Great Stavropol' Canal and to bring a second link into operation by November 1, 1974. Despite an unexpected encountering of sand instead of clay in the construction of the tunnels, the canal was completed on schedule. The total number of irrigated hectares in the region rose from 192,000 in 1970 to 370,000 in 1977.[86]

When Kulakov died in 1978, Gorbachëv was selected to replace him. In October 1980, he was elected a full member of the Politburo. His current responsibilities seem to extend well beyond agriculture to include the entire agro-industrial complex—a sector of the economy reported to contribute 46 percent of the country's added value.[87] Since the organization of the CC apparatus links the food industry with light industry, Gorbachëv's supervision of the relevant department also makes him the leading Politburo member for consumer goods.[88] Finally, undoubtedly because of his law degree, Gorbachëv was also elected chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet. This committee takes part in the drafting of all Supreme Soviet legislation and exercises special oversight over law-and-order questions.

Gorbachëv is young enough and new enough to the leadership that his policy views remain largely unknown. On some questions, such as foreign policy, those views may not even be completely firm. His 1979 election speech expressed fervent support for détente, while his 1981 speech was just as fervent in its support for the Soviet right to intervene in Afghanistan.[89] His published speeches and articles naturally concentrate on agriculture, on which he takes a generally pro-reform position.[90] If the May 1982 CC decision on agriculture is any indication, he is an extremely timid reformer indeed, but it is likely that that decision reflected the judgment of older colleagues. A man of Gorbachëv's age and responsibilities would almost surely adopt a strong position in favor of economic reform as a way of gaining support from the younger obkom secretaries against the central government and of giving himself an excuse to

[85] The association was quite close, for Gorbachëv was a candidate member of the kray party committee's bureau while Komsomol first secretary and subsequently a full member of the bureau of the rural kraykom. Ibid., Sept. 26, 1961, p. 1, and Dec. 28, 1962, p. 1.

[86] *Stavropol'skaya Pravda,* Mar. 26, 1971, p. 1, Jan. 22, 1972, p. 2, Oct. 7, 1972, p. 1, Oct. 10, 1972, p. 2, Dec. 31, 1973, p. 1, Nov. 1, 1974, p. 1, and Jan. 27, 1978, p. 3. The number of hectares of mechanized irrigation, which is reported in the statistical handbooks, is much less, but also showed considerable growth.

[87] *Pravda,* June 17, 1982, p. 2.

[88] For example, he has been the Politburo member who attends light industry meetings. Ibid, June 13, 1981, p. 1, and July 3, 1981, p. 2.

[89] *Stavropol'skaya Pravda,* Feb. 3, 1979, p. 2; and *Altayskaya Pravda* (Barnaul'). Feb. 1, 1980, p. 2. These long foreign policy discussions were not included in the versions of the speeches printed in *Pravda.*

[90] For example, M. Gorbachëv, "Current Questions of Agriculture and Its Effectiveness," *Kommunist,* No. 11, July 1980, pp. 10–26.

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remove old officials and build his own machine.

If the succession takes place quickly, Gorbachëv's youth and relative inexperience with the non-Russian nationalities and with foreign policy will count against him. It should be noted, however, that he has a most striking range of political connections. As already discussed, his patron, Kulakov, was associated with Chernenko in Penza. Kulakov's election as CC secretary in 1965 was quite likely on Chernenko's recommendation. The head of the organizational party work department, and subsequently the organizational secretary of the Stavropol' kraykom under Gorbachëv, A. K. Vedernikov, has since served as the head of the section of the Central Committee's Organizational Party Work Department in charge of Moldavia and the western Ukraine.[91] This, too, may have solidified the tie with Chernenko. In addition, Gorbachëv's post as Komsomol secretary in Moscow University placed him under the supervision of Grishin and Kapitonov. His work in Stavropol' was in a kray where Suslov had once been first secretary, and at Suslov's funeral, he was the only Politburo member to stop and talk with each member of Suslov's family.[92] Finally, Richard Kosolapov, the chief editor of *Kommunist,* was in Komsomol work with Gorbachëv at Moscow University.[93]

The Succession

Speculation about the outcome of the struggle for power is fraught with danger. We tend simply to focus on the question of who will be the general secretary, but it should not be forgotten that the real leader—the real strongman—may hold a different post. In the Soviet Union, both Lenin and Malenkov were head of government (rather than head of the party), and in China, Deng Xiaoping chose to rule from a less lofty post. Moreover, the arrangements made immediately after the succession may fall apart quickly. Malenkov was removed as party secretary in a week, the "gang of four" lasted a month, and Lavrentiy Beria was arrested in four months. These events, in turn, were only the first steps in a political struggle that lasted for some years.

We also do not know the time of the succession, the health of the various contenders at that time (or even which ones will be alive), the personal relationships among the Politburo members, and their opinions of each other's abilities and judgment. Are, for example, Chernenko and Andropov major adversaries, or have they reached an agreement on the succession? Is Andropov, who looks frail on television, willing to accept the less demanding Suslov portfolio? Is Grishin ill enough that he would be satisfied with Arvid Pel'she's post of chairman of the Party Control Committee (a post for which he would seem well suited by temperament and reputation)? How antagonistic are the Moldavian and Dnepropetrovsk factions of the Brezhnev group? We should not pretend that we have the answers to these and many similar questions.

Events will also affect the succession in ways difficult to foresee. The performance of the economy may absolutely require reform or may permit reform to be postponed. There may be foreign policy crises. The Polish crisis, for example, has no doubt already affected the Soviet succession. It dramatically pointed up the dangers of Soviet pricing policy and of excessive reliance on foreign credits. It surely posed severe dilemmas for Soviet policymakers; some Politburo members probably panicked and counseled invasion, and others advised patience. In the process, the position of some contenders must have been strengthened, and the position of others weakened. Even the Middle East crisis may have had an impact.

Besides events, the process of "cabinet-building" may have a major effect on the final outcome. One of the striking facts about this succession is the number of key posts that it is likely to open. If Andropov, Grishin, or Gorbachëv became general secretary, it is highly likely that Tikhonov, Kirilenko, and Chernenko would soon be replaced or moved into more ceremonial positions. Gromyko and Ustinov are also candidates for retirement in the relatively near future, and the new chairman of the KGB, Vitaliy Fedorchuk, could easily be a transitional figure. All these jobs, as well as the former job of the new general secretary, could become open.

Other key posts could be created or strengthened. The post of chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet could be filled again by a man other than the general secretary. The chairmanship of Gosplan might well be upgraded in a time of economic reform, perhaps even to the level it had under Nikolay Voznesenskiy or Mikhail Saburov. Normally, of course, the post of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers has been a highly important one, with several such officials represented on the Politburo. (Today there is only one first deputy chairman, the 75-year-old Ivan Arkhipov, an old Brezhnev crony who is not even a candidate member of the Politburo and who almost certainly will disappear with Brezhnev.) And the system badly

[91] *Stavropol'skaya Pravda,* Feb. 21, 1971, p. 1, and Feb. 23, 1974, p. 1; *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (Kishinëv), Jan. 30, 1976, p. 1; and *L'vovskaya Pravda* (L'vov), Dec. 23, 1978, p. 1.

[92] I am indebted to Mark Zlotnik for this point.

[93] Kosolapov's biography states only that he entered Komsomol work immediately after graduation in 1955 (1981 *Yezhegodnik,* p. 584). That would not have occurred, however, if he had not been active in it in the university. *1981 Yezhegodnik,* p. 584.

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needs a national security adviser to coordinate foreign and defense policy.

A key to the struggle for power, then, will be the ability to distribute these posts to powerful figures within the Central Committee in a way that will build a winning coalition. Any such exercise now is deeply threatening to Brezhnev, unless he has decided to retire, for a coalition in place has little incentive to wait until his death. Unless Brezhnev has permitted Chernenko to build a coalition, the contenders may be avoiding cabinet-building lest Brezhnev get wind of it and move against them. If so, the succession would have to take place in a great hurry under difficult circumstances.

Even if past experience did not point in such a direction,[94] the present situation within the Politburo suggests that the immediate post-Brezhnev leadership will be a collective one. The crucial question, however, is what type of collective leadership will it be? Will it be a status quo collective leadership in which, as has been the case in recent years, the major interests are able to prevent policies that would do them serious harm? Or will it be a collective leadership on the 1953–57 model—a leadership that, while beset with conflict, permits and even encourages individual members to carry out major policy initiatives in their own spheres of responsibility?

It is easy to make a strong case for either of these options. Even excluding Brezhnev, 7 of the 12 Politburo voting members are 70 years of age or older. Forty percent of the voting members of the Central Committee will be 65 or older by the end of 1982 (more than half of them 70 or older, and one fifth 75 or older). Seventy percent of the Council of Ministers members who are voting members of the Central Committee will be 65 or older.[95] Most of these older men must sense that reform means retirement in the relatively near future and would surely prefer a leader such as Grishin (at least if he is described correctly here), who would not challenge the status quo seriously and who might not retire them too quickly.

It seems to me, however, that while this scenario is quite possible, it underestimates the probabilities of near-term reform. Domestically, there is a pressure for change, a frustration at the weakness and indecision of Brezhnev, a desire for a strong leader and some action, and an impatience on the part of younger (really middle-aged) leaders to have their chance. Abroad, there is the threat of an all-out arms race and the disarray in the Western alliance, which give the Soviet leadership an added incentive to go beyond their usual peace offensive and take really meaningful steps toward arms control. Finally, there is the shock over the events in Poland, whose year-and-a-half of turmoil is likely to make the other peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union more willing to forgo radical action in favor of evolution and more willing to accept price rises in the framework of the promise of reform.[96]

A reformist collective leadership is also politically quite possible. The Politburo has been changed significantly in the last few years through the deaths of Kosygin and Suslov, the decline of Kirilenko, and the selection of a basically nonpolitical transition figure (Tikhonov) as chairman of the Council of Ministers. As a result, the Politburo members who will most likely be the key figures in the brokering—Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachëv, Grishin, Gromyko, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Grigoriy Romanov, Shcherbitskiy, and Ustinov—average only 66 years of age, a situation quite different from what it would have been three years ago. In the Central Committee, 60 percent are younger than 65, and a coalition needs only 51 percent for victory. In addition, at least a few of the older CC members are either anticipating retirement in any case or hoping to be one of those who will benefit from the succession.

If there is to be a reformist collective leadership, it may not matter too much who will occupy precisely which posts. Regardless of his exact position, Gorbachëv would probably concentrate on agriculture and the services sector (that is, on a partial return to the New Economic Policy). Andropov would probably have major responsibility for foreign policy and ideology. Vladimir Dolgikh, the new member of the Politburo, would very likely handle industrial reorganization. Chernenko (if he is included) would concentrate on political reforms.

If one is to speculate about actual posts, I have had the sense that Andropov has the best chance to be general secretary or at least the strongman behind a weak general secretary. As chairman of the KGB, Andropov has been ruthless enough to reassure the conservatives that he would not let reform get out of hand (in fact, he probably would be quite harsh on dissident activity even as he loosened some of the controls on acceptable political activity). That same ruthlessness might reassure the reformers that he has the strength to handle the ministries. I suspect that Andropov has excellent relations with the Army Chief of Staff Nikolay Ogarkov, who fought on the Karelian front in World War II near the area where Andropov was associated with

[94] For the argument that successions tend to follow the same pattern, including early collective leadership, see George W. Breslauer, "Political Succession and the Soviet Policy Agenda," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1980, pp. 34–52.

[95] These and later statistics on Soviet officials are drawn from the biographies of Central Committee members, all of which were published at the end of the 1981 *Yezhegodnik*.

[96] For the opposite case, see Seweryn Bialer, "The International and Internal Contexts of the 26th Party Congress," in Bialer and Gustafson, op. cit., esp. pp. 33–38.

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Vladimir Shcherbitskiy (left) inspects the Raba Rolling Stock and Machine Works in Gyor, Hungary, during a 1972 visit.

—INTERFOTO MTI/Photoreporters.

the partisans.[97] Ogarkov's appointment as minister of defense might complete the needed coalition.

As I read the Soviet media of the last few months, however, my instincts suggest that the coalition may already be in place. In April, the most sophisticated of the Soviet political observers, Fëdor Burlatskiy, wrote about the "interregnum" (*mezhdutsarstviye*) and "time of troubles" (*smutnoye vremya*) in China and included some generalizations that had obvious relevance for the Soviet Union:

In the history of interregnums it often turns out this way: after the death of a sovereign, emperor, or leader who did not leave a successor, a time of trouble ensues, in which different groups compete in a struggle for power until a new leader appears who is capable of ending the political confusion and reestablishing a firm order. Moreover, in the first stage, as a rule, a completely inconspicuous person is advanced. He succeeds in using the favorable situation while the basic rivals have a mortal grip on each other.

Perhaps Mao Zedong calculated on establishing collective leadership after his death? Then he should have stated this and worried about the creation of political mechanisms inside the party and the state which would have made this possible. . . . And, thus, as has often happened in periods of interregnums, the successor at first turned out to be one of the least-known figures—the man on whom no one had turned any attention beforehand, Hua Guofeng.[98]

Whether by coincidence or not, the weeks after this article was published saw a series of events that suggested the major rivals—or perhaps Brezhnev himself—were introducing some order into the situation. In the wake of Kirilenko's two-month disappearance from public view, Dolgikh was elevated to candidate membership in the Politburo, apparently with Kirilenko's long-time responsibility for the Planning and Financial Organs Department.[99] Kapitonov suffered a significant reduction of status.[100] While this may have been part of a campaign against Kirilenko, it was also a sign that one of Grishin's main hopes was not going to be of any help and that he, Grishin, was one of the "inconspicuous" candidates who was not likely to make it.

If the immediate succession is more or less in place, and enjoys Brezhnev's approval, then Chernenko must be a big part of it—most likely, either as the general secretary or chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (if the two jobs are to be separated). Indeed, if Gorbachëv is linked to Chernenko through Kulakov and if Dolgikh is likewise linked to Chernenko through his long years of work in Chernenko's home region of Krasnoyarsk, it is easy to put together hypothetical "cabinets," with Chernenko as general secretary. If Gorbachëv is politically trustworthy, he would make an excellent personnel secretary, both because of his experience with organizational work and because of his supervision of agriculture. Dolgikh could assume either Kirilenko's post in the CC Secretariat or a high post in the Council of Ministers. Andropov is a natural occupant of the Suslov slot, perhaps even expanded to become "national security adviser." The chairmanship of the Council of Ministers is a problem, because the other men are Russians (although Chernenko's name is Ukrainian) and because it usually has had foreign policy

[97] In a 1942 article that Andropov chose to have republished in his 1979 selected works, he emphasized the closeness to the front and the help that the Komsomol was giving it through the making and collecting of supplies. Yu. V. Andropov, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Writings), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp. 24–25. For a discussion of Andropov's work at this time, see *Za liniyey Karel'skogo fronta* (Behind the Lines of the Karelian Front), 2nd ed., Petrozavodsk, Kareliya, 1979, pp. 62, 78–79, 214, and 289.

[98] Fëdor Burlatskiy, "Interregnum, or Chronicle of the Years of Deng Xiaoping," *Novyyi Mir* (Moscow), No. 4, 1982, pp. 210–11.

[99] See fn. 36.

[100] In recent years, Kapitonov always signed obituaries out of alphabetical order as the first of the CC secretaries not on the Politburo. That is, he signed in front of Dolgikh and Mikhail Zimyanin ("Z" comes before "K" in the Russian alphabet). In addition, he almost always signed minor cultural obituaries with Zimyanin in cases where only the latter seemed appropriate. However, beginning with an obituary published in *Pravda*, Apr. 28, 1982, p. 6, Kapitonov no longer signed the obituaries of minor cultural figures; and beginning with an obituary printed in ibid., June 9, 1982, p. 3, Kapitonov's name was listed in alphabetical order after Zimyanin. Cf. ibid., June 1, 1982, p. 3, the last obituary signed in the old way.

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responsibilities (if the general secretary has not assumed them). As a Ukrainian, Tikhonov might well be kept on for a while, despite his age; however, non-Russians such as Shcherbitskiy and Eduard Shevardnadze are obvious candidates for promotion.

To repeat, however, the critical question—especially for the outside world—is the basic policy orientation of the majority in any new collective leadership. The Brezhnev regime has lasted for nearly 20 years, and the Brezhnev generation has been near the top for more than 40 years. As a consequence, it has become very difficult for us to judge which features of Soviet politics and policies are inherent in the system and which really reflect more the values of this historic generation. There are enormous differences between Communist systems such as North Korea and Yugoslavia—or even Hungary and Romania—and it is at least conceivable that many aspects of the Soviet Union which we have ascribed either to the essence of the system or the Russian national character will turn out to be less permanent than we have assumed.

It seems to me that a new collective leadership is likely to make significant changes—perhaps even quite significant changes—fairly quickly. The Khrushchev-Brezhnev social policy has come to a political dead end. By basing their legitimacy so heavily on egalitarianism, the leaders have set an impossible goal for themselves and will always be judged by their failures rather than their achievements. Indeed, by overrewarding the industrial proletariat, they do not even serve the cause of social justice, for they neglect the truly underprivileged in Soviet society—the lower white-collar and service personnel. By permitting the gap between prices and the supply-and-demand equilibrium point to widen, they create inexorable pressures for the broadening of a black market that strikes at the moral fiber of the system, and they create a growing privileged group among those willing to function outside the law. The leading theorists who speak out on this subject say that all means should be used to liquidate this problem, and this seems to indicate—and certainly should indicate—price reform and a partial legalization of private activity in trade and the services.[101] For these reasons the social policy is likely to be modified in the interests of economic growth.

To be sure, policy changes may be halting and uneven, especially if Brezhnev retires with honor rather than dies or is removed. The Soviet Union would certainly not move quickly toward anything approaching Yugoslavia's market socialism, and even movement toward the Hungarian model would be slow. Near-term reforms would conceivably be movement toward meaningful price adjustments, legalization of parts of the second economy, and greater independence for the farms and individual peasants. As in Hungary, a selective importation of key Western consumer goods would symbolize change and absorb excess purchasing power (an importation of 100 million hand calculators would cost only US$500 million—far less than is spent on grain). As in 1953 and 1954, some of the simplest changes are in the foreign and defense policy realms. If there is to be reform, it may come there first. The most severe conflicts between economic growth and social policy are likely to be the center of the second phase of the succession, several years hence.

If, of course, no change takes place in the wake of succession, if the new Soviet leadership pushes forward as blindly as the Polish leadership did in the 1970's, then serious thought has to be given to the question of the stability of the system. Because of the identification of communism with Russian nationalism, one would anticipate that the first riots would be directed against the leadership rather than against the system as a whole. If so, the disturbances could be quieted by reform. However, if troops refuse to fire on rioters—as occurred in March 1917—there will be no threat of outside intervention (as in the Polish case) to save the system. It is precisely the recognition of this fact that is likely to persuade the new Soviet leaders that they cannot wait until later in the decade to begin reform.

[101] R. Kosolapov, "Contribution of the 24th, 25th, and 26th CPSU Congresses Toward the Solution of Theoretical and Political Problems of Developed Socialism and the Transition to Communism," *Kommunist*, No. 5, March 1982, pp. 66–67; and V. Pechenov, "On the Firm Ground of Socioeconomic Policy," ibid., No. 11, July 1982, pp. 41–42.

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Soviet Succession:

Signs of Struggle

by Sidney I. Ploss

American national security expert William G. Hyland has compellingly argued that a useful approach to understanding the Soviet succession is to determine the main players and their policies.[1] Although the tightening of political secrecy in Moscow after Nikita Khrushchev's downfall in 1964 has made it more difficult to study the flow of influence and opinion in the Kremlin, the task is not insuperable. Indeed, the same sorts of signs that have historically betokened intraparty factionalism have surfaced during the period that Leonid Brezhnev has led the Soviet Communist party. By carefully reading these indicators, Kremlinologists can tentatively identify the principal actors in the Soviet leadership, their likely stand on major policy issues, and the way these people and policies may shape the succession process in Moscow.

A Word About Signs

At the outset, it might be useful to explain why analysts undertake the seemingly convoluted approach of Kremlinology, of watching who seems to be edging out whom, who seems to be on the ascendant and who is on his way out—all based on such signs as sequence of signatures in newspaper articles, the order in which the Politburo members speak or even stand at important celebrations, manipulation of published versions of speeches, or allegorical and suggestive news stories. The reason for doing so lies in the persistence of certain Russian revolutionary traditions into the Soviet period. Revolutionaries in 19th century Russia developed a method of veiled discourse that enabled them to insert anti-regime ideas into the censored tsarist press. The Bolsheviks adopted this form of "communication-by-innuendo" and continued to use it even after they seized power, for it allowed various party cliques to spread their views without violating the ban on intraparty factionalism imposed by Lenin in 1921.[2] This, in turn, helped preserve the fiction of party unity for purposes of preserving a formidably united common front before the Soviet public.

The importance of such indirect expression in Soviet leadership politics is explained in Isaac Deutscher's account of the Stalin-Trotsky debate on "socialism in one country":

As sometimes happens in important disputes, where both sides are strongly committed to certain common principles, so in this controversy, too, its explanation cannot be found in the literal meaning of the disputants' words, certainly not in their zealous reiteration of "common" principles, but must rather be sought in the subtle, often imperceptible, shifts in the emphasis of their arguments. . . . The audience that listens to the disputants is left unmoved by their professions of common principle; it treats these as part of a customary ritual. But it pricks up its ears at the different hints and allusions thrown out by either side; and it avidly absorbs all their undertones and unspoken conclusions. It quickly learns to tell the operative part of any formula from the reservations and escape clauses that seem to contradict it.[3]

[1] "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1982, pp. 17–26.

Mr. Ploss is a senior analyst at the US Department of State (Washington, DC). He is author of Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia, *1965 and* The Soviet Political Process, *1971, as well as numerous articles on Kremlin dynastics. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy of the US government.*

[2] Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Random House, 1960, p. 211.

[3] Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1949, p. 288.

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Ceremonies in honor of deceased Politburo member Mikhail Suslov on Moscow's Red Square, January 29, 1982. From right to left: Konstantin Chernenko, Andrey Kirilenko, Nikolay Tikhonov, Leonid Brezhnev, and Viktor Grishin.

—APN/SYGMA.

The technique is openly recognized by Soviet officials as a political tactic. Edward Hallett Carr recounts how Politburo member Grigoriy Zinoviev used parable to attack his colleague Nikolay Bukharin in 1925. Zinoviev published an article in *Pravda* which was ostensibly a critique of some essays by the émigré economist N. V. Ustryalov. Zinoviev said that Ustryalov's work constituted a harmful "canonization of the kulak," a position illustrative of the "danger of degeneration" which Lenin had always regarded as inherent in the prolongation of peaceful evolution at home and the delay of revolution abroad. Ustryalov, according to Zinoviev, was "the ideologue of the bourgeoisie." When Stalin entrusted his henchmen to bring Zinoviev under fire, Lazar Kaganovich charged that Zinoviev's *Pravda* article "professed to be about Ustryalov, but the real target was comrade Bukharin."[4]

Alexander Solzhenitsyn writes graphically of the role of disguised political messages in communications within the Soviet bureaucratic elite. In a novel set in the mid-1950's, he describes the eagerness with which administrator Rusanov awaited delivery of his newspapers:

He felt real jealousy if someone else, with unhallowed fingers, opened a fresh newspaper before him. No one here could possibly understand a newspaper as he did. He regarded newspapers as a widely distributed instruction, written in fact in code, nothing in it could be said openly, but a skillful man who knew the ropes could interpret the various small hints, the arrangement of the articles, the things that were played down or omitted, and so get a true picture of the way things were going. This was why Rusanov had to read the paper first.[5]

Similarly, former Soviet philosophy professor Alexander Zinoviev, in a 1976 novel about life in a Soviet-type state called Ibansk—led by a Brezhnev-like figure—writes:

Here's the leading article of the Newspaper. For you it's empty chatter and demagogy. But for an expert it's a world of information. Here one finds lots of visible and invisible evaluations. The first business of an Ibansk careerist is to learn to read such texts, which mean nothing for outsiders. For you and me these texts are a

[4] Edward Hallett Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia: Socialism in One Country*, Vol. 1, New York, NY, Macmillan, 1958, pp. 300–01.

[5] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Cancer Ward*, trans. by Nicholas Bethell and David Burg, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1969, p. 210.

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hollow sound. But they are a guide to action for those people.[6]

For the Kremlinologist, too, glaring irregularities or other "signs" in official information sources are significant, not as guides to action but as reflections of debate or infighting among the top Soviet leaders. Usually, the analyst will collect a number of related signs before reaching a tentative conclusion, thereby avoiding the pitfall of overinterpretation.[7] The inductive methods of Kremlinology are necessarily imperfect; nevertheless, they do permit us to make provisional judgments about divisions and shifts on the Soviet political scene.

Pre-Succession Struggle?

What do these tools tell us about the rumors that the January 1982 death of Mikhail Suslov, "number two" man in the Soviet hierarchy, may have triggered a struggle for succession to Brezhnev's key post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)? The East European officials largely responsible for this speculation are somewhat suspect, because seven years ago they had spread gossip that Brezhnev might soon leave office for reasons of health.[8] Yet examination of hints and allegories contained in several articles published in the CPSU daily *Pravda* during February and March do seem to support the idea of a pre-succession power battle.

In late February, the Western press began reporting from Moscow that an investigation was taking place into purported corruption and bribery on the part of the USSR's top circus administrator, Anatoliy Kolevatov, alleging that the wrongdoer was a friend of Brezhnev's daughter, Galina Churbanova. According to the stories in circulation, Kolevatov allowed performers to make trips abroad on the condition that they bring back for him high-value items that fetch extraordinary black market prices in Moscow.[9] At the same time, *Pravda* carried a commentary on readers' letters devoted to the theme of personal morality.[10] One letter had it that, "in children, as if in a mirror, there is reflected the psychological disposition and the convictions reigning within their families."

Anti-Brezhnev rumors gained strength on March 1, when *Pravda* carried an interview conducted by a Galina Kozhukhova—a rare by-line in the columns of

An interview in Pravda *in early 1982 with Soviet State Circus star Yuriy Nikulin (left) was a possible sign of a move in one sector of the Soviet leadership to discredit Leonid Brezhnev and remove him from power.*

—Photo of Nikulin by Novosti from Sovfoto.

Pravda—with famous circus clown Yuriy Nikulin. Nikulin was said to have remarked that if he were in a position to change the Soviet circus, he would add more "unselfish and fully dedicated people." He also lamented the behavior of the young actor who rushes "to work as an administrator of his own success, strives at once to organize for himself trips that are more interesting and to obtain decorations more rapidly." He contrasted such an actor with someone who did not get a state prize until age 60 and never cared about perquisites. The virtuous performer "acquired and did everything by himself, with his own hands. . . ." The sophisticated reader of *Pravda* within the Soviet bureaucracy could easily have construed such material as an allegory about the circus director Kolevatov, who has a reputation for greed and string-pulling. *Pravda*'s clientele might further have linked the article to the anti-Brezhnev rumors by

[6] Alexander Zinoviev, *Ziyayushchiye vysoty* (The Yawning Heights), Lausanne, L'Age d'homme, 1976, p. 431.

[7] Sometimes even a lone sign can be like a fire bell in the night—e.g., Moscow's *Pravda* on Oct. 11, 1964, heralding the removal of Khrushchev by unusually spelling his title *"first"* rather than *"First"* Secretary of the CPSU.

[8] See "Brezhnev 'Very Tired,' Budapest Editors Told," *The New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1975.

[9] See "2 Scandals Have All Moscow Abuzz," ibid., Feb. 27, 1982, and "Soviets Said to Arrest, Fire Officials in Scandal," *The Washington Post* (Washington, DC), Feb. 27, 1982.

[10] *Pravda*, Feb. 22, 1982.

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associating "decorations" with Brezhnev's office, which grants awards. And the name "Galina"—the same as Brezhnev's daughter—in the by-line of the article doubtless raised eyebrows.

An article in the March 12 *Pravda* lent further credence to the notion that a challenge to Brezhnev was brewing within the Kremlin. Reading like a riposte to the March 1 interview, the story defended a party official whose career bore astonishing similarities to Brezhnev's. *Pravda* said of Klavdiy Svechnikov, the secretary of a party committee on a state farm: "At age 15 he began to toil as a worker . . ."; Brezhnev's latest memoir says that, "I became a worker when I was fifteen years old."[11] Svechnikov studied to become an agronomist; Brezhnev attended land management and reclamation technical school, and worked in 1927–29 as a land specialist. Both are veterans of World War II, and Svechnikov goes from one hospital to another as the ailing Brezhnev doubtless has done for some time. As the story has it, amidst rumors of corruption (evoking the story of corruption at the state circus), Svechnikov was ousted from his state farm position by scheming bosses eager to hush things up. The district leaders got medical experts to certify Svechnikov physically unfit, unable to continue in his party post for "reasons of health." At the end of the story, virtuous Communists on the state farm supposedly rebelled against their political superiors and called for a review of the decision to oust Svechnikov. Higher-ups allegedly stormed against this "violation of the principle of democratic centralism" in the state farm's party cell. But, as *Pravda* emphasized, Secretary Svechnikov's party committee had elected him unanimously, and the account implied that the committee alone should have determined the professional fate of its secretary. The logic of events creates the unmistakable impression that this article was a significant political parable rather than just a routine piece of investigative reporting. Any leaders intent on deposing Brezhnev might follow the pattern of Khrushchev's overthrow and tell the world that Brezhnev had stepped down "for reasons of health." Brezhnev and his supporters would argue his right to stay at the helm, given that he alone among the top party leaders had been "unanimously" elected by the CPSU Central Committee at the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981 and that only the Central Committee had the right to remove him.[12]

Thus, *Pravda* seems to have confirmed the guess of outside observers that certain Soviet leaders were responsible for the widespread Moscow rumors of corruption in Brezhnev's family. The anti-Brezhnev overtones of the *Pravda* interview with circus clown Nikulin tended to debunk the theory that Brezhnev's authority was enormous and his power position unassailable. The implicit attack on the General Secretary's moral authority was particularly striking in light of his own solemn moralizing in recently-published memoirs about the proletarian rectitude of his parents.[13] From our knowledge of press procedures in the USSR, we can be almost certain that some Central Committee Secretary examined the Nikulin interview in galley form and felt himself powerful enough—and Brezhnev sufficiently weakened—to approve its publication. The allegorical story about Svechnikov suggested that Brezhnev's entourage was resisting an intrigue to have the General Secretary dismissed as someone who had become inconvenient. All told, the conflicting signs served to buttress the conclusion that after Stalin's personal despotism, which rested on police terror, no Soviet chief has been able to stand above the political fray in the Kremlin, but has had to rule through alliance and compromise at the Politburo. They also suggested that the succession may be near at hand.

Principal Contenders

It is therefore both useful and instructive to take a closer look at Brezhnev's likely successors and at what is known or can be inferred about their position on major policy issues. Without going into any elaborate discussion, it is possible to outline some general criteria for a successor on which most Western analysts by and large agree.[14] Briefly put, the successor is probably going to be a full member or, at the very least, a candidate member of the Politburo, with major responsibilities in the party's Secretariat; he is likely to be a Russian by nationality or a Russified Slav; and, unless he is to be an interim caretaker, he is not likely to be over 70 years of age. There is more disagreement among analysts about the likely stance of such a person with regard to policy. On the evidence of past successions, the successful contender should appear as a centrist, consensual leader during the succession process. Some analysts argue, however, that the pressing nature of the policy dilemmas facing the USSR now would require a contender who is decisive and has well-defined policy goals. In the near term, one can discern four immediate possibilities to succeed Brezhnev.

[11] *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 11, 1981, p. 13.

[12] Khrushchev made the same point about his tenure at the 1961 CPSU Congress, when he reviewed his 1957 fight with Georgiy Malenkov and Vyacheslav Molotov, evidently to intimidate any new group of Kremlin adversaries interested in toppling him. See *Pravda*, Oct. 29, 1961.

[13] Loc. cit., and *Pravda*, Nov 12, 1981.

[14] Gray Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1975, pp. 1–21.

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

Konstantin Chernenko, the current "heir presumptive" to Leonid Brezhnev, shown during attendance at the 24th Congress of the French Communist Party on February 3, 1982.

—SYGMA.

The heir presumptive. Since Suslov's death, Konstantin Chernenko has emerged as the untitled deputy leader of the CPSU. Since March 1976, Chernenko has had major responsibilities (as head of the General Department) within the party Secretariat, a body that furnishes data for Politburo sessions and influences policy execution. In October 1977, he was elected a candidate member of the Politburo, and in November 1978, he became a full member. In March 1982, he presided at the shakeup of the Soviet trade union leadership and later was depicted as a kind of acting General Secretary, closely involved in military, police, agricultural, and foreign affairs.[15] A "restless man," as Brezhnev praisingly called him on the occasion of his 70th birthday in September 1981,[16] Chernenko appears to be a robust Siberian with great energy.

Despite little formal education or practical experience at the grass roots, Chernenko is a shrewd party official who favors using opinion surveys to gauge public moods and doing more for the consumer.[17] Subsequent to the Polish labor revolt of 1980, he explicitly warned that in socialist countries the neglect of human wants is "fraught with the danger of social tension and of political and socioeconomic crisis."[18]

Chernenko, however, insists that the state bureaucracy and its interest in efficient administration be strictly subordinated to the party apparatus and operate under tight ideological discipline. Chernenko's faith in the miracle-working power of check-ups in factories and farms by political controllers is obvious from his remark in a 1980 election speech that "the state of supervision and verification of performance to a decisive extent determines the effectiveness and quality of leadership and administration."[19] Chernenko has equally shown his dedication to tested tradition with an attack on "pragmatism" and economic managers who put "excessive trust in material stimuli alone," i.e., in monetary incentives.[20] Chernenko tells party officials to devote equal time to mass indoctrination, job appointments, and monitoring of government operations. If cadres overemphasize educational work to the detriment of organizational work and decision-making, he cautions, the party will be transformed from the great integrating force of Soviet society into a loose coalition of interest groups along Western lines.[21] These declarations of Chernenko leave small doubt that he would be disinclined to initiate genuine reform of the Soviet command economy or to tamper with the principle of the absolute primacy of the party apparatus in decision-making.

As a rule, Chernenko's stance on foreign policy has been less bellicose than that of others in the power structure. Although he has spoken of the "potential threat of a new world war," his tone is milder than that of senior officials who aver that the danger of US-Soviet conflict is a grim reality of international life.[22] At the same time, Chernenko sounds strikingly similar to other post-Stalin leaders who have been opportunistic about

[15] For some highlights of Chernenko's varied activities, see *Pravda*, Mar. 13, May 12 and 28, and June 3 and 16, 1982.

[16] *Ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1981.

[17] Special programs for the in-depth study of public opinion are urged in Chernenko's *Voprosy raboty partiynogo i gosudarstvennogo apparata* (Questions of the Work of the Party and State Apparatus), Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p. 335. Chernenko revealed in an April 1979 article in *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* (Moscow) that a group for analyzing public opinion had recently been created within the CPSU Secretariat.

[18] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 13, 1981.

[19] *Pravda*, Feb. 16, 1980.

[20] *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1982.

[21] *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Moscow), No. 2, 1982.

[22] Compare Chernenko's speech to French Communists in *Pravda*, Feb. 7, 1982, with that of Soviet trade union head Aleksey Shibayev to international Communist trade union leaders in ibid., Feb. 12, 1982. Chernenko supervised Shibayev's ouster on Mar. 5, 1982. See ibid., Mar. 6, 1982.

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damaging Western standing in the developing countries even while eagerly seeking to obtain the benefits of limited cooperation with the Atlantic powers. He could be expected to support Karen Brutents, a deputy chief of the CPSU Secretariat's International Department, in his militant polemics with those who urge less aggressive Soviet policies in the Third World.[23]

A counterweight. A second key figure is Yuriy Andropov, a veteran party official who headed the secret police (KGB) from 1967 until May 1982, when he was appointed to the party Secretariat with as yet unrevealed policy responsibilities.[24] Aged 68,[25] Andropov seems to be following the examples of Georgiy Malenkov and Aleksandr Shelepin, who propounded the line that domestic policies should be based more on professional expertise than on ideological fervor. This political tendency, it seems to me, is far more indicative of the policies Andropov would likely pursue as General Secretary than are his unclear role as Soviet ambassador to Budapest in 1956 at the time of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, his attitude toward the KGB's secret war with the US Central Intelligence Agency, or his alleged preference for Western libations and novels. While all Soviet leaders can be assumed to be "ruthless" and few could be classed as ascetic, the leadership has often been rent by violent arguments over the proper relationship between state management experts, who tend to favor practical solutions to socioeconomic dilemmas, and party functionaries, who are normally disposed toward exhortation and mobilization as a technique for problem-solving.[26]

In this context, Andropov's speech at Lenin Day

[23] Ibid., Feb. 2, 1982.

[24] Ibid., May 25, 1982. Andropov was chief of the Secretariat's Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries from 1957 to 1967 and a party secretary from 1962 to 1967.

[25] The ages given for Soviet leaders in this article are those as of Sept. 1, 1982, and are based on information in A. V. Shumakov, comp., *Knizhka partiynogo aktivista, 1981* (Party Worker's Booklet, 1981), Moscow, Politizdat, 1980.

[26] The Malenkov-Molotov clique was accused of having "waged a struggle against . . . the directing role of the party" (*Pravda*, Nov. 12, 1958) and of having tried to justify the "need for the primacy of state bodies over party bodies" (*Kommunist*, No. 10, 1957).

Yuriy Andropov, Central Committee secretary and Politburo member, addresses the April 22, 1982, Lenin Day rally in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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observances in Moscow on April 22, 1982, clashed with Chernenko's recent call for keeping a balance in party activities between oversight of economic management, on the one hand, and educational and ideological work, on the other. Andropov said that the party's "very first task" should be "to be concerned ceaselessly about raising the working people's consciousness and political culture," in other words, mass indoctrination.[27] Thus engaged, the party would (implicitly) afford more freedom to managerial specialists. Underscoring this markedly revisionist approach to the cardinal issue of the CPSU's role was a highly symbolic action downgrading the party's importance taken at this meeting, at which Andropov was the principal speaker. Until 1982, *Pravda's* account of the Lenin Day rally in Moscow had always indicated that the participants heard the "USSR State Hymn," or national anthem, at the start and stood to sing the "Internationale," or party anthem, at the end. This year, however, *Pravda* reported simply that the national anthem was heard at the end of the meeting and made no mention whatsoever of the party anthem.[28] The effect was to highlight the importance of the state at the expense of the party.

Andropov's revisionism did not escape the attention of party stalwarts. A short time later, the first secretary of the Volgograd city party committee contradicted Andropov's view that indoctrination should be the party's "very first task" by recalling that "V. I. Lenin in the first years of Soviet rule pointed out that 'we must now pose as our first, current, and very main task the practical nature and efficient quality of organizational work.' This very main task has not at all lost its political urgency."[29] Moreover, the CPSU daily published a historical reference to "the majestic melody of the *Internationale*" just four days after the account of the Lenin Day rally.[30]

Reform of the domestic order would seem to necessitate a lowering of East-West tensions, and Andropov has been more vocal than other top leaders in supporting improved relations with the United States. Alluding to the heavy burden of defense spending on the Soviet economy, he told an April 1976 Lenin Day audience that "aimless waste of material resources for no purpose" could result from "delay in the process of détente and even more so, slipping back, if only temporarily."[31] By August 1978, when other Soviet chiefs had cooled to the policy, Andropov continued to hail détente's successes, "especially" those attained in the early 1970's (the time of the strategic arms limitation negotiations—SALT I).[32] Andropov's tactful approach to Moscow's dealings with its allies is evident from his good personal relations with reform-minded Communist leaders in Hungary.[33] Back in the Khrushchev era, Andropov attacked old Bolshevik Molotov for "juggling Stalinist formulas" and spawning a "theory" that offended the East Europeans by trampling upon "socialist patriotism, the love of each people for its homeland."[34] This evidently signifies a reluctance to press for too much political and economic integration within the bloc.

The third man. Yet another major contender, Andrey Kirilenko, Central Committee secretary for industrial management and Communist-bloc economic relations, was long regarded as Brezhnev's successor-in-waiting. In his heyday in the mid-1970's, Kirilenko was able to bring a protégé, Yakov Ryabov, into the Secretariat from Kirilenko's former Sverdlovsk base in the Urals and gain for Ryabov the choice duty of supervising armaments production. Ryabov, however, was sidetracked to the State Planning Committee in early 1979.[35] Kirilenko himself was soon snubbed in a widely celebrated photographic manipulation in the local Moscow press.[36] Kirilenko was missing from public view for a two-month span in early 1982, but he reemerged on May Day,[37] and so may still be in the running to succeed Brezhnev.

Kirilenko's statements suggest that this 75-year-old engineer favors a certain amount of economic reform within the framework of central planning. He has spoken warmly about the broader use of financial incentives in industry and the granting of greater autonomy to firms. At the same time, Kirilenko espouses a rather narrow political orthodoxy, reviling domestic critics of Stalinism and, particularly, violators of labor discipline. One can imagine Kirilenko and the late Suslov having been aligned on law-and-order issues.[38]

In foreign affairs, Kirilenko has projected the image of someone who wishes to work for a better understanding with the United States, but without the fanfare of dra-

[27] *Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1982.
[28] Ibid. Cf. *Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1981, and Apr. 22, 1980.
[29] *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Apr. 30, 1982.
[30] *Pravda*, Apr. 27, 1982.
[31] Ibid., Apr. 23, 1976.
[32] Ibid., Aug. 6, 1978.
[33] See "Why Hungarians think Andropov will succeed Brezhnev," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), July 9, 1982.
[34] *Pravda*, Dec. 2, 1961.
[35] *Pravda*, Apr. 18, 1979, and *Sobraniye postanovleniy pravitel'stva SSSR* (Moscow), No. 7, 1979.
[36] Kirilenko's image was missing from a photograph of the Politburo line-up at the May Day parade on Red Square published in *Vechernyaya Moskva* (Moscow), May 1, 1979. His image did, however, surface in *Pravda's* analogous graphic on May 2, 1979.
[37] Kirilenko was absent from such important occasions as a Kremlin awards ceremony for Politburo member Dinmukhamed Kunayev on Feb. 25, 1982, a Politburo outing to the theater on Mar. 3, the rally for International Women's Day on Mar. 5, and the Lenin Day meeting on April 22.
[38] Kirilenko's basic views can be surmised from speeches and articles in his *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Politizdat, 1976.

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

Dmitriy Ustinov, USSR Defense Minister, during his March 1982 visit to India.

—Baldev/SYGMA.

matic accords signed at a summit[39]—the latter running the risk of undermining the discipline of the Soviet public. He appears to share the Sinophobia that Brezhnev has exhibited in talks with Western statesmen.[40] Kirilenko's involvement with Middle East affairs seems to have convinced him that Moscow should avoid too forward a strategy in the region.[41]

The seeming falling-out of Kirilenko and Brezhnev in recent years may have been over resource allocation and industrial management. Kirilenko probably opposed Brezhnev's willingness to slow the advance of machine-building for the sake of increasing spending on agriculture. He was probably also averse to Brezhnev's talk about a need for broader concessions to regional interests at the expense of the Moscow economic ministries.[42] It is possible that the Polish crisis widened the rift between these one-time comrades in party work in the Ukraine.[43]

Kirilenko's party duties are suggestive of a special tie with the editors of the CPSU daily for industrial matters, *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya.* In early 1981, this newspaper managed the news from Warsaw in an especially hard-line direction,[44] which raises the possibility that Kirilenko was more impatient than Brezhnev on the question of when to crack down on the Solidarity trade union movement. A resurgence of anti-Sovietism in Poland or an outbreak of labor unrest inside the USSR are contingencies that might help to vindicate Kirilenko's harsh view of popular dissidence and improve his fading chances for succession, even though his advanced age would likely mean he would be at best an interim leader in the post-Brezhnev period.

Another caretaker. The fourth major contender would seem to be Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov. Although himself of advanced age (74), Ustinov must be taken seriously as someone with broad enough experience to mediate rivalries among party, state, and military hierarchies. A civilian specialist on the arms industry, he worked in the party Secretariat from 1965 to 1976. He was named head of the Defense Ministry in April 1976 without being formally dropped from the Secretariat at a Central Committee plenum.[45] Ustinov's sizable influence can be gathered from his unusual press acclaim as a "major party and state figure,"[46] whose public papers are among "the best works of Marxist thought devoted to defense of the revolution

[39] A warm reference to summitry in Kirilenko's election speech published by *Pravda* on June 12, 1974, was excised from the version reprinted in his *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i,* p. 348.

[40] On Brezhnev's fear of China, see Willy Brandt, *People and Politics, The Years 1960–75,* London, Collins, 1978, pp. 354–55; and *The Memoirs of Richard M. Nixon,* New York, Grosset and Dunlap, 1978, p. 882. Kirilenko's references to China in speeches made during the 1970's were stiffened in his collected papers. Cf. *Pravda,* June 9, 1971, and June 12, 1974, and *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i,* pp. 75 and 505.

[41] Kirilenko visited Syria in 1973 and during the decade held talks with Arab officials visiting Moscow. Anti-Israel rhetoric in certain of Kirilenko's speeches was softened when they were reprinted. Cf. *Pravda,* Jan. 4, 1972, Jan. 25, 1973, and May 29, 1974, and *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i,* pp. 227, 256, 332.

[42] For Brezhnev on agriculture, see *Pravda,* Nov. 17, 1981; on intended reform of the USSR government, L. I. Brezhnev, *Voprosy upravleniya ekonomikoy razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva. Rechi, doklady, vystupleniya* (Problems of Managing the Economy of a Developed Socialist Society. Speeches, Reports, and Statements), Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p. 417.

[43] Brezhnev was first secretary of the Zaporozh'ye regional party committee in 1946–47, and Kirilenko was then second secretary. *Knizhka partiynogo aktivista, 1981,* pp. 8, 10–11.

[44] E.g., *Pravda* on Apr. 4, 1981, ran a TASS dispatch from Warsaw optimistically stating that Polish leaders had taken decisions that would consoldate their party and that Poland would be able to extricate itself from crisis. These passages did not appear in the same TASS item as carried by *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* on Apr. 5, 1981.

[45] Party supremacists may have wanted Ustinov to hold both party and military portfolios, which would have underlined the principle of civilian control over the military.

The breadth of Ustinov's experience is quite impressive: Minister of Armaments, 1941–53; Minister of Defense Industry, 1953–57; Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, 1957–63; First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, 1963–65. *Knizhka partiynogo aktivista, 1981,* pp. 14–15.

[46] *Pravda,* June 29, 1979.

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and problems of war and peace."[47]

In light of the increasing economic constraints facing the USSR, any leader seeking broad political acceptability must be seen as even-handed in brokering rival claims to raw materials and skilled manpower. That Ustinov may be such a person is suggested by the following crypto-public dispute over a 1978 comment he made regarding maintenance of defense capabilities. According to the *Pravda* account of his speech, Ustinov said that "the party is strictly observing Lenin's precept of the dialectical unity of economic, scientific-technical, moral-political, and military capabilities as the basic components of the state's defense power. And under present conditions, that unity *has become* even closer and more many-sided."[48] A few defense experts obviously thought that more could be done to stiffen the Soviet defense posture, and they soon cited this paragraph of Ustinov's speech in a Defense Ministry journal, distorting the above comment slightly to make their point: "The party is strictly observing Lenin's precept. . . . And under present conditions that unity *is becoming* even closer and more many-sided."[49] This taking of liberties with Ustinov's text did not go unnoticed: the very next issue of that journal contained a "correction" saying that the wording should have been exactly as it had been in Ustinov's speech, as reported by *Pravda*.[50]

Everything known about Ustinov from his career pattern and published statements tends to confirm the Moscow rumor that he has disapproved of efforts to groom Chernenko—the nonexpert and meddler—for the top party post.[51]

Of course, one or all of these four elderly top runners might become incapacitated or blocked from power as the result of a factional stalemate. One way a deadlock could arise is if the Politburo collectively felt that a nominee's temperament would not ensure harmony in the ruling team. Lenin, it will be recalled, in a December 1922 letter to the party Congress, proposed Stalin's removal from the post of General Secretary and his replacement by a man who would have "greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness, and more considerate attitude towards comrades, less capricious temper, etc."[52] Was it by accident that the self-same words were repeated at a March 3, 1982, performance in Moscow of a play about Lenin attended by nine Politburo members, including Brezhnev?[53]

The above occurrence makes it conceivable that such considerations are already casting a shadow on the ambitions of Chernenko and Kirilenko. There was a hint to this effect in the April 30, 1982, *Pravda,* which published an interview called "Like the Air We Breathe," conducted with Konstantin Sytnik, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine and director of a Ukrainian scientific research institute. Sytnik was quoted as having said:

. . . at times one does not know from where an unfavorable "wind" will blow . . . for example, the deputy director for economic affairs and the main bookkeeper could not come to an understanding. The former let loose his coercive ardor, and the latter gave free scope to his feelings, and soon the personal sympathies and antipathies became the property of the entire staff. . . . Both were warned that if they did not "make peace" they would have to leave the institute. . . .

One might argue that these lines represented a parable about current Kremlin politics. For example, Sytnik refers to birthday rites at his institution, which are remarkably similar to the widely publicized ceremonies staged for Politburo members. "Deputy director for economic affairs" would be a fitting allusion to Kirilenko by dint of his duties at the CPSU Secretariat, and Kirilenko's attacks on anti-Stalinists and lax workers hint at a personality which has a strain of "coercive ardor." Chernenko's direction of the General Department in the Secretariat puts him in charge of party documents, and this could rate him the sobriquet "bookkeeper."

Longer-term Hopefuls

Behind these "candidates" are a crop of hopefuls whose power aspirations might blossom either immediately after Brezhnev leaves the scene (in the event of a stalemate or incapacitation of the top four) or somewhat later (after leadership has been briefly entrusted to an interim secretary from among the four). These longer-term hopefuls include four full members of the Politburo (CPSU secretary for agriculture Mikhail Gorbachëv, age 51; Moscow city party secretary Viktor Grishin, 68; Leningrad oblast party first secretary Grigoriy Romanov, 59; and Ukrainian Communist Party First Secretary Vladimir

[47] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 6, 1979.

[48] *Pravda,* Feb. 23, 1978. Emphasis added.

[49] *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 9, 1978, p. 4. Emphasis added.

[50] Ibid., No. 10, 1978, p. 128.

[51] See "Kremlin Power Struggle On," *The Japan Times* (Tokyo), Apr. 12, 1982.

[52] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy. Izdaniye pyatoye. Tom 45. Mart 1922–Mart 1923* (Complete Collected Works, 5th ed., Vol. 45, March 1922–March 1923), Moscow, Politizdat, 1964, p. 346.

[53] *Pravda,* Mar. 4, 1982, and "Kremlin Power Plays Surface in Theater . . . Audience," *The Christian Science Monitor,* Mar. 5, 1982.

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Among possible longer-term contenders for Brezhnev's mantle are, from left to right: Politburo members Grigoriy Romanov and Vladimir Shcherbitskiy; Politburo candidate member and Premier of the RSFSR Mikhail Solomentsev; and party secretary and Politburo candidate member Vladimir Dolgikh.

—The first three photos, TASS from Sovfoto; the last, Katherine Young.

Shcherbitskiy, 64), plus two Politburo candidate members, Russian Republic Premier Mikhail Solomentsev, 68, and CPSU secretary for heavy industry Vladimir Dolgikh, 57. Thus far, all of these men have been kept away from the most important responsibilities in the CPSU Secretariat. But any one of them might just become party head later in the 1980's if not sooner.

The exceptionally lackluster Grishin, like Chernenko, is a strident party-firster and outspoken critic of Eurocommunist innovators.[54] Romanov and Solomentsev are similar to Kirilenko insofar as they encourage cooperation between state managers and party officials while vigorously promoting the cause of ideological "vigilance."[55] Shcherbitskiy and Dolgikh have followed Brezhnev's lead in associating with the idea of granting a certain amount of regional autonomy in economic affairs.[56] The most interesting has been Gorbachëv, who has plumped for wider adoption of the *zveno* as the best means for organizing production on Soviet collective farms.[57] Orthodox Communists view the *zveno* experiment—in which small teams of collective farm members are assigned fixed portions of land on which they perform all production tasks and from whose profitable cultivation they directly benefit—as a "rebirth of the kulak."[58] This opposition, or perhaps additional harvest setbacks, could abruptly halt Gorbachëv's climb to the top.

Barring a catastrophe, the grand prize of Soviet politics cannot be won by the other full Politburo members not yet mentioned. Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, 77, and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, 73, are technical experts who have never served in the party apparatus, which is the springboard to preeminence. Old Bolshevik Arvid Pel'she, 83, is superannuated and a non-Russian (a Latvian) as well. Kazakhstan party boss Dinmukhamed Kunayev, 70, can hardly qualify for the top job as a Central Asian in a Slavic polity that has grown even more racist since the Afghanistan conflict. Nor is there more than a remote possibility that Brezhnev's party legatee will come from the group of Politburo candidate members who are overaged (Vasiliy Kuznetsov, 81, and Boris Ponomarëv, 77) or non-Slavic (Geydar Aliyev, 59; Sharaf Rashidov, 64; and Eduard Shevardnadze, 64). This leaves as eligibles and marginal possibilities Politburo candidate members Pëtr Demichev, 64, and Tikhon Kiselëv, 65; and the CPSU secretaries Mikhail Zimyanin (in charge of culture, age 68), Ivan Kapitonov (party staffing, 67); and Konstantin Rusakov (Communist-bloc liaison, 62).

The Military Factor

While there is no professional military officer among the likely contenders for party leadership in the post-Brezhnev period, the military may nonetheless play an

[54] See his attack on "those who, casting doubt on what has really been achieved in life, intend to formulate some kind of 'new path' in a purely conceptual fashion," in *Problemy Miri i Sotsializma*, No. 6, 1982.

[55] For Romanov, see *Pravda*, June 19 and Aug. 4, 1981; for Solomentsev, ibid., June 10 and Dec. 10, 1980.

[56] For Shcherbitskiy, see ibid., Sept. 15, 1978; for Dolgikh, ibid., Feb. 9, 1979.

[57] *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye* (Moscow), No. 7, 1981.

[58] *Izvestiya* observer Anatoliy Ivashchenko refers to such opponents in his pro-reform article in *Chelovek i zakon* (Moscow), No. 3, 1978.

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important role by supporting those leaders who favor the extremely conservative positions advocated by influential figures in the military. On the basis of Khrushchev's memoirs and émigré literature, we can assume that the influence of the military is not inconsiderable and can increase in periods of leadership change.[59]

Looking toward a Brezhnev succession, the hawkish wing of the military is likely to promote policies of greater defense spending, increased Warsaw Pact integration, and foreign expansionism. In a 1978 article, Kirill Moskalenko (from 1960 to 1962 Commander of the Strategic Rocket Troops and since then Chief Inspector of the USSR Defense Ministry) alleged that the USSR finds itself in a state of "imperialist encirclement."[60] This was a surprising formulation inasmuch as both Khrushchev and Brezhnev had earlier suggested that the Stalinist concept of "capitalist encirclement" was no longer germane.[61] Moskalenko's revival of the concept implied that it would be wrong to economize on defense or loosen the central reins on a vast array of sectional interests which covet the quality resources of the sprawling defense industry.

Differences between the military and the prevailing party line are also suggested by the differential treatment accorded a June 3, 1980, speech to leading military personnel delivered by Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff. The speech was covered both in the Defense Ministry's newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* and in the journal *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil,* published by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, which functions as a department of the CPSU Secretariat.[62] In the latter account, party watchdogs greatly toned down the more alarmist and combative passages in Ogarkov's speech—his allusion to the inherently aggressive nature of American leaders and his grim portrayal of the world scene. They also revised Ogarkov's text to make it appear that international power rivalries are local rather than universal in scope, and blue-pencilled Ogarkov's claim that "positive processes" on the world scene were exemplified by the "defeats" suffered by "imperialism" in Angola, Ethiopia, Iran, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Kampuchea, Zimbabwe, and a "number of Central American countries."

Marshals Kirill Moskalenko (left) and Nikolay Ogarkov (right) represent a "hard-line" point of view within the Soviet military with which any successor to Brezhnev will have to cope.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

This was not the first time that great-power chauvinism in upper military circles has drawn the ire of party bosses. In 1974, Defense Minister Andrey Grechko (1903–1976) extolled "fidelity to proletarian internationalism" as one of the "Leninist principles of military building."[63] In reviewing Grechko's book, *Pravda* changed "proletarian internationalism" to read "socialist patriotism and internationalism."[64] In Stalinist times, the phrase "proletarian internationalism" was habitually used to denote the necessity of unquestioning obedience by foreign Communists to the orders of Moscow, and justified the wholesale imposition of Soviet-style institutions on East European states. Under Khrushchev, the phrase was used more loosely, with the other socialist states accorded greater leeway. Relations within the Soviet bloc were increasingly characterized as regulated by the principle of "socialist patriotism and internationalism," terminology which conveyed more of a cooperative than a master/serf relationship. Thus, civilian leaders may have felt that Grechko was mistakenly arguing for intensifying and speeding up the process of military integration within the Warsaw Pact on Soviet terms.

The self-assertiveness of hard and independent military leaders could make it more difficult for a party leader after Brezhnev to repeat the General Secretary's own 1973 gambit of consolidating personal power by bringing a crony marshal (Grechko) into the Politburo.

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[59] *Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament.* Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1974, claims that the Soviet military had an influential voice in the decision-making for defense and foreign policy (pp. 34, 345–46, 540–41). Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, in *Sily i bessiliye Brezhneva: politicheskiye etyudy* (The Strengths and Weakness of Brezhnev: Political Sketches), Frankfurt/Main, Possev-Verlag, 1979, contends that Brezhnev as a rule had to negotiate with the defense minister in order to govern (pp. 35–36, 72–73) and was pressured by the marshals to occupy Czechoslovakia in 1968 (p. 191).

[60] *Pravda,* Feb. 20, 1978.

[61] Ibid., Jan. 28, 1959, and May 25, 1977.

[62] Cf. *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), June 5, 1980, and *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 14, 1980.

[63] Andrey Grechko, *Vooruzhënnyye Sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva* (Armed Forces of the Soviet State), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974, p. 32.

[64] *Pravda,* May 29, 1974.

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Without such a prop, the next general secretary may find his tenure less secure, even if it might leave him more room for maneuver on investment and foreign policies. Alternatively, the military hard-liners might restrain themselves and participate in a national-unity regime of top professionals determined to keep the party functionaries at bay.

Conditioning Factors

The history of Kremlin successions shows that leaders of intellectual power and intitiative (Trotsky and Malenkov) were defeated by associates who were relatively unsophisticated and initially wedded to the status quo (Stalin and Khrushchev). The failure of the dynamic Shelepin to best Brezhnev in the struggle for power after Khrushchev's removal similarly confirms this tendency for the spoils to go to those deficient in breadth of vision.

While every Soviet leader must to some extent subdue or alter his opinions out of expediency, some of Brezhnev's potential successors give the impression of being notably unventuresome. Chernenko and Grishin appear to be leaders who would be reassuring to colleagues at ease with the irresolute but "safe" consensus style of policymaking in vogue under Brezhnev. This distaste for dynamic leadership was evident in *Pravda's* August 26, 1979, denunciation of "those who are impatient to return to the 'glorious olden times'" and who "instill in youth the thought that all problems and difficulties supposedly will be solved when a 'strong arm' comes to power." Although the author was ostensibly talking about neo-Nazism in West Germany as treated by documentary film producers there, he left open the possibility that he was attacking neo-Stalinists in the Soviet Union when he noted at the outset that there are "disputes and struggle" that cannot be avoided in any country.

Such a slap at neo-Stalinists doubtless would have the blessing of middle-of-the-roader Brezhnev. But an opposing view surfaced in late 1980, when a CPSU journal published a reminder by an official of the CPSU Secretariat stating that Lenin "always condemned indecisive, vacillating and unprincipled people who played the role of reconcilors of completely opposite views."[65] Regardless of whether this broadside was aimed at Polish party head Stanislaw Kania or at Brezhnev himself, the underlying longing for resolute leadership—whether reformist or reactionary in its thrust—would appear to favor the succession chances of bolder personalities like Andropov or Kirilenko.

Only pundits would try to answer with certainty the question of which political factor will be overriding in the struggle for succession to Brezhnev. The CPSU could again settle for a "safe" man. Or the desire for a strong man to break new paths in a clear-cut direction either toward reform or toward reaction might prevail.

[65] Ivan Pronin in *Partiynaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 23, 1980, p. 27.

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Soviet Investment Policy: Unresolved Problems

by Boris Rumer

Although the 11th Five-Year Plan (FYP), which is supposed to guide Soviet economic activity in the years 1981–85, contains the lowest indicators of economic growth ever issued by the Soviet leadership in the postwar period, it is still far too ambitious and unrealistic. Never before have the planned rates of growth for national income and for state capital investment been so low—calculating out at average annual growth rates of 3.4 and 1.0 percent respectively.[1] More important than the low level of these two key targets, however, is the unprecedented gap between them.[2]

How does the Soviet leadership intend to fulfill this plan? What shifts are planned in which economic spheres in the current five-year period, as compared to the first 15 years of Leonid Brezhnev's reign (1965–80), when the rhythm and proportions now determining Soviet economic development took shape? If we throw out the usual incantations in the plan about growth of labor productivity and economizing on material resources, it turns out that most of the significant innovations are in the sections that concern investment. But can the Soviet economy as currently constituted bring about the improvements in investment performance envisaged in the 11th FYP?

In exploring this key aspect of the plan, this article will first review the record of the Brezhnev regime with regard to investment policy. Then it will outline the main features of the investment strategy implicit in the 11th FYP. Finally, it will assess the prospects for fulfillment of the plan for investment and the broader implications of likely failure in this area.

Investment Activity in the Brezhnev Era

By the late 1970's, the pulse of Soviet investment had become so weak and irregular that it appeared scarcely capable of sustaining the steady flow of new capital necessary for a healthy, growing economy. The steady and accelerating decline in growth of investment over the Brezhnev era can be seen in Figure 1. The figure also demonstrates the growing disproportion between the financial resources committed to investment and the physical resources needed to realize it. And even the latter data do not reflect the hidden inflation in prices of new productive capacities having roughly the same structural and qualitative characteristics as those already in operation.

The period was characterized by an explosion of investment in the oil and gas industry (investment in this sector grew from 9.7 percent of total state investments in 1975 to 14.3 percent in 1980). This shift in priorities occurred at the expense of several other important industries. Food processing, construction-materials pro-

Mr. Rumer is a Research Associate at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA). From 1964 to 1977, he was Head of the Department of Economics and Investment at the USSR National Institute of Economics of the Construction Industry in Moscow, the last eight of these years simultaneously teaching economics at the Industrial Executive Training Institute. He published widely in the Soviet Union prior to coming to the United States in 1978, and his recent writings on Soviet industry have appeared in Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, Soviet Studies, *and* Harvard Business Review. *The author wishes to thank the National Council for Soviet and East European Research for funding which helped make possible the research for the present article and Professors Abram Bergson, Evsey Domar, and Vladimir Treml for their encouragement.*

[1] See "Law on the State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981–1985," *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 20, 1981.

[2] In the three preceding five-year periods (1965–70, 1971–75, and 1976–80), average annual growth of national income was 7.8, 5.8, and 4.2 percent respectively, while that of capital investment was 7.6, 7.0, and 3.5 respectively. See *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1980), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981, pp. 379 and 333. Henceforth, respective volumes of this statistical yearbook will be referred to simply as *Narkhoz* with the appropriate year.

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FIGURE 1: GROWTH TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPITAL INVESTMENT, 1965-80



duction, light industry, and even ferrous metallurgy (so crucial to the success of the Soviet economy) experienced drops in their share of total investment over the same period. The machine-building industry, whose share had increased 9 percentage points in 1965–75, was able to muster only a sickly 0.4 percentage point growth (from 24.3 to 24.7 percent).[3]

As a result of the declining priority accorded investment in the ferrous metallurgy and construction-materials industries and the sharp braking of investment increases for machine-building, fewer productive capacities were put into operation in these industries. For example, the addition to steel-producing capacity was 32 percent lower in 1980 than in 1975; for automobiles, 67 percent lower; for metal-cutting lathes, 74 percent lower; and for cement, 80 percent lower.[4] Moreover, a number of key branches of industry were already being operated at or near peak production potential, which was causing an exhaustion of existing production machinery.[5] The result was an absolute decrease in the production of metal, many kinds of machinery, construction materials, and other items,[6] and prospects were dim for a reversal of this trend. In turn, replacement of machinery and equipment slowed, which meant a drop in the technical level of production and a slower rate of automation; this slowed technological progress throughout the economy and hindered

[3] *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 338.

[4] Ibid., pp. 328–29.

[5] On this point, see K. K. Val'tukh, "The Investment Complex and Intensification of Production," *EKO* (Novosibirsk), No. 3, 1982, p. 15, where the author provides a table compiled by V. L. Lavrovskiy and N. N. Kuznetsova from the annual balance sheets of enterprises in "the most important" sectors of industry. According to this table, enterprises in 48 percent of the branches surveyed averaged 96 percent utilization of productive capacity in 1975. By 1979, the utilization rate for these enterprises had fallen to 91.5 percent.

[6] For example, between 1978 and 1980, output of steel dropped from 151 million metric tons to 148 million; and output of metal-working machinery, from 238,000 units to 216,000 units. Between 1977 and 1980, production of coal-cutting machinery dropped from 75 to 60 units; output of pumping units dropped from 1,386,000 to 1,343,000 units; and production of cement dropped from 127 million metric tons to 125 million metric tons. See *Narkhoz 1980*, pp. 158, 166, 167, and 178.

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realization of the investment programs in agriculture and in the oil and gas complex.

Finally, there was a lowering in the share of investment going to the construction of housing, schools, stores, hospitals, nurseries, laundries, and other social facilities. The proportion of total investment going to these "nonproductive" sectors dropped to 28 percent in the 1976–80 plan period, a postwar low (the high was 38 percent in 1955–60, under Nikita Khrushchev).[7]

A very significant feature of investment policy during the first 15 years of the Brezhnev era was a stress on renovation and technical reequipment (*rekonstruktsiya i tekhnicheskoye perevooruzheniye*) of existing industry in place of construction of new enterprises. This policy was voiced at every congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) or plenum of the party's Central Committee dealing with industry or construction. In the 1970's, this policy was intensified, as the central planning bureaucracy labored to root objects of new construction out of the projected plans of branch ministries and to switch resources over to the renovation and improvement of existing facilities. Whereas in 1970, some 58 percent of all funds allocated to industrial investment were targeted for renovation and expansion of older enterprises, in 1980, the figure was 72 percent (in the latter year, the target for the metallurgy and machine-building industries was 80 percent).[8] Since the bulk of existing industry is concentrated in the European portions of the USSR, this policy perhaps unintendedly gave preeminence to investment in this part of the country.

The policy of renovation was heralded as the optimum way of "intensifying" production, i.e., of increasing the productivity of capital and labor inputs into industrial production.[9] The claimed advantages seemed indisputable:

- An increase in the volume of production with fewer

[7] Ibid., pp. 336–37.

[8] *Narkhoz 1970*, p. 485, and *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 339.

[9] See, e.g., A. Palamarchuk, *Effektivnost' rekonstruktsii predpriyatiy* (Effectiveness of Enterprise Renovation), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1978; and M. Budunova, *Effektivnost' kapital'nykh vlozheniy i rekonstrukstii v promyshlennosti* (Effectiveness of Capital Investment and Renovation in Industry), Moscow, Stroyizdat, 1978.

A socialist emulation campaign in early 1982 sought to boost output of cold-rolled steel at the Verkh-Isetskiy metal works in Sverdlovsk.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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

Housing going up for workers and managers at the Kama Automobile Factory. Financing for such "company housing" is expected to be tight under the 1981–85 Soviet economic plan.

—Henri Cartier-Bresson/MAGNUM.

expenditures of capital (compared to new construction), since renovation and modernization would—in the opinion of the Soviet party leadership—require investment mostly for the renovation of machines and equipment and only minimally for rebuilding or construction of new buildings and installations.

- Acceleration of the withdrawal of old technology from operation (a key objective of an amortization reform in 1975) and its replacement with new, economical technology, thereby reducing production expenses.

- Hastening of the "turnover of capital" by shortening the amount of time needed to set up and break in productive capacities.

Clearly, the Brezhnev renovation policy was not the sole factor affecting results in any one of these three directions. Nevertheless, a change in the investment flow in the direction of already existing enterprises such as was undertaken in the 1970's could not help but have a dominant influence on the functioning of the whole industrial investment sphere. Furthermore, it could not but decisively affect (directly or indirectly) the economics of industrial production as a whole.

How successful was the Brezhnev renovation policy in achieving the indicated goals? Let us look briefly at each of the three areas mentioned.

Reduction of capital expenditures per increment of output. Basing himself on the party's imperatives, Tigran Khachaturov, the leading Soviet theoretician in the field of investment, formulated the idea of the economically expedient renovation of an enterprise in this way:

Renovation is effective when replacement of equipment with better equipment does not require significant and expensive construction or installation.[10]

[10] T. Khachaturov, *Effektivnost' kapital'nykh vlozheniy* (Effectiveness of Capital Investment), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1979, p. 61.

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In other words, the criterion for economically effective renovation of an enterprise was a minimum of expenditures on construction and installation and a maximum of expenditures on equipment within overall capital investment.

What do Soviet data tell us about the success or failure of this effort? From 1972 to 1980, the share of equipment in total industrial fixed capital increased from 36 percent to 38 percent, while the share of buildings dropped from 30 percent to 29 percent.[11] Over the same period, fixed capital newly put into operation comprised more than two thirds of the amount of capital existing at the outset.[12] That the share of buildings in total fixed capital stock dropped only one percentage point over the decade suggests that the renovation policy was virtually a dead letter for all the publicity accorded it.

Not surprisingly, the expected improvement with respect to capital costs in production was not forthcoming. Indeed, what the Soviet call the "capital coefficient of industrial production" (defined as the increment in capital investment divided by the increment in industrial output, in comparable prices) increased during the 1970's and at a faster pace than in the 1960's. According to calculations based on data from the USSR's Central Statistical Administration, the "capital coefficient" for industry was 60 percent higher in the second half of the decade than in the first.[13]

Replacement of old technology with modern, more economical technology. Did the renovation policy result in a speedup in the replacement of machines and equipment as the 1970's progressed? We may judge results in this regard by looking at the dynamics of "writing-off" (or scrapping) of machinery and equipment. This should have increased both through the targeted increase in investment in the renovation of the existing stock of equipment and through the amortization reform of 1975, as a consequence of which the service life of industrial equipment was to be reduced on the average from 15 years to 12 years.[14]

However, official statistics do not reflect the desired shifts. The writing-off of total fixed capital stock in industry actually declined (in relative terms) in the 1970's—from 1.8 percent of the existing capital stock in 1970 to 1.4 percent in 1980.[15] Over the course of the decade, the yearly writing-off of *equipment* alone also dipped, from 2.4 to 2.2 percent. The only consequence of the introduction of new amortization norms in 1975 was to increase the gap between scheduled and actual writing-off of equipment. According to calculations by Soviet specialists, actual writing-off of industrial fixed capital should be twice the 1979–80 level of 1.4 percent.[16] In the late 1970's, achievement of the amortization goals would have required a tripling of actual write-offs of equipment. However, the machine-building industry—undercapitalized and oriented predominantly toward equipping new production capacities—was not capable of producing either the amount or the proper types of machinery to sustain such a program of equipment replacement (more on this below).[17]

Moreover, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the share of genuinely new equipment within total replacement technology did not increase. A look at the dynamics of the Soviet machine-building industry suggests a declining capacity to furnish industry with equipment having advanced scientific and technical parameters, or to do so within a reasonable time frame.

For example, in 1973, some 47.9 percent of the machinery put into manufacture in the USSR contained innovative technology; in 1978, the figure had dropped to 39.5 percent.[18]

Another way of judging the technological level of the Soviet machine-building industry is to see how many new kinds of equipment are created annually. In the latter half of the 1970's, there was a drop in the number of prototypes for various kinds of new machinery being created, compared to the first half of the decade. This included a 27 percent reduction for energy-related equipment, a 12 percent reduction for machine tools, a 20 percent reduction for equipment for metallurgy, and a 15 percent reduction for equipment for the chemical industry. Particularly sensitive for technological progress in industrial production was the drop (5 percent) in the number of new models in the precision machine-building industries: those producing instruments, automation devices, and computers.[19]

Time delays in producing equipment with new technology is yet another hindering factor. Thus, it has been reported that in the output of a number of machine-building industries, the share of products that take five years or less to bring into production declined from 55 percent in 1967 to 42 percent in 1978, while the share

[11] *Narkhoz 1972*, p. 64, and *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 143

[12] *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 146.

[13] Ibid., pp. 123, 336–37.

[14] D. Palterovich, "Renewal of Equipment and Technical Reequipment of Production," *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 9, 1980, p. 104.

[15] *Narkhoz 1970*, p. 169, and *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 147.

[16] V. Senchagov and V. Ostapenko, "The Significance of Amortization in Technical Renovation," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 1, 1981, p. 34, 37.

[17] There is little likelihood that the rate of writing-off will be stimulated during 1981–85 by establishment of new amortization norms. Twelve years elapsed between the amortization reforms of 1963 and 1975. See Palterovich, loc. cit. p. 104; and M. Zavalishin and A. Malygin, "Reevaluating Basic Funds and Making Amortization Norms More Precise," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 6, 1981.

[18] Palterovich, loc. cit.

[19] *Narkhoz 1980*, pp. 100–01.

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of products taking more than 10 years to bring into production rose from 16 percent to 27 percent.[20]

For all these reasons, industry has been on starvation rations when it comes to receiving technologically advanced equipment, and the situation has been deteriorating in recent years. Replacement is taking place chiefly on the basis of improved versions of equipment designed from old plans and methods of production.

As a consequence, the role of major overhauls (*kapital'nyy remont*) has grown not only in maintenance but also in the marginal modernization of equipment, despite the fact that the revised amortization norms introduced in 1975 called for reduction in the share of major overhauls in the latter function.[21] Thus, instead of replacing old equipment with new, plants repair the former many times, with slight improvements made where possible. This trend can be seen by comparing amounts spent for major overhauls with amounts devoted to capital investment. For example, in 1970, expenditures on major overhauls in the ferrous metallurgy industry totalled 694 million rubles, compared to 2,200 million rubles spent on capital investment in the industry; in 1978, major overhauls required 1,280 million rubles, compared to 3,100 million rubles spent on capital investment.[22]

Speeding up capital turnover. Inordinately long periods for construction and the breaking-in of newly introduced productive capacities have long characterized the Soviet investment process. Indeed, discussion of the need for shortening these time periods (and the grave consequences in store for the Soviet economy if this is not done) has been de rigueur at congresses and conferences from the very first years of Soviet power.

[20] Palterovich, loc. cit.

[21] Senchagov and Ostapenko, op. cit., pp. 38–42.

[22] V. Krasovskiy, "Technical Reequipment of Production and the Effectiveness of Overhauls," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 7, 1981, p. 32.

The century-old "Serp i Molot" (Sickle and Hammer) metal works in Moscow in 1981 finished a complete renovation and reequipment, which included installation of nine automated production lines made by West Germany's Sundwig firm. Russian and German specialist confer during the renovation.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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Did the Soviet policy of transferring investment from new construction to renovation succeed in the 1970's in bringing increases in output closer to the moment of investment? In a word, "No." What has been observed is a lengthening, not a shortening of construction periods. Testifying to this is the fact that the volume of unfinished industrial construction doubled from 1970 to 1980, from 52.5 billion to 105.1 billion rubles.[23]

As for the time necessary to break in newly introduced productive capacities, reality did not match expectations here, either. Indeed, the ratio of increments in output to net increments in capacity took a sharp turn for the worse in the second half of the 1970's as compared to the first half (see Table 1). As the table shows, there were only two categories in which this relationship improved in the period 1976–80; in all others it deteriorated or remained unchanged. Indeed, in 8 of 17 categories the increment in output amounted to less than half the increment in productive capacity.

In the coal industry, from 1975 to 1980, productive capacity increased 90.4 million tons, but yearly output increased only 15 million tons over that period. In the chemical industry, a 9.7 million-ton increment in capacity for the production of sulfuric acid over the same period resulted in an increase of only 4.4 million tons in annual production. In the case of soda ash, the comparable figures were 505,000 and 88,000 tons; and for mineral fertilizers, 39.3 and 13.8 million tons (in conventional units). In the machine-tool industry, introduction of productive capacity for an additional 12,500 machine tools was matched by an absolute 15,000-unit drop in production.[24]

The reasons for the increase in unused productive potential are many and varied. General factors include languishing of the raw-material industries and inadequacies of transport conditioned by the growing distance between where the raw materials are produced and where they are used; irregularities in fuel deliveries; and finally, an overall breakdown in control over the economy. More specifically, the delays reflect the following concrete factors: technologically interconnected stages of production processes are not put into operation simultaneously, and auxiliary facilities (particularly, repair shops) are usually opened later than the production operations they are meant to service.[25]

Thus, not one of the goals of the renovation policy of the 1970's was met. Output failed to increase as planned and there was little saving of resources. The investment process did not become more healthy. The policy slowed technological progress in industry: in the second half of the 1970's, the capital intensity per unit of industrial production increased by 60 percent as compared to the first half, while the annual rate of increase in labor productivity in industry fell by almost half.[26]

Table 1: Ratio of Increments in Output to Increments in Capacity in Soviet Industry, 1971–80

Products	1971–75	1976–80
Pig iron	1.32	0.71
Steel	2.29	0.49
Rolled ferrous metals	1.47	0.58
Steel pipes	1.51	1.16
Sulfuric acid	0.75	0.45
Mineral fertilizer	0.91	0.35
Plastics and synthetic resins	1.19	0.53
Fibers and chemical fibers	0.95	0.95
Automobile tires	1.31	0.65
Turbines	0.48	0.46
Automobiles (including buses)	1.07	0.96
Excavators	1.22	0.22
Cellulose	0.81	0.33
Paper	2.02	0.26
Cement	1.29	0.27
Knitted underwear and outer garments	1.18	3.20
Leather footwear	0.28	2.13

SOURCE: G. Pavlov and L. Pchelkina, "Balances of Production Capacities—The Basis for Working Out Production Plans," *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 9, 1981, p. 46.

Why the Renovation Policy Failed

Why the failure of the renovation policy? In effect, reality imposed itself on the ideal scheme of the Soviet planners. It turned out that the state of existing industrial structures, communication and technological networks, energy systems, systems of raw-material supply, and repair and other auxiliary services was so decrepit that in a majority of plants it was impossible to modernize the basic technological components without a substantial (and frequently radical) renovation of buildings and other structures. Indeed, the latter sort of

[23] *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 345. In the 10-year period, unfinished construction as a share of annual capital investment increased from 73 percent to 87 percent.

[24] G. Pavlov and L. Pchelkina, "Balances of Production Capacities—The Basis for Working Out Production Plans," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 9, 1981, p. 46.

[25] For a particularly telling discussion of these problems, see V. Krasovskiy, *Problemy ekonomiki kapital'nykh vlozheniy* (Problems of the Economics of Capital Investment), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1967. On p. 50, Krasovskiy observes that three years after being "put into operation," Blooming Mill No. 1150 of the metallurgy works at Krivoy Rog in the Ukraine was still producing at only 70 percent of projected capacity, because only 8 of its 16 planned pit-furnace complexes had gone into operation.

[26] *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 136.

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activity came to swallow the lion's share of renovation funds.[27] Such endeavors generally run a tortured course and, compared to the construction of new enterprises in new regions and the concomitant creation of a new social infrastructure, are not very effective, either in saving investment resources or in advancing social progress. This is especially true when old enterprises are expanded or rebuilt in the thickly populated regions of the European center, the Northwest, the Urals, or the Donetsk-Pridnepr basin—in other words, in the old industrial core of the Russian empire.

The Soviet economy's investment sphere was totally unprepared for the renovation policy. The necessary scientific, design, planning, and machine-building bases were not reoriented or prepared. Design organizations have traditionally concentrated heavily on designing new enterprises—standard serial projects which are easier and more profitable. The construction industry was not reorganized or reequipped to engage in renovation work. Soviet construction firms continued to steer clear of renovation projects, the labor intensity of which is reportedly from 20 to 35 percent higher and the profits 75 percent lower than in new construction.[28] For their part, enterprises in the machine-building industry continued to prefer to manufacture serial, standardized equipment, not machines made to fit the specific conditions and dimensions of an enterprise under renovation. Finally, no one established the kind of material incentives that would offset the material risk managers face if they are not able to fulfill production plans while renovation is going on.

Even as Soviet leaders constantly reiterated the policy, it was being supplanted by another approach—"expansion," i.e., the addition of new shops or the building of genuinely new enterprises on the grounds of those already in operation or on adjacent tracts. Aware of the impediments to renovation, heads of ministries and enterprises resorted to subterfuge. Under the guise of "renovation," they carried out what was essentially new construction. In the words of one observer:

The ministries and industrial associations suppose that it is simpler to "order" a new enterprise from builders and then allege that [the latter] have violated the terms of construction, than to bear responsibility for the completion of renovation and technological reequipment projects. The heads of many enterprises continue to feel that renovation is an irksome task, somehow less prestigious than new construction.[29]

Expansion is preferable for enterprise managers and construction contractors alike. Through this stratagem, managers can formally hew to the political line of the party leadership and the State Planning Committee



Construction on the Ust-Ilim hydroelectric power station on Siberia's Angara River in the mid-1970's. Such major projects are preferred by construction enterprises to less profitable, more labor intensive work in renovating existing plants.

—Camera Press.

[27] See V. K. Fal'tsman and A. Yu. Ozhegov, "Proportions in the Development of Machine-Building and Construction," *Izvestiya Akademiya Nauk SSSR, seriya ekonomicheskaya* (Mosocw), No. 2, 1981, p. 67.

[28] V. Danilov, *Pravda*, Dec. 17, 1980; T. Bakayeva and V. Zadorozhnyy, "Calculating the Influence of Structural Shifts on Earnings in Construction," *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), No. 10, 1977, p. 18.

[29] A. Stepun, "On the Rational Direction of Capital Investment in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan," *Planovoye khozyaystvo*, No. 10, 1981, p. 36.

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(Gosplan), but at the same time add to productive capacity with minimum disturbances to the normal production rhythm. For the contractor, such an approach assures a much larger volume of work and work on an open building site rather than within the confines of existing structures.

To be sure, expansion entails greater total outlays of labor per increment in output than does renovation. But even under conditions of growing manpower shortages, this concern has been secondary to the managers' drive to expand capacity. Capital remains the main concern of Soviet "executives." As Vadim Kirichenko, Director of the Economic Research Institute of the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan), observed in 1981:

One can sense a certain inertia of economic thinking in accordance with which the most important thing is to create capital stock, to erect new objects; meanwhile, the feeling is that labor can be found anywhere.[30]

Thus, Soviet industrial managers have circumvented Gosplan regulations like rivers flowing around boulders.

At the same time, a number of the factors hindering "renovation" also applied to "expansion." Expansion was carried out under circumstances in which the technological resources of the Soviet machine-building industry were shrinking; in which the opportunities for the import of advanced technology were extremely limited; and in which raw-material, energy, and ecological factors in the European part of the Soviet Union (where most of Soviet industry is concentrated) were becoming increasingly restrictive. Thus, expansion represented an "extensive," resource-wasting way to increase productive potential.

The 1981–85 Investment Program

The investment program of the 11th Five-Year Plan promises to exacerbate the contradictions and disproportions observable in Soviet investment policy in the 1970's. The program is distinguished by the following features.

First, capital investment is expected to be stabilized at 1980 levels (if we are to believe the report of USSR Finance Minister Vasiliy Garbuzov at the November 1981 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet[31]) or grow only slowly (if we follow the law on the 1981–85 plan published two days later[32]).

[30] Kirichenko, loc. cit., p. 8.
[31] *Pravda*, Nov. 18, 1981.
[32] Ibid., Nov. 20, 1981.

The second feature is a sharp increase in industry's share in total investment. Along with the tendency to stabilize capital investment in the national economy as a whole, the planners project a significant (23 percent) increase in industrial investment for the five-year period.[33] This implies that industry's share of investment for 1981–85 may exceed 40 percent, a postwar high.[34]

Which branch(es) of the national economy will be sacrificed to permit this increase in industry's share of the investment pie? Apparently not agriculture and related activities, which are to continue to receive 27 percent or may even get a slightly higher percent of the economy's investment resources.[35] What about transport? This is already a bottleneck in the country's economy, and given the growing distances between raw-material reserves and the related processing industries, the need for transcontinental conveyance has been growing significantly. Therefore, there is no basis to expect a reduction in transport's current 12 percent share of total investment.[36]

It is evidently the "nonproductive" sectors of the economy that will be sacrificed, as so often before, particularly under Stalin. For example, in the above-mentioned report, Finance Minister Garbuzov stated:

We have resolved that our task is to limit the construction of administrative buildings, entertainment facilities, and sports facilities, as well as structures erected over and above the limits of state capital investments, through noncentralized sources of financing.[37]

He is clearly talking about housing construction (among other things), since roughly one quarter of new housing built in the 1970's was financed through noncentralized capital investments "over and above the limits of state capital investments."[38]

Third, the investment sections of the 11th FYP feature, if anything, an increased emphasis on renovation. At the 26th CPSU Congress in early 1981, Soviet Premier N. A. Tikhonov declared:

In particular, it is necessary to speak about capital investment directed at the renovation and technological reequipment of existing enterprises. . . . The task before us consists of even greater application of investment in

[33] See the report on the 11th FYP by Gosplan Chairman N. Baybakov at the November 1981 Supreme Soviet session, in ibid., Nov. 18, 1981.
[34] In the 1970's, industry's share was in the vicinity of 35 percent. See *Narkhoz 1980*, pp. 336–37.
[35] Baybakov, loc. cit.
[36] *Narkhoz 1980*, pp. 336–37.
[37] Loc. cit.
[38] *Narkhoz 1980*, pp. 390–91.

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renovation and an increase in its share of overall capital investment.[39]

Fourth, extraordinary efforts are to be directed toward reducing the volume of uncompleted construction and concentrating investment resources on a limited number of projects in the final stages of construction. Strictly speaking, this cannot be considered a peculiarity of the investment policy of the current five-year plan, since there has never been a Soviet five-year plan which has not proclaimed this same objective. At the same time, as seen above, investment dispersion is quite severe,[40] and judging from the Soviet press, the resolve of the Soviet leadership to regain control over an essentially uncontrolled process of construction is unusually great. Three points in Brezhnev's report on the 11th FYP at a CPSU Central Committee plenum on November 16, 1981, testify to this. The Soviet leader spoke of (1) a 30-billion-ruble reduction in "the volume of capital investment and construction-installation work originally projected for the five-year plan"; (2) the need to take measures to prevent physical deterioration at projects currently "on hold"; and (3) the need to establish construction "reserves" for the next (1986–90) five-year plan, "especially in the raw-material industries."[41]

Fifth, the eastern regions of the country will apparently receive a share of total national investment equal to or exceeding the historically high level observed toward the end of the last decade. Whatever large-scale economic problems may have been resolved in Siberia in the Soviet period, the region's share of investments had never exceeded 17 percent until the latter part of the 1970's. In the quarter of a century from 1950 to 1975, this share had only gradually moved upward, from 15 percent.[42] Although data on the territorial distribution of capital investment generally disappeared from published sources after 1975, Minas Chentemirov (one of the chief architects of Soviet investment policy) recently revealed that Siberia's share had jumped to 20 percent in 1978,[43] i.e., had increased by 3 percentage points in just three years.

Such a disturbance in the territorial structure of capital investment—unprecedented for the Soviet Union's inert investment planning system—has been associated with the equally dramatic shift in the branch structure of industrial investment toward the fuel and energy complex. In the 1981–85 plan, total investment in the fuel and energy complex is slated to increase an additional 50 percent over the total for 1976–80, with virtually all of incremental output expected to come from Siberia.[44] It would appear that toward the end of the last decade, all notions about proportional, balanced development in the structure of industry were set aside and subordinated to one supertask: to maximize production of oil and gas, no matter what the cost, as a means of rescuing the Soviet economy from the desperate position into which Brezhnev's government has led it.

(One other, related factor contributing to the surge in Siberian investment is the construction of the Baykal-Amur railroad, which is expected to be basically completed during the current five-year period.)

As if to highlight the importance attached to the eastern regions in the current five-year plan, Gosplan has reached back to a World War II practice and created a corps of "authorized representatives" to work exclusively in Siberia and the Far East, and the Soviet leadership has established a new all-Union Ministry of Construction for the Far East and Trans-Baykal.[45]

Prospects

Among these features of Soviet investment policy for 1981–85, the first speaks for itself. The Soviet Union is faced with stagnation in the growth of investment, a factor which long helped fuel the country's "extensive" growth model. Now, the economy must make more productive use of its increasingly scarce investment resources if growth is not to stagnate.

As for the implicit curtailment of investment in the "nonproductive" sphere of the economy, it is not the intent of this article to assess the possible impact. Suffice it to say that the Soviet leadership has placed considerable store on the popularity of its recent claims to have increased the priority assigned to the consumer sector. In view of Polish events, a reversal of this policy cannot have been undertaken lightly.

[39] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 28, 1981.

[40] In the late 1970's, there were reportedly nearly 80,000 industrial establishments being built or reconstructed simultaneously. See USSR Academy of Sciences, *Metody i praktika opredeleniya effektivnosti kapital'nykh vlozheniy i novoy tekhniki: sbornik nauchnoy informatsii* (Methods and Practice of Determining the Effectiveness of Capital Investment and New Technology: Handbook of Scientific Information), Issue No. 32, Moscow, Nauka, 1981, p. 132.

[41] *Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1981.

[42] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo RSFSR v 1975 g.* (The National Economy of the RSFSR in 1975), Moscow, TsSu RSFSR, 1976, pp. 328–29. An exception was during World War II, when Siberia's share increased to 18 percent because of the temporary evacuation of industry there from the western regions of the country.

[43] USSR Academy of Sciences, op. cit., p. 130. Chentemirov cited *Kapital'noye stroitel'stvo v SSSR* (Capital Investment in the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1979, a statistical yearbook for 1978 which apparently was never put on public sale.

[44] Baybakov, loc. cit.

[45] On the authorized representatives, see R. Shneper, "Plan Work in the Region," *EKO*, No. 12, 1981, p. 16; on the new ministry, see a report from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1979, and a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers in *Sobraniye postanovleniy pravitel'stva SSSR* (Moscow), No. 24, Sept. 18, 1980, Art. 147, pp. 592–97.

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

January 1982 construction on the Buryat section of the Baykal-Amur Railroad heads east of Uoyan toward the Severo-Muya Mountains.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Regarding the continued emphasis in the investment section of the 11th FYP on "renovation," one gets the distinct impression from recently published materials that the policy continues to encounter considerable resistance. In his speech on the plan to the November 11, 1981, session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Gosplan Chairman Nikolay Baybakov stated that the share of renovation and technical reequipment in total investment in production construction would rise to 32.5 percent in 1981–85, compared to 29.5 in the preceding five-year period.[46] Yet, the deputy director of Gosplan's capital investment department, A. Stepun, has reported that the share of renovation and technological reequipment in total capital investment outlays will remain virtually unchanged in 1981–85—at 29.7 percent compared to 29.4 percent in the previous five-year period. He also noted that of total investment earmarked for productive sectors in the 1981 plan, new construction accounted for 50 percent; expansion, 31 percent; and renovation, a mere 19 percent.[47] And Finance Minister Garbuzov has indicated that the share of renovation and reequipment in state capital investment in 1982 would be only some 17 percent.[48]

Stepun is most explicit about the sort of resistance encountered:

The ministries did not work out in time for the 11th Five-Year Plan period long-term plans for technological reequipment on the basis of new technology—plans that would have determined the scope and order of priority of work which has to be fulfilled at individual enterprises, and which would give us a clear impression of the economic efficiency of this work vis-à-vis new construction.[49]

[46] *Pravda*, Nov. 18, 1981.

[47] Stepun, loc. cit., p. 36.

[48] Loc. cit., p. 36. Garbuzov indicated that renovation and reequipment would take 21 billion rubles of the 121.6 billion rubles of investment financed by the state.

[49] Loc. cit., p. 36.

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USSR Finance Minister Vasiliy Garbuzov, one of the officials trying to keep the lid on dispersion of capital investment funds in the Soviet Union.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Despite all the restrictions on new construction and the absolute drop in capital investment targeted for 1982,[50] Stepun reports that the heads of ministries and the union-republic councils of ministers included in their 1982 investment programs three times as much new construction as in 1981! Although Gosplan officials cut back sharply on these proposals, in a number of cases they "had to resort to new construction in order to guarantee the assigned levels of production in the current five-year plan, and to create the necessary surpluses for coming years."[51]

Yet another commentator has stated that the policy of renovation is "permeated with contradictions engendered by both objective conditions and the subjective position of individual departments and the heads of certain enterprises." To such organizations, new construction "better guarantees fixed capital stock and labor reserves, while putting new objects into operation expands the productive potential of an industry."[52]

Efforts to concentrate new capital outlays on a limited number of nearly completed projects is also likely to encounter serious difficulties. This abrupt disruption of the investment rhythm should generate a sharply increased demand for equipment, something that the Soviet machine-building industry is not in a position to satisfy.

The Machinery Bottleneck

As noted above, there was in the late 1970's a decline in the number of new productive capacities put into operation in the machine-building industry. For the first time in Soviet postwar history, output of many types of metallurgic, metal-working, chemistry-related, and energy-related equipment dropped. Of particular importance was the declining production of coal-cutters, pipe-borers, pumps, and other machinery for the petroleum industry.[53] Such items are, of course, crucial for fulfilling the priority energy goals of the current five-year plan.

It would be a mistake, however, to predict immediate shortages of equipment in connection with the stress on bringing on line facilities currently under construction. Two factors are likely to ameliorate, though not completely rectify, the situation.

First, reserves of spare equipment can be expected to play an essential, if short-term, role. Inventories of equipment—domestic and imported—have been building up for many years in the warehouses of industrial enterprises and material-technical supply organizations and on construction sites. In 1975 alone, the value of uninstalled equipment reportedly totalled 6.3 billion rubles, or some 16 percent of the year's expenditures on equipment from capital investment accounts.[54]

Industrial enterprises hardly need this whole mass of equipment and spare parts for their normal functioning. Rather, the accumulation is predominantly associated with the constantly growing general shortage of

[50] Investment in 1982 is to be 103.3 percent of that in 1980; investment in 1981 was 104 percent of the 1980 level. See *Pravda*, Nov. 20, 1981.

[51] Stepun, loc. cit.

[52] P. Ignatovskiy, "Tendencies of Economic Development in the 1980's," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2, 1981, p. 80.

[53] *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 167.

[54] V. Isayev (First Deputy Chairman of Gosplan), "Raising the Effectiveness of Capital Construction," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2, 1977, p. 12. In 1979, imports accounted for 15 percent of capital investment in machinery and equipment. N. P. Shmelev, *Sotsializm i mezhdunarodnyye ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya* (Socialism and International Economic Relations), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1979, p. 304.

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machinery. Under such conditions, enterprises regularly strive to build up inventories of equipment for exchange or merely for a rainy day. Often the equipment has nothing to do with the enterprise's own production needs. Helping to broaden the scope of this phenomenon is the growing tendency to turn enterprises into autarkic units having their own repair centers, construction departments, etc. In his report to the 26th CPSU Congress, Premier Tikhonov strongly attacked this policy of hoarding equipment, raw materials, and processed materials.[55]

While locating and redistributing these equipment surpluses is no small task, even for a centralized economy, it should be possible to mobilize a significant portion of them, particularly within a given industry. This should help ease the equipment bottleneck at least within the 1981–85 time frame.

A second means of ameliorating the equipment shortages likely to plague the Soviet investment sector over the period 1981–85 could be to increase equipment imports. However, this will depend on the state of the critical "grain vs. machines" trade-off that has increasingly bedeviled recent Soviet import planning. The period 1976–78 saw a sharp acceleration of the long-term rise in the share of equipment in Soviet imports. In the period 1950–75, this share had increased steadily, from 22 to 34 percent, but in the next three years, it jumped to 42 percent, only to drop again to 34 percent in the 1979 and 1980. By contrast, the share of agricultural products in imports dropped from 23 to 19 percent in 1976–78 (years of good harvest) and increased to 24 percent in the 1979–80 period (years of poor harvest).[56] This correlation between the state of Soviet grain harvests and the volume of equipment imports will surely be felt in the foreseeable future as well.

[55] *Materialy 26-go s"yezda KPSS* (Materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU), Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p. 126.

[56] *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 540.



An April 1982 photo of an East German rotary bucket excavator put into operation in the Soviet Union's "Bogatyr" open-cut coal pit in northeastern Kazakhstan.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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

Gas exploration on Siberia's Yamal Peninsula, a prime area of Soviet investment in the 1981–85 period.

—SYGMA.

The need to transfer foreign-currency reserves to larger and larger purchases of grain, meat, and other agricultural products is not the only thing which has caused a drop in the volume of Soviet equipment imports. Another reason is the increased stockpiling of uninstalled imported equipment and the low level of utilization of such equipment due to poor maintenance—a state of affairs revealed by periodic inspections by the Investment Bank of the USSR and by other organizations, conducted with increasing frequency in the late 1970's. These findings led the Soviet leadership to conclude that it would be expedient to curtail equipment imports for certain industries.[57] However, this reduction should only be a temporary phenomenon, and one would expect Soviet priorities to swing the other way again shortly.

When we discuss importation of machinery, we are not talking exclusively about Western machinery. We must also consider the expanding role of the East European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In the latter half of the 1970's, there occurred a shift in suppliers of Soviet equipment imports in favor of the CMEA countries. This was felt especially strongly in the importation of sub-surface and open-pit mining equipment and of equipment for oil refineries. Yet, this trend should not be overstated. Imports from Western suppliers accounted for increasing shares of several other kinds of equipment—e.g., rolling mills and chemical industry machinery.[58] Thus, on balance, Soviet demand for Western machinery is still likely to increase if the Soviet leadership really manages to realize its current policy of concentrating investment resources on completing existing construction projects.

Turning to the policy of more rapid exploitation of Siberia's oil and gas resources, we find that a number of the problems already noted are likely to apply with particular intensity. In this case, the past may be prologue

[57] The author himself participated in these investigations and in the drafting of measures to temporarily curtail imports of machinery which was not being promptly installed.

[58] Ministerstvo Vneshney Torgovli SSSR, *Vneshyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1970 g.* (USSR Foreign Trade in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, pp. 93–114; *Vneshyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1975 g.*, pp. 91–110; and *Vneshyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1980 g.*, pp. 80–97.

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to the future. Already once in the postwar period there was a huge, sudden increase in investment in a particular industry. This was in the early 1960's, when Khrushchev resolved to develop "big chemistry" dramatically. Unfortunately, as shown in a review of the results by a Soviet expert, the chemical industry was in no position to swallow such a large amount of investment rubles and wound up choking on them instead. In four years, the chemical industry's share of industrial investment increased by almost five percentage points. However, results—as measured by new productive capacities commissioned and increased output—were totally inadequate, given the extraordinary investment effort. The reason offered for this by the Soviet commentator was the fact that only 50 percent of the equipment needed to carry out the investment program for "big chemistry" was provided, i.e., industries closely connected to the chemical industry were not prepared to carry out the program. In that period, all of the Soviet economy's investment proportions were violated, thousands of construction projects were put on hold, and for the first time there appeared surpluses of construction materials and of many kinds of equipment. In a word, the policy produced chaos throughout the investment sphere. The consequences of this chaos were felt not only throughout the remainder of the 1960's, but also well into the 1970's. Summarizing the episode, the Soviet observer recommended that the Soviet Union never again "attempt such a sharp turn of the ship of construction."[59] One might well ask whether the crash investment program for the Siberian fuel industries will retrace the course of "big chemistry" fever and end up undermining Soviet investment potential for a long time.

The fuel and energy complex is one of the most capital-intensive spheres of the economy, involving many different stages, such as extraction, processing, transportation, and distribution. Directly or indirectly, it uses nearly 20 percent of all the metal produced in the USSR and more than 15 percent of the output of the machine-building industry.[60] But, as we have seen, the late 1970's saw considerable neglect of the very industries upon whose healthy functioning the oil and gas development must rely. Consequently, if the Soviet leadership is to have any chance of meeting the goals of the 11th FYP for development of the fuel and energy complex, it will have to turn to the West for imports of the machines, equipment, and high-quality steel which Soviet domestic industry is not currently capable of producing. Again, this raises the question of whether or not the state of Soviet agriculture will allow this. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the Soviet economy will be able to utilize these critical imports more efficiently than in the past.

[59] V. Krasovskiy, *Problemy ekonomiki kapital'nykh vlozhenii* (Problems of the Economics of Capital Investment), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1967, p. 17.

[60] Yu. Kononov, "Foreign Production Ties and the Inertia of Development of the Fuel and Energy Complex," *Izvestiya Sibirskogo otdeleniya Akademii nauk SSSR, seriya obshchestvennykh nauk* (Novosibirisk), No. 6, Issue 2, 1981, p. 12.

Conclusion

In sum, seen against the experience of the late 1970's, the Soviet investment program of the 11th FYP is riddled with confusion and contradictions. For every thesis in the plan, there is an antithesis:

- On the one hand, the leadership plans to increase the share of consumption in total national income and proclaims the primacy of social programs; on the other, they plan to reduce further the share of investment in housing and services, which had already reached a record low in the late 1970's.

- On the one hand, the plan calls for maximizing the percentage of investment in existing industry, most of which is situated in the European part of the country; on the other, it calls for the transfer of funds to the northeast in connection with the new investment impulse aimed at increasing the production, transport, and processing of oil and gas, and at development of the associated infrastructure. Shifts in the regional structure of capital investment which occurred in the second half of the 1970's testify to the fact that this second alternative has already started to be realized.

- On the one hand, investment in the so-called fuel and energy complex has sharply increased; on the other, investment in the industries which create the foundation for the development of this complex has slowed.

- On the one hand, investment resources are to be concentrated on almost-completed construction projects, which will provoke a sharp increase in the demand for equipment; on the other, there is no commensurate increase in the share of investment going to the machine-building industry, even though in recent years there has been a fall in output and in the number of new productive capacities put into operation for many kinds of equipment.

In a word, one cannot really speak of an "investment strategy" in the 11th FYP. The investment activity called for in the plan reflects the state of emergency existing in the Soviet economy, and is subordinated to the pressing

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need to leave untrammeled those branches of the economy generating foreign exchange and those producing arms.

The current Soviet leadership seems locked into unimaginative and contradictory investment policies. Its successors will have to devise a different sort of investment program if they are to extricate the Soviet economy from the dead end into which Brezhnev's policies have led it. One essential, if extremely painful, change will be rejection of the policy of pouring countless sums into the renovation and expansion of enterprises in the European part of the USSR, a policy that only perpetuates the isolation of the basic part of industry from its sources of raw materials and energy. Also unavoidable will be a turn toward intensified investment in the development of processing industries (especially the most energy-intensive ones) in the eastern regions of the country and toward development of the associated infrastructure. Finally, despite maximal investment efforts, an increase in the output of oil and gas can be attained only if imports of metal and equipment are sharply increased, and if investment injections from the West are intensified. This is because the corresponding Soviet industries were not prepared for this policy in time.

To break with the old investment policies will require a reduction (at least temporary) in industrial output, recourse to Western investment resources, and compromises not only in domestic policies but in defense and foreign policies as well. Can the Soviet leadership muster the will to take these major steps?

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Books

Windows on a Changing China

by Lowell Dittmer

HARRY HARDING. *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949–1976.* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1981.

ANTHONY SAICH. *China: Politics and Government.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1981.

LUCIAN PYE. *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics.* Cambridge, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981.

RICHARD CURT KRAUS. *Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1981.

THE DEATH of Mao Zedong removed from the scene a commanding (if somewhat erratic) presence. Mao's departure in turn transformed the character of the Chinese political system from revolutionary charismatic to something else, as yet undefined. Those in China who failed to appreciate this transformation, such as Hua Guofeng, have come to rue their myopia. But although Mao's death left his countrymen determined to change those aspects of the system held responsible for the abuses of the last 10 or so years of the Chairman's life, it left considerable uncertainty about precisely which aspects of the old regime should be reformed and the configuration of the new model toward which the polity should now move.

This uncertainty also left China scholars in momentary disarray. As at previous turning points in Chinese political development, no sooner had the China-watching community positioned themselves around the issue-areas of the Cultural Revolution than the Chinese themselves disavowed this paradigm and began the quest for a new one, if with somewhat less ideological certainty and self-confidence than in the past.

Western scholars have now begun to regroup and reassess the nature of their subject matter, and although the situation remains ambiguous, some early bets have begun to come in—it is too early to speak of a consensus—concerning the shape of the system now emerging in China and, particularly, the most appropriate methodological tools for studying it. The four books here under review explore some of the most promising vistas for an insightful inspection of the newest New China: organization theory, political culture, and class analysis.

AS THE FIRST monographic investigation of organizational issues in Chinese society since the appearance of Franz Schurmann's and Doak Barnett's studies in the late 1960's,[1] Harry Harding's eagerly awaited book (an extensive revision of his dissertation research) amply fulfills our expectations. The text is distinguished throughout by clear organization and lucid prose, patiently documented accuracy, sustained intelligence, and originality and rigor of analysis.

Harding's approach differs from that of either Barnett or Schurmann. As he explains in his Preface, his objective is neither a "comprehensive history of organization in China," nor an "objective description of the structure and operation of the Party and State," but rather a "history of the organizational *issues* that have absorbed Chinese leaders" (pp. viii, emphasis added). This novel tack at once narrows and broadens the scope of his inquiry: though more topically focused, it raises the question of the meaning and value—the ideological and cultural dimensions—of organization in China.

Harding begins with a general theoretical disquisition on the nature and social role of bureaucracy, focusing on what he calls the "bureaucratic dilemma"—the strain

[1] See Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 2nd ed., Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1969; and A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1967.

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between bureaucracy's functional indispensability and its characteristic drawbacks. It is from this theoretical discussion—rather than from his empirical investigation of the Chinese situation—that he derives his categorization of four types of solution or response to this dilemma: "radical," "rationalizing," "internal remedial," and "external remedial." In Harding's schema, the radical response attempts to destroy bureaucracy and replace it with some nonbureaucratic form of organization; the rationalizing response tends to deny any insuperable dilemma and to resolve criticisms by enhancing the efficiency of bureaucracy; the external remedial response seeks to subject bureaucracy to outside supervision and control at the hands of the mass public, the vanguard party, or specific control agencies erected for that purpose; and the internal remedial response attempts to ameliorate bureaucracy by introducing into the structure such "nonbureaucratic" elements as a more collegial form of leadership, modified criteria for promotion or transfer of officials, or new programs for cadre indoctrination.

Harding then proceeds with a chronological review of the post-1949 political history of the People's Republic, examining such organizational vicissitudes as the shift from the "adhocracy" of the early post-Liberation period to the Soviet-patterned "rationalization" of the first Five-Year Plan (for 1953–57), and thenceforth to the decentralized external remedialism of the Great Leap Forward (1958–60). He focuses on those incidents that made bureaucracy an object of criticism and reform, singling out for particular attention two "crises" when the value of bureaucracy was most fundamentally questioned—the Hundred Flowers movement (May-June 1957) and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–68).

Harding attributes the questioning of the bureaucracy in both crises to a combination of substantive and political concerns: in the first, growing inefficiency and dissatisfaction with agricultural performance (blamed on bureaucratic "conservatism"); in the second, anxiety about the growth of "revisionism" in the context of approaching generational succession. Mao was the arbiter of what constituted bureaucratic inadequacy in both cases, even though his critique underwent a process of development from 1959 to 1966. Both crises resulted in external remedial actions combined with radical proposals to restructure the bureaucracy. The latter were, however, abandoned once the crisis was over. (Indeed, Harding seems to feel—pp. 264–266, 294—that the Cultural Revolution did not even really attempt radical reforms, only remedial and rationalizing measures. In my own view, if the Cultural Revolution was not radical the term is devoid of empirical referent.) The power struggles that followed these two crises did not result in any systematic analysis of bureaucracy but rather in the unprecedented reduction of bureaucratic levers and constituencies to the status of political tools.

Harding arrives at the conservative (in terms of organization theory) conclusion that the approach to bureaucratic pathologies in the Communist era has gravitated toward internal remedialism—much like that of the Confucian bureaucracy. Mao and a small band of supporters, sometimes including Deng Xiaoping, occasionally engaged in external remedialism by mobilizing admittedly unreliable outside constituencies, but with results subsequently evaluated as unfortunate.[2] Radical restructuring of the bureaucracy was sometimes advocated, but never seriously pursued on a national scale. Thus the bureaucracy always returns to its center of gravity like a *pu-tao-weng* (a Chinese doll with a weighted base that wobbles its head but always returns to a standing position), feeling justified in its refusal to trust any

[2] Harding concurs with Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, Vol. 1, *Contradictions Among the People, 1956–1957*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1974, in supposing that Deng sided with Mao in support of the Hundred Flowers movement, anticipating his later support for the Democracy Wall in the fall of 1978. Deng's subsequent retreat from that advocacy shows his commitment to external remedialism to be more shallow than that of Mao, however.

Reviewers in This Issue

LOWELL DITTMER—Chairman of the Center for Chinese Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley; author of *Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 1974, and numerous articles on Chinese politics.

WILLIAM I. ZARTMAN—Professor of International Politics and Director of African Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University (Washington, DC); author of many works on the Middle East and Africa, most recently, *The Practical Negotiator*, 1982, and *Ripe for Revolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, forthcoming.

STEPHEN STERNHEIMER—Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston University (Boston, MA), and Research Associate, Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA); co-author of *Soviet Urban Management: With Comparisons to the United States*, 1979; author of numerous chapters and articles on Soviet economic, social, and administrative questions; his research on aging was conducted as part of a project on "Retirement and Aging in Cross-Cultural Perspective," funded by the National Institute on Aging of the National Institutes of Health (Washington, DC).

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independent external monitoring agency (pp. ix, 335).

Harding judiciously concedes to the Chinese Communists the ability to create a vast and complex network of political organizations capable of promoting a high rate of economic development and an "even more impressive degree of social welfare and economic equality." He also argues that they have been remarkably sensitive to any form of bureaucratic pathology, generally taking swift and relatively effective countermeasures. At the same time, he acknowledges that over the years since 1949 there has also been inefficiency, corruption, and arrogance, a "stifling conformity" and resistance to innovation among officials, and a bureaucratic insensitivity to client interests (pp. 329–59).

It seems almost captious to find fault with a study so well executed, but the reviewer must note a few defects. For example, one may ask whether, for all their apparent logical symmetry, Harding's four "escapes" are really of the same logical type.

The rational-radical dichotomy seems to me to refer to enduring ideological propensities in Chinese Communist organization-building that receive varying relative emphasis depending on shifts in the party's general line. Rationalization would seem to be not so much a natural response to a particular type of problem as a fulfillment of properties inherent in bureaucracy from the outset. Indeed, Harding's data seem at least equally compatible with the argument that rationalization presupposes an absence of crisis. Similarly, radicalism seems less a reaction to crisis than the imposition of a doctrinally-based preconception of elite-mass relations upon the state structure. By contrast to these two, internal and external remedialism—featured so heavily in Harding's book as to make it almost a history of rectification campaigns—belong to routine mechanisms of control and adjustment.

There is also some question whether the four categories are mutually exclusive. For example, it seems difficult to distinguish between external remedialism and radicalism, inasmuch as it has usually been in the context of external remedial episodes (specifically mass criticism of the bureaucracy) that proposals for radical restructuring have been advanced. And party control of the administration should not be considered so much an aspect of external remedialism as part of the basic original structure. Moreover, as far as I could tell, neither category—radicalism or external remedialism—takes into account such innovations as the inclusion of mass representatives in bureaucratic positions on either a permanent or rotating basis, unless this is subsumed under Harding's puzzling hybrid category of "open-door rectification" (p. 332).

It is also difficult to know where issues of centralization and decentralization should fit into Harding's categories. Initially, centralization seemed to be viewed by him as an aspect of rationalization (pp. 67–70), but subsequent decentralization measures are also so termed (pp. 289–95).

Many of these conceptual difficulties, it seems to me, may be traced to Harding's implicit model of bureaucratic change. As I understand it, this is what Arnold Toynbee might have called a model of challenge and response: the bureaucracy is confronted with a crisis and opts for one of a few conceivable solutions. Although Harding certainly seems to be well informed about the structure and dynamics of the bureaucracy, he makes clear at the outset that these are not really his interest: the bureaucracy is a black box, into which various inputs (crises) are fed and from which various outputs (the four escapes) emerge. The bureaucrats themselves are assumed to be in the passive position of responding to externally exerted pressures with no apparent vision of their own regarding the organizational future (or diverging futures) toward which they would like things to move.

Harding's model also begs the question of the essential nature of the bureaucratic structure and the role its internal dynamics plays in change. This question seems particularly relevant in view of the apparent resilience of the bureaucracy in the face of external crises.

Tony Saich's unassuming but well-wrought little text complements Harding's study in at least two respects. First, Saich offers chapters in which the internal structures of party and state are described in considerable detail, supplemented by analyses of the control network and of local political arrangements in both urban and rural contexts. And, second, whereas Harding concludes his analysis with the death of Mao and the fall of the "gang of four," making his greatest contribution to our empirical understanding of Chinese politics in his chapters on the Hundred Flowers and Great Leap Forward periods, Saich tends to focus on post-Mao developments, devoting about half of his book thereto.

In other respects, though, it is probably unfair to Saich to compare his book with Harding's. Saich apparently belongs to the (quite defensible) school of thought that a textbook should not be conceptually innovative or present a sustained argument, but should fairly represent the current state of knowledge in the field—and this is what he does, with commendable accuracy.

For the most part, Saich faithfully

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reports the point of view of the Deng Xiaoping regime with little of his own analysis or interpretation. Thus, although he briefly questions the tenability of the distinction between party and state stressed by China's current leadership (p. 92), he proceeds to devote a separate chapter to each. And he reports without commentary a fairly absurd official explanation of why the direct election of workers' representatives should not be extended to higher levels (p. 195).

LUCIAN PYE's most recent contribution to our understanding of Chinese politics is in many ways directly antithetical to the foregoing works, providing a healthy challenge and counterpoint to their more conventional point of view. Whereas Harding and Saich place their bets on the growing importance of the bureaucracy, heuristically accepting the Chinese claim (and general social science assumption) that in the absence of charismatic leadership, organizational structure will become increasingly meaningful, Pye completely dismisses the political impact of formal structure and devotes his attention to informal groups or "factions."[3] Even these informal organizations are, according to Pye, devoid of structure, lacking any predictable relationship to bureaucratic, generational, geographic, or policy interests. And contrary to wishful expectations of a new era of stability and unity around the pragmatic "four modernizations," Pye foresees more factionalism in the future rather than less. He suggests that refusal by China's leaders to acknowledge the existence of factionalism will only ensure that factions remain hidden from public scrutiny and hence be all the more disruptive (p. 230).

Factions are based upon power, Pye says, an exclusive concern for which pervades Chinese politics. This preoccupation is, he argues, psychoculturally motivated, although the precise nature of these motives remains somewhat obscure to this reviewer even after reading the author's exhaustive explanation. Individuals are apparently drawn to "particularistic" ties not by any expectation of reciprocity (as in a patron-client relationship), but out of some festering grievance that inhibits conformity with the majority yet fosters an equally pervasive demand for consensus, arising from a need for security.

It is the interaction between these two conflicting drives, Pye argues, that constitutes the cyclical dynamic of Chinese elite politics. Policy plays no role except to advertise for new factional recruits or to signal the rise or fall of competing factions. The logic of this model Pye explores with unsparing (but often insightful) cynicism; his conclusions are always provocative, sometimes set forth with a bland matter-of-factness in which the scarcity of evidence seems to be offset by the wealth of subtle psychological interpretation.

If Saich is too sparing in his commentary, Pye appears not to mind living dangerously, introducing stimulating new conjectures at every turn about the most important and elusive issue in Chinese politics: the central policy process. His evidence is, however, largely anecdotal. It is true that documentary sources are supplemented in this study by interviews conducted in Hong Kong with 40-odd former PRC citizens, though it is hard to see how these informants can shed much light on our understanding of elite behavior.

Although Pye writes very well, the book is slow going because the authorial responsibility to provide empirical cases sufficient to corroborate his generalizations is in effect delegated to the reader.[4] The validity of the author's generalizations may therefore be variously assessed, depending on the experiences and perspectives of the individual reader. For my part, I would take issue with the following points.

Pye's contention that policy is of *no importance at all in factional controversy* (p. 160) seems to be based not so much upon evidence as upon a denigration of the motives of the participants. This introduces a refreshing note of realism to the sanctimonious self-portrait Chinese politicians tend to prefer. But is Pye's assumption that all political behavior is motivated by self-interest rather than by altruism any more likely to hold true as a general rule than the contrary (Maoist) assumption? The fact that drastic policy changes so often follow the resolution of factional controversy would seem to belie the irrelevance of policy considerations. To dismiss such shifts as "inspirational" and "compulsive," having only fleeting cyclical impact upon the characteristic "immobilisme" of the Communist party leadership (pp. 169–74) seems to me to ignore the sometimes wrenching policy changes that have occurred in China over the last 30 years.

Even if we assume that factional maneuvers are motivated exclusively by power-political considerations and should be regarded as mere symbolic expressions of irrelevant ulterior motives, they still have wide-ranging social ramifications. Pye is

[3] The book reviewed here is the revised version of a study first published by Rand Corporation in 1980 entitled *The Dynamics of Factions and Consensus in Chinese Politics*. Although the present version does in my view represent a significant improvement over its forerunner, the previous title was more precise. This is a study of factional conflict in Chinese politics, but to contend that Chinese politics is nothing but factionalism is to engage in persuasive definition.

[4] The text is also marred by occasional typographical lapses, perhaps the most unfortunate of which is the consistent misspelling of Yanan (Yenan, in Wade-Giles) as Yunnan, a province in Southwest China.

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perhaps not very concerned with the social ramifications, but any theory that claims to explain the dynamics of Chinese politics without regard for policy outcomes, sometimes even seeming to equate all policy outcomes, has definite limitations.

The allegation that factions have no relationship to policy also seems incompatible with Pye's own plausible categorization of factions in the post-Mao era according to their members' prior career experiences, ideal interests, and imputed policy preferences (pp. 22 ff.; cf. p. 79). Granted, the demand for conformity that Pye so perceptively describes does place certain rhetorical limits upon any pursuit of departmental interests, with the result that someone like the noted physicist Zhou Peiyuan (p. 80) must frequently change ideological course in justifying his requests, but I would wager that within this shifting ideological context Zhou consistently finds arguments to defend his own (educational-scientific) interests.

Professor Pye is a founding father of the psychocultural approach to political inquiry and has remained among its most distinguished and prolific practitioners ever since it emerged from the shadow of cultural anthropology. Unfortunately, his book still bears some of the stigmata of the early national-character approach that have since fallen into scholarly disrepute. This emerges in Pye's failure to deal adequately with the chronological dimension. Despite the inclusion of a chronology of the post-Mao years suggesting that his study intends to cover this period, the author has certain points he wishes to make about Chinese factional behavior, and he takes evidence to support his points wherever he can find it, by no means confining himself to the post-Mao period. Pye tends to generalize from worst cases to an unchanging or at best cyclically repetitive universe, giving his findings a deeply pessimistic cast. There are perhaps more references to what the Chinese treat as the Cultural Revolution decade than to the post-Mao period. Although it is preposterous to dismiss the Cultural Revolution as an aberration to be blamed on a few stage villains (as many friends of China tend to do), it is also unfair to consider it a paradigm of Chinese political behavior that is valid for all time. While Pye scores many points against overly facile applications of a bureaucratic politics model, it also seems to me premature to dismiss any possibility of variation based on organizational or regional subculture. This tendency to overgeneralize and to ignore chronological or situational differences, unfortunately, may lead many readers to ignore the valuable and penetrating insights Pye has to offer.

ISSUES of class distinctions and class struggle—matters that have bitterly divided the Chinese Communist leadership and also the Chinese masses—are the subject of Richard Kraus's excellent monograph. Of particular interest here is the author's concern with the evolving ideological definition of class by China's leaders. However, he is equally concerned with the empirical dimensions of the problem and with the question of what happens to society if, as he suspects is likely, China's officials increasingly neglect the issue of class differentiation. This latter aspect of the book reminds a scholarly community almost obsessively concerned with China's politics of the continuing importance of developments in the society itself.

Kraus traces the roots of the Chinese Communist class system to the land reform campaign in the countryside and to the apparently less thorough campaigns concurrently mobilized in the cities, which sought to categorize China's entire population into four general "class designations," based on each family's relationship to private property in the pre-Liberation period. This stratification system was later supplemented by an occupational rank system based on current economic position, and also in some cases by a hierarchy of pejorative political "labels" applied by the Chinese Communist Party to political deviants. These three stratification systems tended to compete with one another, with various segments of the leadership or the population tending to favor one or the other depending on their objectives and interests. Class designations became rigidly ascriptive, "caste-like" categories automatically passing from parents to their children. Occupational sector rankings and political labels were more flexibly applied, though it was difficult to efface the latter once the "cap" had been worn. Class designations and occupational rankings have at times overlapped. For example, Kraus notes (pp. 59–61) that after the 1959 anti-Rightist campaign, class designations and labels were frequently conflated in a new categorization known as "elements" (*fenzi*).

Mao's contribution to this jumble of hierarchical categories was to reemphasize the importance of class and class conflict (in contrast to others, who considered such distinctions increasingly irrelevant), but to redefine class on the basis of current behavior and political criteria rather than ascriptive family backgrounds. Mao's enthusiasm for a behavioral theory of class stopped short of demanding a formal reclassification, which would have brought him into conflict with those within the leadership (such as Liu Shaoqi) who might have demanded that any new categories correlate with current economic realities. Yet, when-

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ever an opportunity of sufficient political importance and ambiguity presented itself, Mao tended to stress behavioral criteria.

Such an opportunity was provided by the Cultural Revolution, when the "pedigree theory" was initially used by children of high-ranking cadres to monopolize leadership of the Red Guard movement. Because these *gao gan zi di* (high-cadre children) had a stake in defending precisely those bureaucratic vested interests that Mao was determined to destroy, he discovered a natural affinity with radicals of less than pure worker-peasant class background who were prepared to lead the assault on "Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road." And in what would later be termed the "late Cultural Revolution period" (1970–76), the "gang of four" (and Mao as well) sought further to develop the theory of class by deriving class relationships from the state's defining role in society (p. 143). But neither Mao nor the "gang of four" were ever prepared to discard family background altogether in their search for political allies.

The post-Mao period Kraus derisively terms one of "more inequality and less class analysis." He argues that although the theoretical importance of class categories has been deemphasized, the objective existence of economic inequality seems likely to increase.

Kraus has seized upon an important topic at the intersection of politics and society, for the first time subjecting to sustained analysis a topic heretofore analyzed primarily in the context of the Cultural Revolution that made it publicly controversial. Although developments in the articulation of various stratification systems in the People's Republic follow no discernible inherent logic, Kraus claims to see a clear and progressive logic in the development of Mao's own theory of class over the same period. I think, however, that Kraus tends to overstate the coherence of Mao's theoretical position. Notwithstanding Kraus's valiant defense (pp. 100–14), it seems clear that Mao's resort to a behavioral theory of class was indeed fraught with all the dangers of arbitrariness which Benjamin Schwartz ascribed to it.[5] Though Mao did seem more sensitive to the plight of the new underdogs in the emerging socialist status order than his colleagues, this sympathy coincided with his interest in mobilizing a constituency against those colleagues. As soon as his rivals had been disposed of and he himself had been restored to his proper station, Mao became more equivocal about the need to redefine the stratification system. Certainly during the 1968–71 period there was a resurgence of the old pedigree theory of class as the defining factor for a number of "affirmative action" programs introduced to ameliorate the position of the disprivileged (e.g., lowering of university admissions criteria). Not until 1973–74, with the campaign against "taking the back door" (*zuo houmen*), was there a return to a behavioral definition of class, selectively applied to officials.

The "gang of four" never arrived at an entirely coherent position, even if they did, in my view, make some original and theoretically interesting contributions to the theory of class. Yao Wenyuan's article on "On the Social Basis of the Lin Biao Party Clique" (*Hongqi,* No. 3, 1975), discussed in Kraus (pp. 143–64), attributes bureaucratic class consciousness to the occupational rank system introduced in 1956 (in a development of ideas ironically first presented by the same Lin Biao that Yao is attacking). Zhang Chunqiao's more subtle analysis (which Kraus oddly ignores) seeks to trace the persistence of class to the distinction between collective and whole people's (i.e., state) ownership and other variables in the economic base.[6] Still other strains of the radical argument derived class on the basis of allegiance or opposition to the ideological line selected by the leadership, a "superstructural" variable.[7] These apparently incompatible elements of the radical position Kraus fails to integrate or even to discuss, though he does take note of the radicals' uncharacteristic reticence in drawing practical political implications from their analysis (pp. 161–64).

In view of the abundant self-contradictions in the radical position, it is unclear to me why Kraus launches such a bitter assault on post-Mao revisions of class theory (pp. 165–83). While the latter are less theoretically ambitious, they are surely more practical than Maoist formulations and, given the dogmatic constraints on redefining key terms, may represent the most reasonable interpretation that is now feasible. At least the problem of "sociological fossils"—inherited class background—has been disposed of, opening the way toward a more flexible and hopefully empirically open-ended application of the loaded terms of class analysis. Thus, the 1979 decisions to remove the class designations of former "exploiters" and to include intellectuals among the working class eliminate a stigma that is both theoretically dubious and functionally counter-

[5] Benjamin Schwartz, *Communism and China: Ideology in Flux,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 19–21.

[6] Zhang Chunqiao, "On Exercising All-round Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie," *Hongqi* (Beijing), No. 4, Apr. 1, 1975, pp. 3–13; see also my analysis in "The Radical Critique of Political Interest, 1966–1978," *Modern China* (Los Angeles, CA), October 1980, pp. 363–96.

[7] See Yuan Qing, "An Important Question in the Relations of Production," *Hongqi,* No. 5, May 1, 1975, pp. 8–14; see also Fang Hai, "Criticize the Bourgeois Style of Life," *Xuexi yu pipan* (Shanghai), No. 3, Mar. 16, 1976, pp. 27–29.

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productive, in view of the objectives and constituency of the current regime.

At the same time, Kraus is correct in pointing to the reemergence of income inequalities under new policies stressing material incentives. Some of the poorer communes in Shaanxi, for example, report that introduction of the "responsibility field system" has generated a differential of as much as 16 to 1 in family incomes.[8] Will elements emerge within the leadership prepared to mobilize the envy awakened by such contrasts on behalf of a resurrection of the sort of radical egalitarian and antibureaucratic policies Mao prophesied on his deathbed?[9] The prospect cannot be foreclosed, Kraus warns in his concluding paragraph.

THESE FOUR contributions have made significant strides in clarifying methodological alternatives and research strategies in the study of post-Mao China. But they have not resolved all questions.

Harry Harding has certainly expanded the horizons of the study of organization in China by introducing the question of the value and meaning of bureaucracy in the political arena, and the relevance of this ongoing controversy to bureaucratic change. In view of the probability that the value of bureaucracy will no longer be subjected to fundamental public debate in China, it would be useful to integrate Harding's contribution with a deeper understanding of the inherent dynamics of bureaucratic development or stagnation, including further study of the implications of such classic features as dual rule, internal and external control, and structural duplication.[10]

One might also examine what demands political elites are likely to press upon the bureaucracy, judging from their likely objectives and dilemmas. Among the most fundamental of these dilemmas has always been the relationship between formal and informal organization, between structure and culture. Lucian Pye has employed his remarkable sensitivity to cultural nuance to illuminate the latter terms in this set of antitheses, discounting the former almost entirely. Politics in China, he says, is basically irrational, having no relationship to policy and only a tenuous one to ideology. Pye's argument is cogent, but in my view overstated. True, cultural factors and such informal organizational features as factionalism have played and will continue to play a very important role in Chinese politics. But, assuming that China conforms to general patterns of political development (structural differentiation, functional division of labor, and so forth), the analysis of political culture must in the future transcend its focus on national character and include examination of consistent structural patterns, subcultural variations, and diachronic changes.

Finally, class and class struggle also seem likely to remain an empirically significant problem in the People's Republic for the foreseeable future, even in the likely event that theoretical discussion of the issue dies out entirely. Richard Kraus appropriately alerts us to the enduring importance of the subject and the need to continue studying it.

Thus, much remains to be understood about contemporary China. In the continuing quest for enlightenment, future China scholars would do well to build upon the studies of the authors considered above.

[8] Based on a June 1982 conversation with an official in a position to know in Beijing, who prefers to remain anonymous.

[9] See the long statement by Mao on June 1, 1976, cited in *China Archiv* (Hamburg), November 1976, p. 581, in which Mao says: "I have long predicted that possibly in China a restoration of the bourgeoisie would occur everywhere. I see great difficulties for these days. You should know that time does not go backward. In a few decades, centuries, at the latest a few thousand years, the red banners will again wave everywhere. That is the law of history."

[10] See my article "The Formal Structure of Central Chinese Political Institutions," in Sidney Greenblatt, Richard Wilson, and Amy Auerbacher Wilson, Eds., *Organizational Behavior in Chinese Society*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1981, pp. 47–76.

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The USSR in the Third World

by William I. Zartman

AMNON SELLA. *Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1981.

MOHAMMED AYOOB, Ed. *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1980.

ROBERT H. DONALDSON, Ed. *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.

W. RAYMOND DUNCAN, Ed. *Soviet Policy in the Third World.* New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1980.

JOSEPH G. WHELAN, Ed. *Soviet Policy and United States Response in the Third World.* Report prepared by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, for the US House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981.

ADEED DAWISHA and KAREN DAWISHA, Eds. *The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives.* London, Heinemann, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982.

THE SOVIET role in the Third World has proved a difficult and intractable question. Such studies as there are often lack a common or even explicit basis for discourse on what is or what should be (in a structurally determined, not a moral sense) the nature of relations between strong and weak states. Thus, it is still possible to debate, in more or less scandalized tones, whether the great powers should be involved at all in the Third World, let alone what the legitimate limits of great power involvement should be.

There are at least three schools of interpretation around, which might be called Pax, Pox, and Proxies. The first sees a Soviet "grand design" to take over the Third World and establish a Pax Sovietica, which the American-led West must counter at all costs. The second school is a "southernist" view, which in effect says, a pox on both your houses. Both great powers (and their predecessors) have been interfering and creating conflict in the Third World, and the Third World should and can be left in peace and free to conduct its affairs any way it chooses. The third school sees a more complex situation. Conflict is endemic in the Third World, it argues, and gradually draws both East and West into its vortex in an incremental series of interactions.

The books under review here cover a broad and overlapping range of approaches. The Pax school is represented by Amnon Sella's *Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East,* a work on regional conflict. Unfortunately, the treatment is disturbingly complex, with a clutter of detail that obscures settings and conclusions.

The Pox school is represented by *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World,* edited by Mohammed Ayoob, a book that brings together descriptions (each of varying quality) of seven regional conflicts, but without concept or conclusion (despite Ayoob's attempt at one). Like the Sella book, it focuses on conflict rather than normal relations.

The Proxies school is represented by the remaining four books. *The Soviet Union in the Third World,* edited by Robert Donaldson, is the most comprehensive, although it is thereby sometimes reduced to little more than dry factual accounting. Its 21 chapters cover Soviet activities in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Most are on a single country; however, some are broader in scope and deal with whole regions, issues, or functional areas of activity. *Soviet Policy in the Third World,* edited by Raymond Duncan, is quite similar, though shorter. Its 12 chapters are organized by region, country, or by issue. *Soviet Policy and United States Response in the Third World,* edited by Joseph Whelan, is the broadest of all. It is therefore somewhat thinner on Soviet policy, since half its space is devoted to US responses and Third World perceptions. *The Soviet Union in the Middle East,* edited by Adeed and Karen Dawisha, focuses on the Middle

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East alone. It has some subregional breakdown (Arab World, Northern Tier, and Horn) as well as six additional chapters on functional areas of Soviet activity. Each of the four books avoids the Pax and Pox schools and does a careful, restrained job of evaluating Soviet aims, capabilities, and achievements.

What the books under review lack—regardless of the merits of the individual contributions—is a common conceptual framework or an agreed structural understanding of great power roles in the Third World. Rich details are provided, but the larger canvas is still mostly unfinished. And it is this larger canvas that is essential to an understanding of the way the great powers relate to the Third World.

IN DISCUSSING the Soviet role in the Third World, therefore, all is relative to an understanding of the baseline: On what criteria does one judge the behavior of the great powers—in this case, one of the greatest powers—in the Third World? The answer varies slightly according to the particular Third World region, and since space does not permit an examination of all of the Third World, I shall focus here on two diverse but overlapping areas—Africa and the Middle East.

Put simply, the various components of the Third World stand in an entirely different relationship to the West than to the East. On the one hand, the Third World is essentially a part of the West. Politically, to be sure, it is nonaligned. But in most other respects—ties of trade, aid, and investment, values and aspirations, and even culture (the West provides an important ingredient in the new cultural synthesis emerging in the Third World)—it is still a part of the West. Africa (as discussed by Raymond Copson in the Whelan book) is unequivocally an example of this relationship. The Middle East, like some other areas, has a more complex relationship with the West. Its economic relations are dominated by the West. Historically, however, its culture is involved in a dialectic relationship with the West, with the latter viewed as at once antithesis to the region and part of the synthesis (none of the books reviewed here—except for Douglas Pike's excellent chapter on Vietnam, in the Donaldson book—seems very interested in the underlying cultural relationships).

On the other hand, the Third World has none of these relationships with the Slavic, Communist East—not even the historic cultural conflict. This is true not only for regions distant from Soviet borders, such as Africa. It is true even for regions that directly adjoin the Soviet Union, such as the Middle East (as is shown in Edward Corcoran's thorough but inconclusive chapter on Soviet Muslim policy in the Donaldson book, and in Adeed Dawisha's perceptive survey in the Dawisha book).

This fundamental asymmetry has important consequences (as discussed by Whelan in his book, and by David Albright and particularly well by Keith Dunn in the Donaldson book). For the West, there is a certain responsibility for the well-being and security of these poorer, developing, nonaligned countries. This sense of responsibility by no means seeks to dispossess the local inhabitants of control over their own destiny, for which in most cases they struggled. Rather, it seeks to encourage and support local self-determination, to help local authorities see their way through the problems and conflicts that weaken and distract them.

For the East, by contrast, there is no such sense of responsibility, only a position of disadvantage vis-à-vis the West. As we shall see, this fundamental disadvantage defines the role the Soviet Union can hope to play in the Third World—with regard to both the opportunities it seeks and the limitations it suffers.

THE SOVIET UNION has opportunities for relations with the Third World on a variety of levels. First, it has access through normal diplomatic, commercial, touristic, and other forms of interaction. This is seemingly a dull subject, since it concerns ordinary activities and becomes attractive only when it goes beyond the ordinary. All the same, the relevant chapters of the Whelan, Dawisha, Duncan, and Donaldson books have merit even when they lack excitement. They catalog a wide range of Soviet activities that can never be judged a win or a loss. The principal Soviet goal on this level is simply to maintain an active presence—to support anti-Western policy options, act as an "opportunistic free-rider" (Robert Paarlberg in the Duncan book), and otherwise maintain relations and cause trouble for the West. If the Soviets have another goal, it is to pose as partaker in and sympathizer with Third World concerns on such "southern" issues as food, population growth, nuclear power, the environment, energy, development assistance, the new international economic order (NIEO), military assistance, and ideological alternatives. As a number of incisive chapters in the Donaldson, Duncan, Whelan, and Dawisha books show, the Soviet Union has been manifestly unsuccessful in this latter effort. Just as being "part of" the Third World on a shrinking, increasingly interdependent globe does not exclude the Third World from normal exchanges with other regions of the world, so such exchanges with the USSR do not challenge the basic Western orientation of the Third World.

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Second, the Soviet presence in a Third World country can gradually shift from a normal relationship to preponderance. The circumstances are usually when a left-leaning government requires legitimation and ideological support from the East, or when a regional conflict impels a government to borrow power from the great power enemy of its enemy's great power friend. The opportunity usually arises when a friendly government or succession of governments increasingly friendly to the USSR invite greater Soviet ties (as was the case with Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt or Marien Ngouabi's and Denis Sassou Nguesso's Congo).

The institutionalized high point of this level of relations is the treaty of friendship. The Soviet Union has signed such treaties with twelve countries of the Third World. Two were surprisingly short-lived—with Egypt (1971–76) and Somalia (1974–77). Several others—with Iraq (1972), India (1971), Congo (1981), and possibly Syria (1980), Angola (1976), and Mozambique (1977)—seem to allow a great deal of flexibility and multilateralism in foreign relations. The rest—with Afghanistan (1978), South Yemen (1979), Vietnam (1978), and possibly Ethiopia (1978)—embrace what is clearly a patron-client relationship (or "institutionalized dependency," as Shirin Tahir-Kheli characterizes it in the Donaldson book).

In these last cases, of course, a third and deeper level of Soviet penetration has clearly occurred—outright Soviet predominance. The circumstances usually arise when a leftist, ideological regime is engaged in internal and external conflicts simultaneously and must resort to foreign military support. The opportunity is bolstered by the actual presence of troops, from either the USSR or its allies.

There are several examples of Soviet penetration at this level. One is Afghanistan, whose Marxist factions and power struggles are portrayed by Tahir-Kheli in the Donaldson book, in passim in the Dawisha book, and in an excellent synthesis by Whelan in his own book. Another is Ethiopia, where a revolution against a feudal monarchy, followed by invasion by an irridentist neighbor, provided an opening for incremental Soviet engagement. This case is analyzed well by Richard Remnek in the Donaldson book and by Robert Patman in the Dawisha book, but more tendentiously by Ayoob in his own book. A third is Angola, whose internecine war between a Marxist liberation movement and Western-aided opponents is skillfully examined on its many levels by Arthur Klinghoffer in both the Donaldson and Duncan books. Unfortunately, a similar case, that of South Yemen, is not treated in the books reviewed here.

All such cases are suggestive of other situations in which the Soviet Union might seek gains in the future. Opportunities such as those in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, and South Yemen are rare and unlikely to arise again; there are few feudal monarchies or anticolonial struggles or non-Communist neighbors of the Soviet Union left in this world. But such cases point to other, similar situations, in which an oppressive landowning system or a historic territorial/ethnic conflict could give rise to an ideological neo-national liberation movement. One such case is South Africa, for which D. J. Goldsworthy, in the Ayoob book, gives a particularly sensitive and Daniel Papp, in the Donaldson book, a thorough but drier portrayal of Soviet activities and opportunities. Another is elsewhere in Southern Africa, where the Soviet Union tried to position itself for future benefit from the decolonizing struggles in Zimbabwe and Namibia, but did so with notable clumsiness and restraint. As a result, it bet heavily on the wrong horse in Zimbabwe and on a weak horse in Namibia (unfortunately, touched on only in passing by Klinghoffer in the Duncan book). Still another is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Here, the Soviet Union has hovered on the fringes, giving support to various Arab parties merely to the extent of keeping them in the fray and buttressing its own claim to be included in any regional diplomacy. So far, when push has come to shove (1973, 1982) the Soviet Union has not pressed its claims to the point of either regional or bipolar stalemate. Yet, it can at least play the role of a spoiler, the party that makes an already intractable confict insoluble.

The sum of such propositions is that, beyond a certain minimal level, the Soviet entry into regions of the Third World rides on local conflict. Admittedly, some of Moscow's relationships—notably, with the Congo, despite that country's feuds with Zaire across the river—do not seem to be so based. In such cases, though, the ties are not very firm. Most Soviet penetration of the Third World has been closely connected to local conflict—as in Ethiopia, Angola, and Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the strength and durability of the Soviet Union's relationships in the Third World appear to vary with the intensity of the conflict. Indeed, Soviet predominance may well weaken and be reduced as the conflict that gave entry wanes. The Soviet Union failed to give military support to Somalia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Angola, Mozambique, Syria, and Vietnam when it was clearly needed, and in most cases, neither distance nor military risk (factors in Vietnam, for example) was the explanation. Yet, the Soviet Union continues to proffer friendship treaties in areas where a

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tangible Soviet commitment is even less likely, as indicated by its latest treaty with Congo.

It is certain, however, that the Soviet Union will find other opportunities in the Third World. Conflict is endemic in the Third World, much more so than in the West. New ranking orders and relationships must be sorted out, states must be established and boundaries fixed, a national group identity must be inculcated, and institutions must be stabilized. Outside meddlers from either East or West need not create conflict—it is lying about in great profusion.

ALTHOUGH the opportunities afforded by Third World conflict are often enticing, the Soviet Union encounters strong limitations in attempting to exploit them. The Soviet Union can no more "develop" its clients through the diplomacy of economic assistance than it can "deliver" them through the diplomacy of conflict resolution.

In the former case, the Soviet Union's resources, and the will to allocate them, are inadequate. Donaldson, in the Donaldson book, incisively debunks Soviet pretensions in the NIEO debates, and Paarlberg, in the Dunan book, provides a similarly thoughtful analysis of Soviet policies in the debates over the world food system.

In the latter case, the Soviet Union lacks leverage. The structure of relations with the Third World makes it difficult for the Soviet Union to pressure its clients, since they can always return to the residual context of a Western orientation. (This is an important topic, like many touched upon here, and this all-too-brief discussion should imply not that leverage is a ready commodity in the West, only that it is even rarer in Soviet hands. Only with great effort can the United States deliver its associates when seeking to resolve Third World conflicts, as US negotiators with Ian Smith in the 1970's and with P. K. Botha and Menachem Begin today can testify. But the Soviet Union has delivered no one in similar circumstances since the Cuban missile crisis, if then. In any case, none of the books discusses the point.) Rather, the Soviet purpose is to reinforce its clients, at least to the extent of keeping them in the fray, and it is only through this effort that it can buy its way into the region at all.

The Soviet Union has had genuine experience in conflict resolution only once—in 1966 at Tashkent, when it mediated conflict between India and Pakistan. Even there, the USSR did not really resolve matters; it mediated an end to the war but resolutely avoided addressing the underlying Kashmir conflict. Apart from this one episode, it has never been able to manage a Third World conflict, let alone resolve one and produce a lasting agreement. The numerous secret and rare public instances where it has tried and failed only reinforce this judgment.

Since the Soviet Union is in no position to deliver concessions from its clients, its role will continue to be primarily disruptive. There is little chance that the Soviet Union can bring concessions from Angola to South Africa, from Syria or the Palestine Liberation Organization to Israel, from Ethiopia to Somalia (except as a means of negotiating the USSR's own return to Somalia), or even from Algeria to Morocco. There may be chance that it can negotiate an agreement between, say, the Eritreans and Ethiopia or possibly even (in the absence of a successful Islamic Conference effort) between Iraq and Iran (although there are many problems involved). There may even be the rare case where the Soviet Union can act as the disinterested arbiter, as it did in Tashkent. But no such case is evident at the moment. Thus, there appears to be no gain to be gotten for either the Third World or the West in bringing in the Soviet Union to attempt to ease tensions and resolve conflicts.

IN SUM, it is this asymmetrical relationship involving the East, the West, and the Third World that fundamentally determines the Soviet role in the Third World. The conclusions are comfortable for none of the three sides.

For the Third World, all policy options rest on a dilemma: Conflict between local parties with presumably legitimate goals and interests leads initially to a competitive search for external support in hope of prevailing, and eventually, as the great powers involve themselves more actively in the conflict, to stalemate at a higher level. As long as one great power does not respond to the call, the other has no intrinsic reason for responding either, except perhaps in the case of an ideological regime which is suffering from conflict among left-wing factions and which calls upon the Soviet Union for ideological reasons. The very structure of the post-World War II international setting decrees that the great power which starts the escalation will be the Soviet Union, alert for targets of opportunity, since in a postcolonial sense, the West is "there" already and is uninterested in being the first to intervene. That is not a virtue, just a fact, Unfortunately, this fact creates the temptation for the West in overeager moments to see Communist intervention even where there has been none.

The obvious conclusion—that Third World states should abstain from calling for outside support—is as idealistic as the proposition that the great powers should abstain from intervention. Abstention makes sense only as long as there is an absolute assurance of abstention by

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the other side, or an assurance of incapacity by the other side (even with foreign intervention). In Ethiopia, for example, it is hard to fault Mengistu Haile-Meriam and his Marxist regime, a fourth of whose territory was occupied by an invading neighbor, for calling for help from the Soviets and their allies. Appeals to the Organization of African Unity might have been nicer, but scarcely effective. In Angola, many of the contending parties, both inside and outside the country, may have found it in their interest, retrospectively, to maintain the Alvor Accords. Once those accords began to collapse, however, it was hard to fault the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) for calling in Cubo-Soviet assistance. In Morocco, a beleaguered but undefeated regime fighting off a Soviet-armed Polisario Front could hardly have done anything but appeal for outside aid. In Iraq, beset by real and imagined enemies all about, Saddam Hussein not only called on the great power enemy of his enemies' great power friend but also made it pay heavily for some pretty slim benefits, as Robert Freedman shows in the Donaldson book. Even Syria felt itself forced into friendship with the Soviet Union because of a lack of response from the United States and an escalation of US assistance for Israel.

For the great powers, there is the same sort of prisoner's dilemma. It is difficult to avoid the glaringly obvious, but not always recognized, conclusion that in a bipolar world the great powers will always be condemned either to call (or raise) the other's wager or to work to disarm the initial conflict. The relationship between these ostensibly clear and opposite poles is not as simple as it sounds, and it leads to the complex dynamics of an American policy of conflict resolution that is beyond the scope and limitations of this review. For the West, the dilemma is less the intrinsic threat of Soviet penetration than the difficulties of coming to terms with Third World perceptions. To be sure, if local Third World conflict opens the door to Soviet penetration, Western attention is immediately engaged. There are limits to the possibility of simply letting the Soviet Union stay on where it has already gained a foothold, lest the Soviet presence become normal and the Western relationship with the Third World be disturbed. But even if local Third World conflict does not lead to Soviet penetration, it can be utilized to have the Third World blame the West and strain the Western sense of responsibility.

The easy answer would be for the West to drop its own sense of responsibility, since it can be fully gratified only rarely and is vulnerable to others' manipulations. Nevertheless, as noted above, there is no getting out of it: the West is held responsible by the Third World parties to their own conflicts.

For the Soviet Union, however, the recurring dilemma is of a different sort altogether: why must it continually play the escalatory role rather than the conciliatory role? The usual reply is that the Soviet Union is a revisionist rather than a status quo power, a power that wants to get into the Third World rather than one that is there already. But that reply misses an essential point: conciliation can be revisionist in objective, and the Soviet Union could get into the Third World through conciliation just as well as through escalation, a goal it achieved in Tashkent.

The answer again lies in the structure of the Third World. A conciliator can act only as an absolute neutral party (the commonplace conception) or as an agent to deliver concessions from its client (a notion quite contrary to what is usually accepted). The West can mediate in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and the Middle East because—or to the extent that—it can deliver concessions from South Africa, Ian Smith, and Israel, not because it delivers concessions for them. But the Soviet Union is in no such position. Therefore, it is condemned to play the spoiler in a few cases, and merely the quiet bystander in most cases. That is not a virtue, just a fact.

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The Graying of the Soviet Union

by Stephen Sternheimer

A. V. DMITRIYEV. *Sotsial'nyye problemy lyudey pozhilogo vozrasta* (Social Problems of Elderly People). Leningrad, Nauka, 1980.

M. S. LANTSEV. *The Economic Aspects of Social Security in the USSR.* Moscow, Progress, 1979.

A. G. NOVITSKIY and G. V. MIL'. *Zanyatost' pensionerov: sotsial'no-demograficheskiy aspekt* (The Employment of Old-Age Pensioners: Social and Demographic Dimensions). Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981.

D. F. CHEBOTAREV, Ed. *Usloviya zhizni i pozhiloy chelovek* (Living Conditions and the Elderly Individual). Moscow, Meditsina, 1978.

V. D. SHAPIRO. *Chelovek na pensii* (The Pensioner). Moscow, Mysl', 1980.

OVER THE next twenty years, the Soviet Union will increasingly acquire the features of an aging society. By the year 2000, roughly one out of every five Soviet citizens will be eligible to retire. Whether Shakespeare's metaphor of old age as a lusty winter—frosty but kindly—can aptly characterize societies as well as individuals remains to be seen. In the meantime, it is safe to assume that future occupants of the seats of power in the Kremlin will have to devote more time, attention, and probably resources to shape a workable policy for the aging, if only because—unlike King Canute—they can hardly expect to stem the tide. Therefore, it is both regrettable and curious that the many Western analyses of the policy implications of impending leadership changes in the Soviet Union, and of the host of social, economic, and political problems Leonid Brezhnev's successors will inherit, rarely treat the issues raised by the aging of Soviet society. Nor do studies of the constraints imposed by present Soviet demographic trends address this question in any depth.[1]

In contrast to Western analysts of Soviet affairs, social scientists in the USSR have given considerable attention to the consequences of aging. The Ninth International Congress of Gerontology convened in Kiev in 1972, and a number of major meetings on gerontology have been organized in the USSR during the past decade. Furthermore, sections devoted to the socioeconomic aspects of aging have been formed within various prestigious research institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences. All of this marks a change from an earlier, virtually exclusive Soviet interest in the physiological and biomedical dimensions of aging.

Concern over the growth of a pension-age population is not confined to academics, however. General Secretary Brezhnev himself noted, at the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971, that "pensioners . . . form a large group in our society [and] we act correctly if we take measures to more actively utilize their experience and energy in the realm . . . of labor activity." Brezhnev's words became a leitmotif in the speeches at the 25th Congress in 1976, as well as in the discussions of the 11th Five-Year Plan at the 26th Congress in February 1981.[2]

WHAT ACCOUNTS for this sudden interest in pensioners by the Soviet leadership? A glance at their numbers and the cost of pensions provides one explanation. On the eve of World War II, 8.9 percent of the USSR's population was of "normal" pension age (55 years for

[1] See, for example, Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors*, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1980; Valerie Bunce, *Do New Leaders Make a Difference?* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981; and Murray Feshbach, "Between the Lines of the 1979 Census," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1982, pp. 27–37.

[2] *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 31, 1971, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter *CDSP*), May 4, 1971, p. 2. For the 1976 Congress, see *Pravda*, Mar. 2, 1976, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 7, 1976, pp. 6–7; see also A. M. Rumyantsev, "An Important Problem," in A. M. Rumyantsev et al., *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiye problemy gerontologii* (Socioeconomic Problems of Gerontology), Tbilisi, AN Gruzinskoy SSR, 1956, p. 5. For the 1981 Congress, see *Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2–9, and Mar. 5, 1981, pp. 1–7, trans. in *Current Soviet Policies VIII*, Columbus, OH, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), 1982, p. 23.

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females, 60 years for males). By 1959 this proportion had risen to 12.2 percent, and by 1970 to 15 percent. Similar age breakdowns have yet to appear for the 1979 census. We know, however, that whereas only one in 15 individuals was 60 years of age or older in 1939, today the ratio stands at roughly one in eight. Interviews I conducted in the Soviet Union in 1981 put the share of the pension-age population in 1979 at 15.5 percent, a level corresponding to the 1975 projections made by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the US Department of Commerce.[3] In addition, women over 60 years of age—who are twice as likely as men to stop working upon reaching retirement age—outnumber their male contemporaries by more than two to one; this imbalance will persist until the end of the century.[4] Equally important, the percentage of pension-age population in the RSFSR (the Russian republic, which is the Soviet Union's political and economic heartland) had risen by 1979 from slightly below to slightly above the national average.[5]

Such an age profile has concrete ramifications for the Soviet Union's economy, if only because old-age pensions represent a growing burden on the national income. Partly as a result of the introduction of a uniform old-age pension scheme under Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, coupled with its extension to collective farmers (*kolkhozniki*) in 1964, old-age pensions in 1978 represented an outlay of 21.3 billion rubles, consuming one twentieth of the Soviet national income.[6] These outlays are expected to rise to 67–71 billion rubles by 1990 and 128–145 billion rubles by the year 2000. Such expenditures—currently nine percent of the economy's total wage bill—will consume twice this share by the end of the century. According to my own calculations, total outlays for old-age pensions will rise from 5.1 percent of Soviet national income in 1980 to 9.6–10.3 percent in 1985.[7]

Resources adequate to support such "entitled expenditures," Soviet-style, may not be easy to locate, especially in view of the stagnant Soviet economy. While the decline in younger age cohorts of the Soviet population is likely to reduce part of the dependency burden on social consumption funds (education, health, family allowances), it will only partially offset the growing cost of old-age pensions. Brezhnev's heirs might therefore have to choose among several difficult options: (1) to renege on the promises of the 1977 Constitution and the last party congress to *raise* the standard of living for all groups of the population, pensioners included; (2) to sacrifice improvements in living standards for the population as a whole simply in order to maintain *existing* support levels for a minority of old-age pensioners whose numbers are rapidly growing; (3) to cut back on defense expenditures or investment outlays elsewhere. The last two options appear the least palatable politically.

THE BURDEN of a growing pension-age population is linked to another problem facing the USSR, namely, the labor shortage. As Brezhnev's words indicate, old-age pensioners could be "more actively" utilized "in labor activity." In brief, the issue is whether significant numbers of non-working, old-age pensioners (NWP's) can be induced, cheaply and effectively, to become working pensioners (WP's). The diversity of assessments and recommendations regarding pensioners in the labor force found in the books reviewed here testifies to the existence of an implicit but nevertheless important, mid-level policy debate in the USSR. It is important to understand this debate, if only because its outcome will define some of the policy options for Brezhnev's successors.

Social theorists such as A. V. Dmitriyev (currently head of a laboratory within the Marxism-Leninism Institute of the Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences) depict older Soviet citizens primarily as a "productive stratum" for whom the "social problems of aging" can be resolved by prolonging their labor activity (*Social Problems of Elderly People,* p. 25). Proceeding from the premise that retirement is detrimental to both the individual and the economy, Dmitriyev marshals data to demonstrate that large numbers of the pension-age population are either working or want to work (80 percent of the males, 50 percent of the females, by his estimate). The data show that retirement is most widespread in industrial professions and that the "average" Soviet pensioner retires only after working three years beyond the age of pension eligibility (pp. 32–35, 41, 43–46). Out of ideological considerations ("from each according to his ability, to each according to his

[3] Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy, "Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *The Soviet Economy in a New Perspective,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 115; also, Yu. P. Lisitsyn and V. K. Ovcharov, "Public Health Tendencies and Research Tasks," *Sovetskoye zdravookhraneniye* (Moscow), August 1981, p. 17.

[4] Lisitsyn and Ovcharov, loc. cit., p. 17, suggest a higher female-male ratio in 1979 among pensioners, on the order of 2.7–3.5 to 1. The ratio for the population as a whole in 1979 was 1.14 to 1; see the table in Feshbach and Rapawy, loc. cit., p. 30.

[5] See the reviewed volume by A. G. Novitskiy and G. V. Mil', p. 18, and the A. V. Dmitriyev book, pp. 16, 18.

[6] Calculated on the basis of *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 g.* (National Economy of the USSR in 1979), Moscow, Statistika, 1980, p. 405; and Novitskiy and Mil', pp. 153–54.

[7] Calculated in current prices on the basis of: unpublished statistics of the State Committee on Science and Technology, 1977; *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Nov. 18, 1981, p. 2; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 g.* (National Economy of the USSR in 1980), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981, p. 379.

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work") as well as for pragmatic reasons, he questions whether more "material incentives" should be offered to pensioners to induce them to remain in the work force.

Dmitriyev raises the point because, after decades of vacillation, current regime policy provides that WP's in most occupational categories are eligible to receive their pension in whole or in part, plus their earned wages, up to a ceiling of 300 rubles per month total income, 120 rubles of which comes from the pension. Raising the combined ceiling would further increase the income disparity between older and younger workers performing the same work, thereby demoralizing the latter. On the other hand, raising the age of pension eligibility would constitute a politically embarrassing public admission of failure on the part of the Soviet welfare state. Furthermore, it would undoubtedly alienate the four fifths of all Soviet pensioners who, according to most surveys, regard the present retirement age as sacrosanct.[8]

For these reasons, Dmitriyev recommends the wider application of "nonmaterial incentives" to induce NWP's to work, including increased opportunities for part-time work, more flexible work-shift arrangements, increased use of "at home" labor (cottage industry), greater mechanization of industrial tasks, and unpaid summer vacations of two to three months (pp. 47–52). Although theoretically attractive, his suggestions run counter to common planning and labor practices in the USSR, which are geared to maintain and raise output levels with a minimum of disruption, new investment, or coordination problems.

Welfare economists such as M. S. Lantsev, of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, adopt a different approach. In his eyes, pensions represent a special form of economic distribution under socialism, that is, "social consumption outlays" which form part of a larger incomes policy over and above their utility as labor incentives. The record does show that the liberalization of old-age pension benefits as a form of welfare under Khrushchev can be held at least partially accountable for the dramatic decline in the proportion of WP's (from 60 percent in 1956 to 11 percent in 1964—see Table 1). But it also indicates that the pension-plus-wages scheme initially introduced in 1965—designed to increase the incomes of those pensioners still working—has led to a rise of WP's to the present level of almost one third of all pensioners (*The Economic Aspects of Social Security in the USSR,* pp. 34–42, 81–92).

Given this evaluation, it is not surprising that Lantsev recommends the maintenance of the existing system of material stimuli. In addition, he advocates increases in income incentives for WP's (presumably by raising the 300-ruble-per-month total income ceiling or by broadening the range of occupations in which WP's receive full pensions); and measures designed to delay pension claims by WP's in favor of higher future benefits (pp. 81, 86, 89–96). (With regard to the last, in January 1980, workers of pension age were given the option of receiving eventual pension increments of 10 rubles per month for every additional year worked, provided that drawing of the pension was delayed, up to a pension ceiling of 150 rubles.[9] However, Lantsev's major concern remains how to alleviate the burden of old-age pensions on the economy.

Table 1: Working Pensioners as a Percent of Total Old-Age Pensioners

Year	Percent of total
1956	59.0
1960	11.7
1962	9.2
1965	12.5
1970	19.0
1975	24.2
1979	27.8
1981	30.6

SOURCE: Calculated on the basis of A. G. Novitskiy and G. V. Mil', *Zanyatost' pensionerov: sotsial'no-demograficheskiy aspekt* (The Employment of Old-Age Pensioners: Social and Demographic Dimensions), Moscow, Finansy i statistika., 1981, p. 37; and M. Sonin, "A Picture of Working Life," *Nauka i zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 9, 1981, p. 21. In the 1970's, the proportion of old-age pensioners working was higher in large cities such as Moscow and Leningrad than the national average. See A. Z. Maykov and A. G. Novitskiy, *Problemy nepol'nogo rabochego vremeni i zanyatost' naseleniya* (Problems of Part-Time Work and Employment), Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1975, pp. 58–59.

Labor economists Novitskiy and Mil' advance yet another set of assessments and conclusions. Their evidence is designed to demonstrate that pensioners do represent an untapped source of manpower for the Soviet economy. They find this to be especially true in the beleaguered agricultural sector (where the pension-age population is one fourth of the total), as well as in consumer services and retail trade (*The Employment of Old-Age Pensioners,* pp. 77–88, 99). For example, according to survey data collected in 1973–74 and 1976–77 in the Russian republic, one third of all male NWP's from the service sector desire to continue working, as do a slightly smaller proportion of female NWP's (p. 74).

The Novitskiy-Mil' data also show

[8] For a list of occupational categories in which old-age pensioners can receive 50 percent, 75 percent, or 100 percent of their pensions together with a wage for working, see M. D. Solov'yeva and L. A. Yegorova, *Pensii rabotayushchim pensioneram* (Pensions for Working Pensioners), Moscow, Finansy, 1980, pp. 11–24. As a rule, engineers and technical specialists cannot draw full pensions; ordinary workers, mechanics, construction and transportation workers, and certain categories of medical and educational personnel can do so.

[9] A. G. Solov'yev, "Providing Incentives for Pensioners to Work," *Agitator* (Moscow), No. 23, December 1979, pp. 57–58.

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that while material incentives remain important in the decision to work or retire, the significance attached to working conditions ("social incentives") now outweighs that attached to financial advantage (p. 94).[10] On these grounds, the authors argue that "the chief focus of efforts geared to broadening employment . . . ought to be directed primarily toward improving the conditions of labor" (p. 98). For rural pensioners, they recommend enhanced development of rural service facilities providing employment opportunities, the use of WP's in processing facilities attached to collective farms, and the introduction of lower (and more variable) work norms for older *kolkhozniki*. In urban areas, the list of recommended changes includes job sharing and part-time work, economic incentives and pensioner employment quotas for industrial managers, and general improvements in working conditions in retail trade and consumer services (pp. 142–43, 153–68).

Other labor economists, however, remain skeptical of the manpower potential represented by pensioners. The most prominent among them is V. G. Kostakov of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). In the early 1970's, when the contribution of WP's to Soviet manpower resources was first broached, Kostakov noted that, for the most part, pensioners had only a primary education (75 percent in 1975), that their technical skills were invariably outdated (thus impeding a rise in labor productivity), and that their performance lagged behind that of younger workers.[11] In a 1979 publication, he reiterated his position that "working pensioners can scarcely increase Soviet labor reserves so that the national economy receives additional resources," again pointing to the lack of easily transferable skills and the disproportionate numbers of pension-age workers engaged in physical labor that was being phased out.[12]

The remaining two studies reflect an "individualist" as opposed to "structuralist" orientation, and thus discuss Soviet manpower needs only indirectly. Instead, they focus on the need to adapt the Soviet work environment to the highly diverse requirements of older individuals. The volume edited by D. F. Chebotarev underscores the importance of developing and applying accurate operational indicators for those auditory, visual, memory, and motor skills required for different occupations and professions. Such indicators would help to prevent what the Kiev-based Institute of Gerontology labels "premature professional aging." It would match older individuals to appropriate job slots by means of a two-track system of "job passports," i.e., a checklist of the demands placed on the worker by particular jobs, coordinated with "labor capacity evaluations," i.e., a format for assessing, with the help of medical personnel, the work-related abilities of each individual (pp. 45–91). Measures of this sort, if adopted, would move Soviet labor policy decisively in the direction of what Western specialists label "functional measures of aging," as opposed to the chronological measures presently used in the USSR and elsewhere.[13] However, functional measures are time-consuming to develop, are clumsy to administer, and necessitate far more decentralized and individually responsive personnel practices than either market or centrally planned economies presently encourage.

The sociological investigations presented in V. D. Shapiro's *The Pensioner* attest to the difficulty in designing a single, centrally administered "policy" for the Soviet aged which would retain them in the work force with a modicum of voluntary compliance (i.e., by using incentives rather than force). The use of survey data to shed light on the "personality characteristics" of Soviet pensioners reveals that: (1) the work/leisure choice is in large part a function of fundamental value differences between WP's and NWP's; (2) "situational" differences related to family circumstances, work environment, or income play a lesser role; and (3) work-versus-retirement decisions do not mirror each other. Only the decision to remain in the work force, and not the one to retire, reflects in substantial measure the impact of situational variables—income from a pension-plus-salary or the availability of part-time work—that are readily amenable to policy management (pp. 87–105). The conclusion of the Shapiro study—that personality values rather than responses to external incentives motivate work/retirement choices—can hardly be of much cheer to Kremlin leaders searching for ways to effectively mobilize Soviet pensioners for continued employment.

BEFORE DISCUSSING future policy options with regard to pensioners, it is instructive to explore how well

[10] For further discussion of Soviet survey results on the issue of incentives for WP's and NWP's, see the author's papers, "Retirement and Aging in the USSR," delivered at the Twelfth International Congress of Gerontology, Hamburg, Germany, July 1981; and "Working Pensioners in the USSR," delivered at the AAASS conference in New Haven, CT, October, 1979.

[11] V. Kostakov, "The Demographic Aspect of Predicting Labor Resources," in a work entitled *Naseleniye i trudovyye resursy* (The Population and Labor Resources), published in Moscow in 1973, cited in Novitskiy and Mil', p. 22; also, *Sovetskaya kul'tura* (Moscow), June 2, 1978, p. 6.

[12] V. Kostakov, *Prognoz zanyatosti naseleniya* (Predicting Employment), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1979, p. 86.

[13] See US Congress, Special Committee on Aging, *How Old is "Old"? The Effects of Aging on Learning and Working*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980; and Anne Foner and Karen Schwab, *Aging and Retirement*, Monterey, CA, Brooks-Cole, 1981, pp. 18–28.

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Soviet policies have performed to date in terms of creating a cohort of WP's. Who bears the cost of a situation in which most Soviets of pension age are retired rather than working, and how generously does the Soviet economic system currently support those whose active work life has ceased? Answers to these questions must invariably form part of any more general assessment of the "costs" of aging for the USSR in the 1980's; they also tell us how significant a factor the "graying of the USSR" will be for the "politics of stringency" that Seweryn Bialer and others posit for the coming decade.

In 1981, 30.6 percent of all Soviet pensioners worked either full- or part-time (see Table 1 above). Optimistic projections for 1990 hold that this figure could reach 60–75 percent, depending on the effectiveness of various policy initiatives.[14] It is useful to remember, however, that the present level of working pensioners reflects at least 15 years of concerted effort on the part of the regime to restore the level of employed pensioners to what had existed before retirement actually became a realistic option (with the introduction of increased pension benefits in 1956).

Currently, the vast majority of WP's are employed full time, with the proportion of those working at home (under 1 percent) or those with a reduced work day or week (0.3 to 1 percent) more or less constant since the early 1970's.[15] For both sexes, work-force involvement levels are highest during the first five years following legal retirement age. Fragmentary data suggest that these individuals remain concentrated mostly in low-skill, low-paying positions or service jobs.[16]

Nevertheless, Soviet writings stress the tremendous untapped labor potential of pensioners. One much-publicized statistic holds that fully 80 percent of all Soviet pensioners are capable of working full- or part-time for five years after reaching retirement age.[17] A prominent Soviet economist calculates that, even factoring part-time work and reduced productivity levels into the equation, WP's employed for a decade past retirement age could add 4 million man-years to Soviet labor reserves.[18] The Novitskiy-Mil' figures project 1.4 to 1.5 million additional workers in the Russian republic if appropriate incentives were provided (p. 171).

Such potential appears impressive, given Western estimates of a Soviet labor shortfall of 800,000 persons annually for the 11th Five-Year Plan (in effect until 1985) and 1.3 million persons annually for the second half of the 1980's.[19] Infusions of WP's could equal as much as half of the increment to the total able-bodied (working-age) population of the USSR for 1981–85 and 1986–90.[20] In the context of the labor shortfall figures given for the RSFSR in January 1980 (Novitskiy and Mil', p. 9), an infusion of WP's could even totally resolve the problem.

However, as suggested throughout this essay, obstacles to the expansion of the numbers of WP's remain numerous and real. My interviews suggest that the delayed pension benefits system introduced in 1980 enjoys little popularity so far, with only 0.01 percent of all WP's opting for the new arrangement. The reason probably lies in insufficiently attractive annual increments for delaying pension claims, coupled with a (still) quite low ceiling on total wage-plus-pension income.

Furthermore, letters in the press as well as the results of several surveys attest to a continued reluctance by Soviet employers to hire pensioners.[21] For example, even in the trade sector, which is confronted with chronic labor shortages, survey results indicate that one-fifth of all store managers flatly refuse to hire the aged, while the rest expect some material compensation from the state for the "risk" (lower productivity levels) of hiring them. Many Soviet factory managers also feel that older workers are more prone to absenteeism and illness, and to making demands on the factory's "social services," than their younger counterparts.[22]

All the same, the need to transform Soviet pensioners from pure "consumers" of welfare goods into some combination of producers and consumers will become increasingly acute for the next generation of leaders. The sheer bulk of pension costs must rise even as the standard of living of Soviet pensioners lags behind that of the rest of the population. To date, the real burden of the graying of the USSR has fallen on the aged themselves. While "official" published information show that the size of average monthly pensions varies considerably (in 1978, in a

[14] M. Sonin, "A Picture of Working Life," *Nauka i zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 9, 1981, pp. 21–22; Rumyantsev, loc. cit., p. 7.

[15] Novitskiy and Mil', p. 177; A. Z. Maykov and A. G. Novitskiy, *Problemy nepol'nogo rabochego vremeni i zanyatost' naseleniia* (Problems of Part-Time Work and Employment), Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1975, p. 60.

[16] L. M. Artem'yeva, "Economic and Statistical Aspects of the Employment of Old-Age Pensioners," in B. P. Belova, Ed., *Trudosposobnost' pensionerov po starosti* (The Work Capacity of Old-Age Pensioners), Moscow, TsIETIN, p. 141; V. Kogan, "Old People at Work," in D. Valentey, Ed., *Zdorov'ye pozhilykh lyudey* (The Health of the Elderly), Moscow, Statistika, 1978, p. 89.

[17] Sonin, loc. cit., p. 21; Novitskiy and Mil', p. 25; Rumyantsev, loc. cit., pp. 6–7.

[18] Sonin, loc. cit., p. 22.

[19] Feshbach and Rapawy, loc. cit., p. 151; US Central Intelligence Agency, *USSR: Some Implications of Demographic Trends for Economic Policies*, SR77-10012, Washington DC, January 1977, p. 3.

[20] Feshbach and Rapawy, loc. cit., p. 129.

[21] *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1976, p. 3; Novitskiy and Mil', p. 80.

[22] Novitskiy and Mil', p. 62; I. V. Bagrova, "Questions of Better Utilization of the Older Group of Labor Resources," in Rumyanstev, op. cit., p. 42.

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range of 76 to 100 rubles for urban workers), the pensions themselves would appear to be adequate.[23]

Unpublished statistics from Gosplan, however, tell a different story. They also do not hold much hope for a substantially rosier future. In 1980, the average monthly pension for urban blue-collar workers and employees stood at 70 rubles; it was scheduled to double by 1990 and triple by the end of the century. As a proportion of the average monthly wage, old-age pensions would thus rise from 41 percent of the total in 1980 to 54 percent over the next two decades. For collective farmers, average monthly pensions now amount to 42 rubles; these are projected to climb to 86–91 rubles by 1990 and to 148–169 rubles by the year 2000. However, compared to the mean pension for urban workers, rural pensions at present are only 60 percent as large and will still be but 75 percent as great by the turn of the century. Briefly summarized, the figures indicate: (1) current income replacement levels for pensioners fall considerably below the 61 percent officially claimed—and deemed by Soviet economists the minimum to ensure an "average" standard of living; (2) even under optimal conditions for 1990 and the year 2000, the average urban and rural pension will remain substandard in terms of income replacement (as measured by average monthly wage); (3) the rural elderly will continue to bear a disproportionate share of the burden, claims for equalization of urban-rural standards notwithstanding; and (4) the relationship between average pensions and average wages, which has worsened steadily since 1956 (when it stood at about 3:5), will improve only marginally over the coming decades.[24]

Under such conditions, it is hardly surprising that Soviet old people—especially the vast majority who do not work—constitute a large and growing burden on their families. Published accounts by economists of the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute reveal that the average pension of NWP's living with their families equals 44 percent of the per capita income of other family members; with a pooled budget (the rule in the Soviet Union), this reduces the per capita family income by 15–20 percent.[25] Since the families of NWP's already tend to cluster on the lower end of the socioeconomic ladder even without older dependents in their midst, inadequate pensions act as a further brake on economic mobility.

WHAT SHAPE are welfare proposals for the aged likely to take after Brezhnev? Since 1976, Soviet welfare economists have spearheaded a drive to gradually revamp the 1956 pension scale so as to raise overall support levels. Current recommendations for the 11th Five-Year Plan hold out the possibility that all pensions awarded before 1970 will be increased so as to equal at least 50 percent of the average pension level of 1976–80. The 12th Five-Year Plan should see the same procedure applied to all pensions awarded in 1970–80, with the average being calculated on the basis of pensions awarded in 1981–85. A third and final step, projected for 1991–95, is to revamp the 1956 pension scale so as to ensure a 10–15 percent increase across the board for all pensions henceforth. Indexing pensions to rising Soviet wage levels, while obviously the most equitable solution, has been rejected as too costly.

The Gosplan figures cited earlier testify to the utopian nature of such proposals, especially in light of the overall stagnation projected for the growth of the Soviet economy. This, together with demands for more investment capital to reindustrialize European Russia *and* develop Siberian resources *and* resolve the USSR's perennial agricultural dilemmas, suggests that any increase in Soviet welfare expenditures for older persons—beyond what is dictated by population aging itself—must take a back seat to a host of other economic problems.[26]

The only dependable patch of blue on the horizon for a new Politburo would seem to lie in adopting measures to widen work opportunities for pensioners "on the cheap," that is, by legislative and administrative fiat or through the imposition of age-specific employment quotas for managers. Material incentives or improvements in the work place appear too costly. Promoting the proliferation of pensioners-cum-wage earners would serve the dual purpose of raising individual incomes and simultaneously swelling the Soviet net material product through new labor inputs. From this perspective, the recom-

[23] Peggy Polk, United Press International transmission from Moscow, May 1, 1976; N. M. Pavlova and N. E. Rabkina, "Current Questions of Old-Age Insurance," in N. M. Rimashevskaya and I. L. Lakhman, Eds., *Dokhody i potrebleniya naseleniya* (Income and Consumption of the Population), Moscow, TsEMI, 1976, p. 60; V. Pozner, "Retirement in the USSR," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Dec. 12, 1978, p. 6; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 g.*, p. 394.

[24] For pension-wage ratios, see Pavlova and Rabkina, loc. cit., pp. 61, 79. Soviet sources do not publish distribution of pension amounts by decile or quartile of the pensioner population, although Pavlova and Rabkina indicate that, in 1972, 62 percent of all pensioners received pensions "in the neighborhood of" 45–60 rubles per month.

[25] N. Rabkina and N. M. Rimashevskaya, "Distribution Relations and Social Development," *EKO* (Novosibirsk) September-October 1978, pp. 16–32, trans. in *CDSP*, Dec. 20, 1978, pp. 46–47. See also N. Rimashevskaya, Ed., *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiye problemy blagosostoyaniya* (Socioeconomic Problems of Welfare), Moscow, TsEMI, 1976, p. 66.

[26] See Boris Rumer and Stephen Sternheimer, "The Soviet Economy: Going to Siberia," *Harvard Business Review* (Cambridge, MA), January-February 1982, pp. 16–38.

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mendations of labor economists such as Novitskiy and Mil' (more part-time work, flexible work scheduling, and so forth) would appear the most cost-effective in both individual and collective terms. However, current Soviet labor planning and welfare practices described earlier render this a long-term solution at best.

Moreover, such a strategy is fraught with problems, independent of any timetable for implementation. For example, the introduction of flexible work schedules and part-time employment, even if such prerogatives could be effectively denied to other groups, still runs the risk of shifting the pensioners already employed away from full-time, regularly scheduled jobs at the same time as additional, formerly non-working pensioners are attracted into the labor force. Other measures for mobilizing pensioners could also boomerang, unless policy instruments are skillfully aligned so as to maintain a delicate balance. Increases in pension levels would have an adverse effect on labor supply and a favorable effect on income, allowing pensioners to "buy" more leisure more cheaply. Increases in pre-pension wage levels could have the potentially contradictory effect of both increasing the demand for leisure as a normal economic "good" while simultaneously making leisure more expensive and thereby inclining those approaching pension age not to retire. By the same token, the recently announced Soviet agricultural program, with its increased stress on the utility of private-plot agriculture for industrial enterprises as well as collective farmers,[27] could well draw many WP's away from employment in urban services and retail stores, even as it provides new incentives for NWP's to again become involved in some kind of economic production.

In short, population aging in the USSR has created a Pandora's box of social, economic and political problems for the Soviet welfare state. Unless Mr. Brezhnev's successors are willing and able to wield a scalpel rather than an axe in the area of labor and welfare policy for the Soviet elderly, both increments in the work force and improvements in the material well-being of Soviet pensioners are likely to be elusive throughout the 1980's. In the meantime, the sort of muddling-through approach suggested by the Gosplan statistics cited earlier means that the force of economic necessity alone will foreclose the retirement option for substantial numbers of Soviet pension-age citizens.

[27] *Pravda*, May 25, 1982, p. 2.

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Notes & Views

Educating Soviet Central Asians

by Edward A. Allworth

Daniel Matuszewski's very useful essay in these pages on some recent prose by Soviet Central Asian writers, reports the fascination of those writers with the archeology and history of their Turkic forebears.[1] However, this polished literature, translated into or written in Russian, represents esthetic and intellectual accomplishment at the most rarefied upper level of today's Soviet Central Asian society. Consequently, it may have but limited potential to shape general public opinion and—with it—cultural, if not political, group identity. It must be seen in conjunction with the rather different influences exerted on the Central Asian nationalities of the Soviet Union at a less exalted level. An important example is the selection and use of indigenous literature in the classrooms, where a new generation is being educated.

Some indication of what is happening at this lower level among the nationalities of Soviet Central Asia is suggested by the article from a Tashkent newspaper mainly for primary and secondary school teachers translated below. In this article, an Uzbek educator, T. Niyazmetawä, advises her colleagues in the classroom use of the 1956 poem "From the Free East Am I," by the Tajik poet Mirza Tursunzadä.[2] The intent of this instruction seems clear: to foster a sense of political superiority and ethnic prejudice vis-à-vis "foreign" Central Asians living outside the borders of the USSR, that is, to rupture any sense of close identity with these non-Soviet kinsmen and coreligionists. This goal is furthered on the one hand by attempting to implant Marxist hostility toward capitalism and its middle and upper social strata and on the other by claiming that only *Soviet* Central Asians enjoy genuine freedom.

At first glance, the selection by T. Niyazmetawä or her superiors of this quarter-of-a-century-old poem by a Tajik establishment poet seems strange: given the marked decrease in Tajik-Uzbek bilingualism,[3] the poem had to be translated from the Iranian Tajik into Turkic Uzbek. However, there are compensations: coming from a Tajik source, the poem has no undercurrent of Uzbek ethnic identity. Moreover, reaching back to 1956 recaptures a time when verses and vocabulary were simpler, and the ideas conservative and unambivalent. Niyazmetawä refers to the language as "journalistic" and easily accessible for pupils 11 and 12 years old. Nevertheless, there is unintended irony in the short practice vocabulary in paragraph 8 of the article. More than half of those words have come into Uzbek from "alien" Arabic and Persian, supplying much-used synonyms used especially in literature.

In the years ahead, the pupils subjected to courses designed "to mobilize their entire being . . . for Communist society" will themselves begin to write and read literature. If this model lesson gives any clue to their eventual cast of mind, the taste for fiction among Soviet Central Asians in the 1990's and thereafter will very likely be formed around some future unreality rather

[1] Daniel C. Matuszewski, "The Turkic Past in the Soviet Future," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1982, pp. 76–82.

[2] Full text translated from Uzbek by Edward Allworth, © July 15, 1982, from *Oqituwchilär gäzetäsi* No. 69, Sept. 9, 1981, p. 3.

[3] Since the late 1920's, when most Tajiks were separated from the Uzbek SSR and formed their own union republic, bilingualism has steadily declined.

Mr. Allworth is Professor of Middle East Languages and Cultures and Director of the Program on Soviet Nationality Problems at Columbia University (New York, NY). He is the author and editor of many books on Soviet nationality affairs, with a special emphasis on Soviet Central Asia.

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than around the memory of the compelling past presented in the rich works by Askad Mukhtar, Mirmukhsin, Olhas Suleymenov, and Chingis Aytmatov that Daniel Matuszewski so sensitively reviewed.

From the Free East Am I
by T. Niyazmetawä

One of today's extremely important duties is especially to bring home to pupils the relentless ideological conflict existing between systems. Seen from that standpoint, the poem "Azad Shärqdän men" *(From the Free East Am I) included in the collection* Asiya awazi *[The Voice of Asia, 1956] by Mirza Tursunzadä (1911–1977), the eminent Soviet poet, Lenin Prize laureate, and Academician, occupies a special place. The poet created the poem, which was included in the 6th-grade reader, as a result of his impressions from a trip he made to the countries of the Near East.*

The poem is composed almost in a political, journalistic spirit. It has been aimed at revealing for readers the dialectic of the struggle going on among classes and among systems. In the initial first and second hours of lessons devoted to the poem, which is planned for three hours of instruction, a few facts will be supplied about Mirza Tursunzadä. They will show how he turned out to be a great Tajik Soviet poet; how he became a Lenin Prize winner, and how a film was made on the basis of his long poem "Häsän äräwäkäsh" [Hasan the Cart Driver]. His poem, "W. I. Leningä [To V. I. Lenin], which was studied in the 5th grade, will be memorized, and expressive reading and studying of the work will be taken up. In the second lesson, too, work on the text will be continued. And the third lesson will be devoted to analysis of the work. We shall provide a specimen of a lesson devoted to the analysis of the poem in this article.

Aim of the lesson: how, in the poem, ethnic groups of the Soviet eastern republics experience an abundant, fortunate, free, and unrestricted life; how unshatterable friendship among them is expressed; reveal for readers the difficult, hard life of ethnic groups in the foreign East, as well as compare the Soviet with the alien East.

Conduct of the lesson: 1. repeating and summarizing the previous theme; 2. explaining the new theme, a) introduction, b) reading or reciting for them the important parts of the poem from memory, c) analyzing the work and comparing it, citing examples, specifying artistic particulars, d) making increasing use of visual aids, e) guiding pupils' independent efforts, f) using a dictionary. 3. Consolidating the new theme—summarizing the lesson, rating the pupils' knowledge, assigning homework. In the lesson, using the method of looking into subjects and problems is advisable.

When making comparisons, in order to reveal characteristics of the foreign East and the Soviet East for them, the life of ethnic groups of the foreign East (even today they are living in difficult working conditions and in a bondage based on hard labor) and the one who has an abundant life—images of a Soviet person—will be clearly contrasted before the pupil's eyes.

*Of course, the pupil will, if only partly, become familiar with alien literature through films, television, radio, and press. Keeping that in mind, answers will be elicited from him to supplementary questions through reminders and emphasis. Visual aids prepared on the basis of that theme have great importance, especially in conveying the teacher's idea and the poem's concept to pupils. It can be developed as follows, according to tabular divisions: Section I: I (a Soviet person), a winner, proud, head high, happiness my companion, valuing a human life highly, a person of a country whose light floods the land of the sun. Section II: You (a foreigner) wan-faced, perplexed, shy, patient, prisoner of misfortunes, needy, always sunk in reveries, suffering torments in a dungeon, a martyr, an ethnic group that works for outsiders (*kelgindilär*), whose labor gives no satisfaction. Section III: I am a person whose native land is flooded with sunshine, who lives with the joy of labor, who dwells in a place of science and enlightenment that the surge of nature bestows. Section IV: You are an ethnic group that was trampled upon, that endures the grief of the era, that tasted the woe of property, one that longs for a vital existence, one that, when working, receives no satisfaction. Section V: I am a person of the Soviet East who, with labor, keeps on the road to the garden of happiness, who, "head held high," proud, wins victory in the struggles, who finds success through friendship, who raises aloft the banner of liberty. Section VI: But, you only now have entered the path of struggle, your patience and restraint gave out, you are a heroic person who emerged onto the field of battle.*

The idea the poet wished to express will be fully revealed for pupils through the verses as if it were arranged in illustrations. The distinction existing between the two Easts will find its own reflection.

While studying the poem, those efforts utilized in mastering all artistic works will be put into practice. For instance, efforts like working on the vocabulary, like copying into literary notebooks for themselves the artistic depictive materials and the words that demand some explanation will be carried out. In particular, words like:

[a—Arabic origin; f—Farsi-Tajik; t—Turkic-Uzbek.]

pinhan[f]—yäshirin[t] [secret, concealed]

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nigah[f] qilmaq[t]—qärämaq[t] [to look, observe]
häsäd[a]—kongli[t] qarälik,[t] qilalmäslik[t] [jealousy, hostility]
ziya[a]—nur[a] [light, ray]
afät[a]—bäkhtsizlik[ft] [calamity, misfortune]
bayat[a]—kuy,[t] qoshiq[t] [melody, song]
muättär[a]—khushboy[f] hidli[t] [aromatic, scented]
shäfäq[a]—quyash[t] nuridäd[ft] qizillik[t] tang[t] atish[t] wä[a] kun[t] batish[t] aldidä[t] hasil[a] bolädi[t] [dawn, the rose of sunrise, sundown]
läl[a]—qimmätbäha[af] tash[t] [ruby, precious stone]
muttasil[a]—daima[a] [uninterruptedly]
säda[a]—awaz[f] [sound, voice]
taptämaq[t]—basib[t] otmaq,[t] ayaq[t] asti[t] qilmag[t] [to trample]
inam[a]—sawghä[t] qilmaq[t] [to give, present]
iqbal[a] wä[a] näjat[a]—bäkht[f] wä[a] erkinlik[t] [success and salvation; luck and freedom]

M. Tursunzadä, in revealing for others so thoroughly the difference between the Soviet East and foreign East, has very productively utilized various methods: rhetorical questions, simile, and definition. The work's first section has been made up of questions put to a foreigner of the East. These queries are rhetorical questions that reflect the content of the work in themselves. Even though this section is in introductory form, it reveals for them the fundamental essence of the thought that the poet intends to express; the conditions peculiar to all sections are constantly evident. These queries instruct pupils to think and ponder.

*In the poem, M. Tursunzadä would seem to describe the Soviet East: "In my homeland (*diyar*), there is another sort of spring, /It is spring when a husband and wife appear to live happily." In so describing it, he especially emphasizes our country's nature and that it is full of beauty; he emphasizes the fact that victory is ever present, and gardens and flowerbeds are covered with blooms. Along with that, he particularly stresses, through the lines below, that for the country (*el-yurt*), gladness will constantly be spread from our Homeland's capital (*Wätän*), Moscow. He also stresses the Communist party's leadership: "The roads lead to great Moscow, Moscow always protects my people. The golden rays of the sun of life /Will shine from Moscow on the countries, it seems." In showing what fundamentally differentiates our Homeland from the foreign East, the analogies found in the poem do acquire special importance.*

The duty of finding special headings for every section of the poem may be burdensome for pupils; even so, it will be worthwhile. For example, for Section I, "Question"; for Section II, "Answer"; Section III, "My Country's Spring"; Section IV, "Inspirer of Victory"; Section V, "Grief-stricken Person"; Section VI, "Path of Struggle," and the like. As soon as the new theme is covered fully, the lesson will be consolidated. At this time the teacher, with the help of some questions, will determine the pupils' comprehension. Questions and assignments will be given on the basis of the textbook.

When assigning homework, the teacher may give supplementary exercises to the pupils. In particular: finding photographs that reflect the life of Near Eastern countries, and assembling pictures right alongside that reflect the life of the Soviet East; reading written materials up to the present that reflect the theme of the foreign East; finding specimens from the works of Uzbek authors that are devoted to the foreign East, and so on. Such independent assignments draw pupils into considerable searching and will broaden their mental horizon. In the course of analyzing the poem, a demonstration album on the theme "Two Worlds—Two Lives" is advisable.

*For shaping communist faith (*etiqad*) in pupils, for revealing the fundamental essence of thinking found amongst the existing systems to them, for conveying the incomparable superiority and humanitarianism of our socialist system to the pupil's consciousness, it is particularly necessary to explain the everyday creative activity of Soviet men. Only in that way will an individual consciously become trained, become one who will mobilize his entire being for the future, for Communist society, for the Homeland and the people, and who will contemplate the future with a spirit of confidence.*

*In the past, the Central Asian republics were considered one of the backward regions. In the era of the Soviet system, they developed intensively, flourished, bloomed, and got the name of the Soviet Union's "Eastern Gate" (*Shärq Därwazäsi*). The ethnic groups of Turkistan who became possessors of an unrestricted and abundant life style, under the leadership of V. I. Lenin and our glorious Communist party, found worldwide fame and glory. Nowadays, the East of the Soviets in a symbolic sense habitually speaks for the ethnic groups of the world. When Academician and poet M. Tursunzadä wrote the poem "From the Free East am I," he actually had those things in view.*

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Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment of matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors,
Problems of Communism,
US Information Agency,
1776 Pennsylvania Avenue NW,
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CHECKLISTING

TO THE EDITORS: The data offered on the Communist Party of Canada in Richard F. Staar's "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981" (*Problems of Communism,* March-April 1982) are accurate as they read. However, footnote "h" introduces an error, inasmuch as the total membership of all Communist groups in Canada is between 5,000 and 6,000.

ALAN WHITEHORN
Kingston, Ontario
Canada

TO THE EDITORS: I would like to offer some corrections to the listing for Mexico in the "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981."

First, the acronym PUSM is incorrect. The name of the party since the autumn of 1981 has been Partido Socialista Unificado de Mexico (PSUM). The PSUM was formed by a union of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), the Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR), the Mexican People's Party (PPM), and the Movement of Socialist Unity and Action (MAUS).

Second, the 18 seats you note having been won in the 1979 legislative elections were gained before the unified party was created. They represent, however, an electoral coalition formed to take advantage of the legal registry of the PCM, which its smaller allies did not enjoy. The actual breakdown following the 1979 election was: PCM—9 seats; PPM—5; PSR—3; and MAUS—1.

Finally, it is my impression that the 112,000 members that you list as "claimed" by the party only refers to the PCM's membership. The PSUM now claims in the press to have more than 200,000 members.

JOHN F. LEICH
Louisiana Tech University
Ruston, LA

TO THE EDITORS: I would like to suggest several corrections to the entry on Nepal in the "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981."

First, the article lists the *status* of the Nepalese Communist Party as legal. This is incorrect. The party system in Nepal was dissolved by the Royal takeover of 1960, and since then, all parties, including the Communists, are illegal.

Second, I have some doubt about the data the author has produced estimating the number of members in Nepal's Communist Party. The estimated number, 1,500 (which is stated to include pro-Chinese members) is vague and confusing, for it gives the impression that pro-Chinese Communists are opposition members inside a Moscow-oriented party. In order to avoid this confusion, it would be better to isolate the pro-Chinese group. This is the more important because, in Nepal, the highly factionalized pro-Beijing groups (some ten different groups exist) are far more significant than the pro-Moscow group (whose political influence is insignificant). In my view, the membership of the pro-Moscow Communist Party does not exceed more than 200, which would leave 1,300 (itself a very low estimate) for the multifactioned pro-Chinese groups.

CHITRA KRISHNA TIWARI
Tribhuvan University
Kathmandu, Nepal

TO THE EDITORS: I found the "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981" extremely informative. The only aspect that I would criticize is in the section dealing with the Communist parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, on page 73. In the column headed "Percentage of votes; seats in legislature" it is stated that for all these countries the Communist party holds *all* the seats in the appropriate legislature. I would debate this point, for in some of these states, the Communist party shares the seats in the legislature with other parties, making up what is often called a National Front or National Bloc. For example, in the German Democratic Republic, the (Communist) Socialist Unity Party (SED) has only 127 seats; the Christian Democratic Union, the National Democratic Party of Germany, the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany and the Democratic Peasants' Party of Germany have 52 seats each; and various "mass organizations" (e.g., the Free German Youth—FDJ) have the remainder of the 500 seats. Of course, in all cases these other parties and groupings have a strictly limited role, but I feel that their existence should be recognized. The Soviet Union, by contrast, is a one-party state in the strict sense of the term, as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union rules alone.

There is no doubt that in all the countries of Eastern Europe, the Communist party, in whatever guise, is the supreme source of power. Nevertheless, I think that the subtle differences between states should be recognized.

WILLIAM J. READ
Stafford, England

TO THE EDITORS: In the "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981," the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) was attributed many more members than it actually has. The Checklist mentioned 25,000 members in 1981. However, Franz Muhri, Chairman of the KPÖ, indicated in an inter-

CORRECTION

In the article "Moscow and Mitterrand" (*Problems of Communism,* July-August 1982) the last sentence of the first full paragraph on page 24 should read:

> As far as Moscow was concerned, Washington in the 1970's "was forced to treat France as the catalyst of West European separatism."[10]

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view in March 1981 that the party has 16,000 members (see the KPÖ's Vienna daily *Volkstimme*, Mar. 29, 1981). The May 13, 1982, issue of the East German periodical *Neuer Weg* reported an even lower 15,000 members in the KPÖ.

KURT SELIGER
Vienna

MR. STAAR REPLIES: I welcome the updated information and corrections offered by the readers.

A letter from James Nelson Goodsell of Boston, MA—contributor of the *Yearbook's* section on Mexico—responding to Mr. Leich correctly noted that the misspelling of the acronym for the unified leftist party in Mexico was inadvertently introduced in the production process, and that the party initials should, indeed, be PSUM. Mr. Goodsell added:

As to the listing of 18 seats as being won by the Mexican Communist Party, this is technically correct, since all 18 were registered as members of the PCM to qualify for the election. At the same time, the reader's breakdown of the actual party allegiances of the 18 is correct.

Finally, on membership totals, the 112,000 figure was given in November 1981 by the directorate of the new unified party. The reader is correct in noting that the directorate now, in mid-1982, claims "at least 201,000 members."

A letter from Barbara J. Reid, of Earlysville, VA—contributor of the *Yearbook's* section on Nepal—welcomed Chitra Krishna Tiwari's "constructive" comments and noted:

The reader was quite correct in pointing out that the Nepalese Communist Party is not legal; this was an inadvertent error. In connection with party membership, a clearer picture would probably be provided by differentiating between the pro-Moscow and the pro-Chinese groups. The membership figure in the table should have been revised to accord with the higher estimate in the narrative of the Yearbook.

With regard to the letter from Mr. Read, the issue of the electoral representation of Communist parties in East European legislatures is a complex one, by and large unmanageable within the confines of a simple table.

Mr. Read is, of course, correct in noting the existence of "other" parties in all the East European Communist states and significant representation of these parties in national legislatures. It is our understanding, however, that all these other parties and groupings gain election by participation in one or another form of Communist-dominated front. The percentage of the vote and representation in the legislature shown in the 1981 "Checklist" were for these front organizations.

In past years, we have listed the formal representation of the Communist parties in their respective legislatures. This, too, offered its own touch of unreality, giving the impression that the Communist party was a minority influence in some of the East European legislatures.

RICHARD F. STAAR

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